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COURTS GONE “IRRATIONALLY BIASED” IN FAVOR
OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT?—ENFORCING
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN STANDARDIZED
APPLICATIONS AND MARGINALIZING CONSUMERPROTECTION, ANTIDISCRIMINATION, AND STATES’
CONTRACT LAWS: A 1925–2014 LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
WILLY E. RICE*
ABSTRACT
Spanning nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has issued multiple
decisions and stated categorically that “judicial hostility to arbitration”
was the sole impetus behind Congress’s decision to enact the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. In fact, before the FAA, systemic trade-specific problems
and practices generated heated disputes and widespread litigation among
merchants and trade organizations. Thus, to arrest those constituents’ concerns, Congress enacted the FAA. Briefly, under the FAA section 2, arbitration is mandatory if a contractual arbitration provision is valid and a
controversy “arises out of the contract.” However, common-law rules of contract formation are equally clear: Standing alone, standardized-preprinted
application forms are not valid contracts; thus, they not enforceable. Yet,
megacorporations, international holding companies, and international financial-services corporations are increasingly fashioning standardized application forms—which contain mandatory arbitration clauses. Put simply, the
consequences of such practices are severe: Before contracts are formed, applicants for goods, services and employment—ordinary consumers and workers as well as small-business owners, start-up entrepreneurs and prospective
franchisees—are forced to relinquish their rights to litigate common-law
and statutory claims in state and federal courts. Even more unsettling, a
judicial split has evolved: Most federal courts enforce arbitration clauses in
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applications and a majority of state courts do not. Based on the compelling
and unexpected legal, empirical and statistical findings surrounding the
dispositions of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts, the
Article encourages Congress to address the concerns raised here and
enact the recently proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2014.
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INTRODUCTION
By several measures, Mitchill v. Lath1 and Lucy v. Zehmer2 are “classic
contract” cases.3 For nearly sixty years, they have been prominent opinions in
the overwhelming majority of contract-law casebooks.4 Quite simply, many
law professors—who teach first-year students—rely heavily on Mitchill
and Lucy to help explain several foundational principles of contract law.
Among other reasons, Mitchill and Lucy are celebrated because the facts in
both cases are remarkably familiar and captivating. In addition, those uncomplicated facts help budding jurists to understand arguably the more
complex and less exciting principles of contract of law.
First, consider the most prominent and intriguing facts in Lucy v. Zehmer.
Welford Ordway Lucy (Lucy) and John C. Lucy were brothers, lumbermen
and farmers.5 They resided in Dinwiddie County, Virginia.6 Adrian Hardy
Zehmer (Zehmer) and Ida S. Zehmer—husband and wife—lived in McKenney, Virginia—where they “operated a restaurant, filling station and motor
court.”7 Additionally, the Zehmers owned the Ferguson Farm—approximately 472 acres of land in Dinwiddie County.8
On a wintry evening in December 1952, Lucy and his employee visited
Zehmer’s restaurant.9 “Lucy took a partly filled bottle of whiskey into the
1

160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
3
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Toward a Prudential and Credibility-Centered Parol
Evidence Rule, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 271 (2000) (employing “the classic case of Mitchill v.
Lath to contrast ... Willistonian[’s] ... four corners [doctrine] ... with Corbin’s [prior-agreements evidence rule to determine] whether [certain] evidence is admissible”); Jean Fleming
Powers, Promissory Estoppel and Wagging the Dog, 59 ARK. L. REV. 841, 881 (2007) (“The
parol evidence rule cases especially show how promissory estoppel can be used to undercut a
longstanding rule. Consider the classic case of Mitchill v. Lath.”); Lawrence M. Solan,
Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 381 (2007) (explaining that Lucy v.
Zehmer is one of the “classic cases” used to demonstrate the “objective theory of contracts”).
4
See Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile: Restoring the Original Parameters of
Exclusive Reproduction, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 215, 242 n.117 (2006) (noting that Lucy
v. Zehmer “is a fixture of many law school Contracts casebooks”); Douglas L. Leslie,
How Not To Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course: Powerpoint, Laptops, and the Casefile
Method, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1289, 1300 (2000) (commenting on the “frequency with which
Lucy v. Zehmer” appears in contracts casebooks); Barak Richman & Dennis Schmelzer,
When Money Grew On Trees: Lucy v. Zehmer and Contracting In A Boom Market, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1511, 1515 (2012) (presenting evidence to support that assertion that Lucy v. Zehmer
is a famous contract case that appears in first-year contract casebooks); see also WILLY E.
RICE, CONTRACT LAW: PRACTICE, INTERPRETATION, AND ENFORCEMENT 87, 469 (2014).
5
Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 517–18.
6
Id. at 517.
7
Id. at 518.
8
Id. at 517.
9
Id. at 518.
2

410

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:405

restaurant ... for the purpose of giving Zehmer a drink.”10 After Lucy and
Zehmer consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, the following exchange occurred:
Lucy: “I bet you wouldn’t take $50,000 for [Ferguson Farm].”
Zehmer: “Yes, I would too; you wouldn’t give fifty.”
Lucy: “[Yes. I] would. ... [W]rite up an agreement to that effect.”11

Zehmer secured a restaurant check and wrote the following on the back:
“We ... agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for $50,000,
title satisfactory to buyer.”12 Both Zehmers signed the “memorandum” and
gave it to Lucy.13 In response, Lucy offered $5 for the Zehmers’ signatures.14
But Zehmer refused that offer and stated: “You don’t need to give me any
money, you got the agreement there signed by both of us.”15 “Lucy left the
premises insisting that he had purchased the farm.”16 The Zehmers disagreed, and Lucy sued for specific performance.17
In their answer, the Zehmers raised several defenses: (1) Lucy’s
$50,000 offer “was made in jest”;18 (2) Zehmer “did not deliver the memorandum to Lucy ... [who simply] picked it up [and] put it in his pocket”;19
(3) Zehmer refused to accept Lucy’s $5 offer after realizing that Lucy was
serious;20 (4) Zehmer “had no intention of selling the farm, [because] the
whole matter was a joke”;21 (5) Zehmer claimed that he “was high as a
Georgia pine” during the transaction;22 and, (6) Lucy and Zehmer were
just “two doggoned drunks bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and
say the most.”23
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the Zehmers’ defenses—declaring that the simple memorandum of understanding was a binding contractual agreement.24 Ultimately, the supreme court ordered the Zehmers
10

Id.
Id.
12
Id. at 517–18.
13
Id. at 518.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 517.
18
Id. at 517–18.
19
Id. at 518.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 520.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 522 (“[T]he writing signed by the defendants and ... by the complainants was the
result of a serious offer by Lucy and a serious acceptance by the [Zehmers], or was a serious
11
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to sell the farm to Lucy and his brother.25 The sale was ordered, even though
only a few words appeared in a short, unsophisticated memorandum of understanding. Even more importantly, the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed
several extremely important principles of contract law: (1) “An agreement
or mutual assent is ... essential to a valid contract”;26 (2) “[t]he mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the formation of a contract”;27 and,
(3) “[an offeror may not assert] that he was merely jesting when his conduct
and words would warrant a reasonable [offeree to believe that the offeror
was presenting] a real agreement.”28
Twenty-six years before the Virginia Supreme Court decided Lucy, the
New York Court of Appeals decided Mitchill v. Lath.29 The controversy in
Mitchill also concerned whether the specific performance was warranted
under an allegedly bargained-for contract.30 Consider the simple facts in
the case. Charles Lath and his business partner owned a farm and wanted to
sell it.31 Lath also owned an icehouse.32 The latter sat on Lieutenant Governor
Lunn’s land, which was directly across the road in front of Lath’s land.33
Standing on Lath’s land, one could see the icehouse.34
Catherine Mitchill approached Lath, looked at Lath’s farm and decided
to make a purchase.35 But there was a condition precedent: she wanted Lath
to remove the icehouse on the Governor’s land, because “the icehouse [was]
objectionable.”36 Accepting the condition, Lath “orally promised” to remove
the icehouse.37 Lath’s oral, stand-alone promise was given as consideration
offer by Lucy and an acceptance in secret jest by the [Zehmers] .... [I]n either event, it constituted a binding contract of sale between the parties.”) The supreme court also outlined
other reasons for rejecting the Zehmers’ defenses: (1) “Zehmer was not intoxicated to the
extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument he
executed”; (2) “Zehmer was not too drunk to make a valid contract”; (3) Lucy believed that
Zehmer’s offer was “a serious business transaction” rather than “a joke”; (4) “Zehmer
[never] indicated to Lucy by word or act that [Zehmer] was not in earnest about selling the
farm”; and (5) “[t]here was no fraud, no misrepresentation, no sharp practice and no dealing
between unequal parties.” Id. at 520–22.
25
Id. at 522–23.
26
Id. at 522.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See id. at 516; Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 646 (N.Y. 1928).
30
See Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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for Mitchill’s contractual promise to purchase Lath’s farm.38 Therefore,
“[relying upon Lath’s oral promise, Mitchill executed] a written contract to
buy the property for $8,400.”39
As activities progressed, Mitchill received the deed and took possession of the farm, intending to use it as a summer residence.40 To help achieve
the latter goal, Mitchill “spent considerable sums [of money to improve] the
property.”41 However, one unexpected development prevented Catherine’s
residential plan from coming to fruition: Lath breached the oral, stand-alone
promise and refused to remove the icehouse.42 Catherine commenced an
action for specific performance in a court of equity.43
Before the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, Lath advanced the
parol evidence rule as an affirmative defense.44 Simply stated, the parol evidence rule places limitations on parties’ contractual obligations and/or prevents parties from tampering with totally integrated, written contracts.45
Justice Andrews wrote the opinion in Mitchill, and he reaffirmed a settled
principle of contract: generally, oral testimony will not alter or contradict
the terms of a written contract.46 Of course, there is an exception to the rule: if
parties intentionally fashion one agreement wholly or partly as consideration
for a second and simultaneous agreement, the two are “necessarily bound together.”47 Whether a bond between two agreements is sufficiently close,
however, can become a major dispute—like the controversy in Mitchill.
In the end, Justice Andrews declared that Mitchill and Lath’s written,
real-estate contract was “a full and complete agreement, setting forth in detail
the obligations of each party.”48 To reach that conclusion, Justice Andrews
observed: if the parties had fashioned an “icehouse agreement,” it would
most naturally appear in the real-estate contract.49 Yes. The oral “icehouse
agreement” was “closely related to the subject ... in the written agreement.”50
38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
46
See Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646–47.
47
See id. at 647 (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 637 (1920)).
48
Id. at 647.
49
Id. (“The presence of the icehouse, even the knowledge that Mrs. Mitchill thought it
[was] objectionable, would not lead [one to believe] that a separate agreement existed with
regard to it.”).
50
Id.
39
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However, the oral, stand-alone promise was a collateral agreement; therefore, Catherine could not introduce it as evidence of an enforceable contractual obligation.51
Each September, for nearly a quarter of a century, the author has witnessed a remarkable phenomenon: Interesting cases like Lucy and Mitchill
encourage first-year law students to fashion exceptionally intelligent, novel,
thought-provoking and commonsensical questions. To illustrate, consider
an alleged incident that nearly wrecked the life of a twenty-seven-year-old
law student (“Jessica”).52 Six years before entering law school, Jessica
applied for an apartment in an “upscale-50-plus-residential community.”53
The two-page, standardized application form contained six paragraphs.54
One paragraph was a mandatory-arbitration clause.55 The latter provision
banned all trial-by-jury and trial-by-judge lawsuits—requiring tenants to
arbitrate all constitutional rights, common law, and civil rights disputes
before private arbitrators.56 Jessica allegedly “forgot to complete and sign
the application.”57 Still, the associate-female manager told Jessica: “Don’t
worry about it.”58 Ultimately, Jessica signed a one-year lease.59 The contract, however, did not contain a mandatory-arbitration provision.60
A few months after Jessica moved into her apartment, the senior male
manager allegedly wanted “to spend time” with Jessica and her new baby.61
Jessica, however, refused the manager’s “romantic and fatherly advances.”62
In response, the senior manager allegedly harassed Jessica—“making [her]
life hell on earth.”63 Later, the same manager forced Jessica to vacate the
apartment, allegedly asserting: “You and your illegitimate child are trespassers. You are not 50-years-old. Leave!”64
51

Id. (“The collateral agreement was made with [Mrs. Mitchill]. The contract of sale was
[made] with her husband .... [N]o assignment of it from him appears. Yet the deed was given
to her. It is evident that ... a transaction in which she was the principal from beginning to
end [occurred]. We must treat the contract ... as it was in fact, made by her.”).
52
E-mail from Former First-year Law Student to Author (Nov. 3, 2009, 5:53 PM, CST)
(on file with author). In oral conversations, the student revealed the material details—
those reported in this Article—about her experiences.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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The then-twenty-one-year-old Jessica contacted an attorney, who concluded that she had viable claims under several federal statutes: The Fair
Housing Act of 1968,65 the Civil Rights Act of 1866—sections 198166 and
1982,67 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1974.68 Furthermore, the attorney
reported that Jessica probably had sound common law assault and breach
of contract claims.69 On several occasions, Jessica considered filing a
multi-action lawsuit against the senior-male manager and the residential
community.70 In the end, however, she vacated her apartment and decided
not to sue.71
When the twenty-seven-year-old Jessica entered law school, she read
Lucy and Mitchill. And, in the course of events, she raised three questions:
(1) whether her former fifty-plus standardized apartment application was
an enforceable memorandum of understanding—like the controversial
memorandum in Lucy v. Zehmer; (2) whether her uncompleted and unsigned lease application was a binding contract, (3) whether the mandatoryarbitration clause in her defunct apartment application was enforceable,
absent probative evidence of any bargained-for exchange consideration;
and (4) whether—under the parol evidence rule—the provisions in her
uncompleted and unsigned application could have altered or amended the
terms in her signed lease agreement.72
To be sure, during Jessica’s tenure in law school as well as today, state
and federal courts are still grappling with each question. For example,
preliminary agreements appear in many forms.73 Consequently, judicial
65

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012) (outlawing housing discrimination under Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
66
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.”).
67
Id. § 1982 (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.”).
68
42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012) (“[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
69
E-mail from Former First-year Law Student, supra note 52.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 14.
72
Id.
73
RICE, supra note 4, at 76–77 (outlining some familiar preliminary agreements—
“memoranda of understanding,” “earnest money agreements,” “deposit receipts,”
“temporary insurance binders,” “conditional binding receipts,” “letters of intent,”
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splits continue to evolve over whether parties’ precontractual agreements are
valid and enforceable contracts.74 Such conflicts persist even though a rich
body of law has developed to answer the question: whether a memorandum
of understanding is an enforceable contract.75 Moreover, even assuming that
standardized application forms are not memoranda of understanding or preliminary agreements, one is still left with a pressing question: whether a
signed or an unsigned completed application is a valid and legally enforceable contract.
The latter question continues to be timely and important for two reasons.
First, like preliminary agreements, standardized application forms are ubiquitous.76 Furthermore, there are many types: applications for goods, services,
employment, membership, prizes, housing as well as applications for one’s
gaining admission to a multitude of programs and institutions.77 Arguably,
“commitment letters,” and “agreements in principle”); see also Global Seafood Inc. v.
Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing a less familiar
preliminary agreement entitled “heads of agreement.”); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v.
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing letters of intent and
commitment letters).
74
See, e.g., Columbia Park Golf Course, Inc. v. City of Kennewick, 248 P.3d 1067,
1080 (Wash. App. 2011) (Korsmo, J., dissenting) (“Courts across the country, and commentators as well, are split on the enforceability of agreements that contemplate future
agreements.”); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 662 (2007) (“For decades, there has
been substantial uncertainty regarding when the law will impose precontractual liability ....
Courts have divided ... over the question of liability when parties make reliance investments
following a ‘preliminary agreement.’ A number of modern courts impose a duty to bargain in good faith on the party wishing to exit such an agreement. Substantial uncertainty
remains, however, regarding when this duty attaches and what the duty entails.”); cf.
Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Parties to
proposed commercial transactions often enter into preliminary agreements, which may
provide for the execution of more formal agreements. When they do so and the parties
fail to execute a more formal agreement, the issue arises as to whether the preliminary
agreement is a binding contract or an unenforceable agreement to agree.”).
75
See infra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
76
Cf. Alison Doyle, How Many Applicants Are There for Each Job Opening (Aug. 18,
2013),
http://jobsearch.about.com/b/2013/08/18/the-number-of-job-applications-per-open
ing.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P7R5-9JPR (“Google, the
company where just about everyone would love to work, gets over a million job applications
each year and reportedly only hires .4 –.5% of applicants. Last year, Walmart reportedly received 5 million applications. Depending on the time of the year, there are 15,000–50,000
job openings at Walmart.”).
77
See, e.g., Cathie A. Shattuck, The Tort of Negligent Hiring and the Use of Selection
Devices: The Employee’s Right Of Privacy and the Employer’s Need to Know, 11 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 2, 6 (1989) (reporting that “most companies use general application forms”); J. Craig
Wallace, Mary G. Tye & Stephen J. Vodanovich, Applying for Jobs Online: Examining
the Legality of Internet-Based Application Forms, 29 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 497, 500
tbl.2 (2000).
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absent the widespread use of standardized applications, face-to-face transactions and interviews would increase dramatically. In turn, efficient operations of most small-to-large institutions, industries and professions would
probably decrease substantially and business costs would increase.78
Therefore, given the ubiquity and use of applications forms, disputes
over whether such forms create legal rights or obligations are exceedingly
common. But consider the pressing question in this Article: whether the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA)79 governs the enforceability of arbitration clauses in standardized application forms? Without doubt, this
question has generated serious splits between and among federal and state
courts.80 Furthermore, as discussed later and more extensively in this Article,
the Supreme Court has fashioned extremely liberal policies—those favoring
the enforcement of mandatory-arbitration provisions in binding contracts
as well as in non-binding instruments.81
Even more disquieting, all too many inferior state courts as well as federal
courts have embraced and applied the Supreme Court’s “liberal” arbitration policies—without seriously questioning the wisdom of such policies.82
And in the wake, two adverse consequences have developed: (1) federal
courts routinely ignore or refuse to weigh carefully and intelligently states’
settled principles of contract law when deciding whether to coerce applicants into binding arbitration; and (2) the Supreme Courts’ admittedly and,
arguably, excessively pro-arbitration bias has encouraged lower courts to
marginalize or ignore consumer protection, antidiscrimination, and civil
rights laws, when the latter tribunals are considering whether to enforce
arbitration clauses in standardized application forms.83
Unquestionably, a few commentators have sounded the alarm—questioning the wisdom of courts’ willingness to enforce mandatory-arbitration
provisions in applications.84 Those discussions, however, have been fairly
78

But see James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679,
1684 (1991) (“Law schools have you fill out lengthy application forms which require you
not only to provide your GPA and your LSAT score, but also to describe your unique
abilities and experiences, and the ways in which you might add to the rich fabric of the
law school class. It takes you about eighty hours to fill out each of these forms .... When
the law school receives your application, it banks your check, adds up your GPA and your
LSAT, and throws the rest of the application away.”).
79
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
80
See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
81
See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
82
See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
83
See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
84
See Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues In Employment Arbitration, 44
BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 444–45 (2006) (discussing a single case involving the enforceability
of an arbitration clause in an employment application); Richard A. Bales and Sue Irion, How
Congress Can Make A More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081,
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brief—appearing essentially as statements or conclusion in the literature.85
Certainly, the FAA covers enforceable contracts.86 But, completed and signed
application forms generally are not contracts under state laws.87 Like many
memoranda of understanding, applications are simply unenforceable written representations or preliminary agreements. Moreover, the FAA’s “savings clause” instructs courts to weigh states’ contract laws and equitable
principles extremely carefully before deciding to enforce arbitration clauses
in contracts.88
Without a doubt, the question—whether courts should enforce arbitration
provisions in standardized applications—is timely and important. Yet, this
question has received surprisingly little serious research and legal analysis.
Therefore, the purpose of this Article is to present a comprehensive and an
interdisciplinary—historical, legal, empirical and statistical—explanation
of the pressing and general question: whether federal and state courts are
equally more or less likely to apply section 2 of the FAA and enforce
mandatory-arbitration clauses in standardized application forms? There is,
of course, an equally important auxiliary question: whether state and federal courts allow legal as well as extralegal factors to influence decisions
to enforce or not enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications?
Part I begins the discussion by presenting an extremely brief review of
several common law rules regarding the following: (1) the formation of a
valid contract, (2) bargained-for consideration and the enforcement of a valid
contract, (3) the enforceability of memoranda of understanding and other
preliminary agreements, (4) the applicability of the parol evidence rule, and
(5) the enforceability of applications for products, services, employment,
residential and commercial tenancy, admissions, and membership in various associations, organizations and institutions.
Part II presents an even shorter review of disgruntled applicants’ federal
and state statutory theories of recovery. Fairly often, in their underlying
lawsuits, applicants allege that defendants violated one or a combination
1088–90 (2009) (citing three employee application forms cases and briefly proposing
ways to make the FAA more equitable); Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and
Fairness In The Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 114–15
(2010) (briefly reporting four courts’ decisions in cases involving the enforcement of
arbitration clauses in employee’s application forms); Linda M. Lasley, Keith Maurer &
H. Wesley Sunu, Recent Developments In Alternative Dispute Resolution, 41 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 123, 133 (2006) (reporting—without providing an analysis—a single
Sixth Circuit dispute over whether an arbitration clause in an employment application
was enforceable).
85
See articles cited supra note 84.
86
See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
87
See infra Part I and accompanying notes.
88
See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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of federal and state consumer protection, civil rights and/or antidiscrimination laws.89 In those same underlying lawsuits, defendants file motions to
compel the applicants/plaintiffs to arbitrate the disputed claims before a
private arbitrator.90 On other occasions, defendants initiate declaratory judgment actions in courts of equity and file motions to compel arbitration.91
Still, in other instances, defendants file motions only after applicants have
commenced underlying antidiscrimination, consumer protection or civil
rights lawsuits in courts of law, and served copies of their complaints.92
Briefly put, the discussion in Part II is a necessary prerequisite for understanding the more troublesome and prevalent judicial conflicts, which are
discussed in Part IV of this Article.
Part III discusses the debate surrounding the actual and purported purposes of FAA section 2—the primary focus of this Article. That section has
repeatedly fostered numerous motion to compel arbitration disputes involving the following questions: (1) whether an arbitration clause in a standardized application form qualifies as a “written provision in a contract” under
89

See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259
(11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting district court’s ruling that denied defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration and stay judicial proceedings in an employment religious discrimination action);
Maddox v. USA Healthcare-Adams, L.L.C., 350 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975 (M.D. Ala. 2004)
(granting, without ruling on the merits of plaintiff’s claims, defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration and stay the proceedings in an employment age discrimination action).
91
See, e.g., Wyatt v. Virgin Islands, 385 F.3d 801, 803–04 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting
defendant’s petition for declaratory relief by declaring that the applicant for employment
did not agree to resolve all disputes in an arbitral forum or forego substantive rights);
Whittington v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc., No. 10-cv-01884-KMT-MEH, 2011 WL 1772401,
at *6 (D. Colo. May 10, 2011) (“Although Defendants’ motion is styled as a motion to
compel arbitration, Defendants’ reply suggests that what Defendants seek is in fact a
declaratory judgment regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as it exists
in Taco Bell job applications .... The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, ‘[in] a case
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States ... may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).”); see
also Gardner v. Ryan’s, No. 1:01CV00030, 2001 WL 1352113, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31,
2001) (“The plaintiff, Charissa Gardner, brought this action alleging racial discrimination
by her employer in violation of her rights secured by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). Gardner also sought a
declaratory judgment as to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement ... signed by the
plaintiff as part of her employment application. The defendant, Ryan’s Family Steak Houses,
Inc. ... has moved to dismiss the action, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings and compel
arbitration in accord with the [a]greement.”).
92
See, e.g., Ives v. Ramsden, 174 P.3d 1231, 1238–39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a defendant waived his right to arbitration when he moved to stay the action to
allow the parties to arbitrate only after three years and four months elapsed since filing of
the complaint).
90
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section 2 of the FAA; (2) whether applicants’ antidiscrimination, civil rights
and harassment claims “arose out of” an enforceable arbitration clause in
an employment contract, or “arose out of” an unenforceable employmentapplication form; (3) whether an applicant’s consumer-protection claims
“arose out of” an arbitration clause in a financial services contract or “arose
out of” an unenforceable application for services; and (4) whether a party’s
failure to prove sufficient and bargained-for exchange consideration precludes the enforcement of an arbitration clause in preprinted application
form. These specific questions have generated judicial splits, which are discussed in Part IV.
Once more, it is important to stress: many federal and some state courts
routinely cite and apply FAA section 2 and enforce arbitration clauses in all
sorts of applications for employment, services, goods, benefits and memberships.93 Under the common law, however, standardized and stand-alone
applications are not valid and enforceable contracts.94 Even more importantly, a large body of congressional and historical evidence exists to support
two assertions: (1) Congress never intended for the FAA section 2 to marginalize or preempt state principles of contract law; and (2) Congress never
envisioned for the FAA section 2 to govern the enforceability of arbitration
clauses in standardized application forms.95 Part III presents the historical
and congressional evidence.
Finally, Part V presents a case study. The reported findings are based
on an analysis of approximately one thousand federal and state court cases.
More specifically, Part V outlines and discusses the substantive and procedural dispositions of motion to compel arbitration disputes—those involving
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in standardized application forms
as well as in standardized and negotiated contracts. Quite simply, the statistically significant findings reported in Part V reveal several unintended and
troublesome consequences: (1) federal courts’ motion to compel arbitration rulings muddle markedly settled, common law principles of contract;
(2) state and federal courts’ decisions undermine or marginalize consumer
protection laws; and (3) federal courts’ section 2 rulings effectively preempt
the application of antidiscrimination statutes, thereby precluding applicantslitigants from securing remedies under those statutes.
Certainly, Congress did not enact the FAA to undermine federal and
state civil rights, antidiscrimination, and consumer protection statutes. Therefore, the Article concludes by encouraging Congress to enact a previously
proposed statute entitled, “The Arbitration Fairness Act.” The evidence in
the study strongly suggests that some state courts and most federal courts
93

See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
See infra Part I and accompanying notes.
95
See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
94
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will continue to enforce arbitration provisions in all sorts of standardized
applications and bar disgruntled applicants’ access to courts of law—unless
Congress acts.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PERTINENT, COMMON LAW
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT
A. The Formation and Enforcement of Valid Contracts
Put simply, “[a] contract is an agreement between two or more parties.”96
Under the terms of an agreement, parties promise to do something for each
other’s benefit.97 Or, one party promises to abstain from engaging in a certain
activity for the benefit of the other party.98 In addition, contractual agreements appear in many flavors: (1) express—oral and written, (2) impliedin-fact, and (3) implied-in-law.99
Settled law is clear: only “valid” contracts are enforceable in courts of
law and equity. Therefore, to enforce an agreement, a party must establish
a “valid” contract by presenting prima facie or probative evidence of the
following: (1) each party’s intent to be mutually bound under the terms of
the contract; (2) one party’s offer; (3) the other party’s acceptance of the
offer; (4) the parties’ meeting of the minds regarding the “undertaking”;
(5) each party’s consent to the terms of the contract; (6) the execution of
the contract; and (7) the “delivery” of the contract.100
96

See, e.g., Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 336 (1978) (“A contract is an agreement
between parties whereby one of them acquires a right to an act by the other; and the other
assumes an obligation to perform that act.”); State v. Atwood, 301 P.3d 1255, 1258
(Haw. 2013) (“A contract is an agreement between two or more persons which creates an
obligation to do or not do something.”); McCraw v. Llewellyn, 123 S.E.2d 575, 578
(N.C. 1962) (“A contract is an agreement between two or more persons upon sufficient
consideration to do or to refrain from doing a particular act.”).
97
See cases cited supra note 96.
98
La Salle Nat’l Bank v. Vega, 520 N.E.2d 1129, 1131(Ill. App. 1988) (“[A] contract
is an agreement between competent parties, upon consideration sufficient in law, to do or
not to do a particular thing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99
Legros v. Tarr, 540 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ohio 1989) (“[I]t is well-established that
there are three classes of simple contracts: express, implied in fact, and implied in law.
‘In express contracts the assent to its terms is actually expressed in offer and acceptance.
In contract implied in fact the meeting of the minds, manifested in express contracts by
offer and acceptance, is shown by the surrounding circumstances, which made it inferable
that the contract exists as a matter of tacit understanding .... Contracts implied in law are not
true contracts; the relationship springing therefrom is not in a strict sense contractual ....
In truth contracts implied in law are often called quasi contracts or constructive contracts.”)
(citations omitted); see also Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923, 925–26 (Ohio 1938);
Columbus, Hocking Valley & Toledo Ry. Co. v. Gaffney, 61 N.E. 152, 153–54 (Ohio 1901).
100
See Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. App. 1999).
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Furthermore, even if a contract is “valid, courts will not enforce it unless
sufficient consideration supports the agreement.101 Quite simply, a contract
is “a promise enforceable against the promisor if the promisee gave some
consideration for the promise.”102 The consideration doctrine requires some
evidence of bargained-for exchange promises, which may be exchanged
acts, forbearance, or “the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal
relation” for another’s benefit.103 Moreover, bargained-for exchange consideration does not have to be extremely valuable.104 In fact, the proverbial
peppercorn may serve as sufficient consideration.105
Of course, even if a promisee cannot establish bargained-for exchange
consideration, it may be possible for a promisee to secure breach of contract
damages under the theory of promissory estoppel.106 Under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, a promise is binding (1) if it is offered to induce a promisee’s performance, (2) if it actually induces the promisee’s performance,
and (3) if enforcing the promise prevents injustice.107 To establish promissory estoppel consideration, a party must prove: (1) a promisor made a
clear and definite promise, (2) the promisor’s intention was to induce the
promisee’s reliance on the promise, (3) the promisee relied on the promise
to his detriment or changed his position, and (4) an injustice would be
avoided by enforcing the promisor’s promise.108

101

United States v. Prokos, 441 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“In evaluating
the consideration supporting any agreement, [a] court is only permitted to determine
whether sufficient consideration supports the contract, a court is not permitted to examine
the adequacy or equities of the exchange between the parties unless there is mutual
mistake or the deal is so unfair that justice prevents its enforcement.”).
102
Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872, 878 (N.J. 2002).
103
Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 383 (N.J. 1988).
104
See, e.g., Traphagen’s Ex’r v. Vorhees, 12 A. 895, 901 (N.J. Eq. 1888) (“A very slight
advantage to one party, or a trifling inconvenience to the other, is a sufficient consideration to
support a contract, [absent mental incapacity] ... fraud, imposition, or mistake.”).
105
See, e.g., Sfreddo v. Sfreddo, 720 S.E.2d 145, 152–53 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (“[A]
gift has been defined as a contract without a consideration. Indeed, ‘by definition, a deed
of gift requires no consideration.’ Consideration represents ‘the price bargained for and
paid for a promise.’ It may come in ‘a benefit to the party promising or a detriment to the
party to whom the promise is made’ .... Virginia has long followed the ‘peppercorn’ theory of
consideration, under which even a peppercorn suffices as consideration. A peppercorn has
been equated with a cent.”) (citations omitted).
106
In re Estate of Ross, No. A07-1249, 2008 WL 2168640, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 27, 2008).
107
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992).
108
Id.
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B. The Enforceability of Purportedly Legal Rights in Written
Preliminary Agreements
Again, the definition is clear: “A contract is an agreement between two
or more persons consisting of a set of promises that are legally enforceable.”109 But consider these facts: “Memoranda of understanding (MOU),”
“earnest money agreements,” “real estate binders,” “deposit receipts,” “temporary insurance binders,” “conditional binding receipts,” “letters of intent,” “commitment letters,” and “agreements in principle” are familiar
examples of preliminary agreements.110 Parties fashion such temporary
agreements in order to outline their intentions, weigh their options, circumvent ambiguities, escape liabilities, and consider the consequences of an
undertaking before binding themselves to a permanent enforceable contract.111 In fact, letters of intent, insurance binders, and similar temporary
instruments are often called “agreements with open terms” or “agreements
to negotiate.”112 On the other hand, some preliminary agreements simply
109

Behrens v. Wedmore, 698 N.W.2d 555, 565 (S.D. 2005).
See Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 223 (2nd Cir.
2011) (discussing “heads of agreement”—a less familiar preliminary agreement); Brown
v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2005) (embracing the view that memoranda of
understanding are preliminary agreements); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Tribune
Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing letters of intent and commitment
letters); Holman v. Musser, 212 P. 33, 35 (Cal. App. 1922) (finding that the deposit
receipt was a preliminary agreement); Robinson v. Hein, No. CV92299893S, 2002 WL
450719, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2002) (accepting that the real estate binder was a
preliminary agreement and leaving the issue of its enforceability to a trier of fact); Kan.
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Kutak, 44 P.3d 407, 410 (Kan. 2002) (accepting without deciding
that the commitment letter was a preliminary agreement); Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns
USA, Inc. v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. 06 CVS 17673, 2007 WL 2570180, at *3 n.4 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Aug. 27, 2007) (reaffirming an “earnest money agreement” is a preliminary agreement);
Sabetfard v. Smith, 760 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (App. Div. 2003) (finding that the real estate
binder was an unenforceable preliminary agreement); Dixon v. Pickle, 327 S.W.2d 50, 53
(Tenn. App. 1959) (reaffirming the proposition that a temporary insurance binder is a
preliminary agreement); Vacek Grp., Inc. v. Clark, 95 S.W.3d 439, 441 (Tex. App. 2002)
(“Clark drafted an ... agreement in principle, which was described in the document as a
‘preliminary agreement.’”); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217,
250–51 (1987) (discussing various preliminary agreements).
111
See Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 707–08 (Md. 2007) (“[In some preliminary agreements the parties state emphatically] that they intend not to be bound until
[a] formal writing is executed or [until] one of the parties has announced to the other such
an intention .... [Other temporary agreements clearly state that the parties must embrace]
one or more specific matters ... before [the] negotiations are concluded.”).
112
See, e.g., Globalmart, Inc. v. Posec Hawaii, Inc., No. 28249, 2012 WL 1650697, at
*7 (Haw. Ct. App. May 10, 2012) (“The ‘binding’ paragraphs of the MOU ... give Land
Mark the ‘exclusive right to negotiate and enter into the Purchase Agreement’ .... [T]he
110
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state that each party accepts all essential terms which appear in the written
document.113 Still, other preliminary agreements are express contracts—outlining the parties’ intentions, forming a contractual relationship, and legally
binding the parties to their ultimate goal or transaction.114
Generally, state and federal courts recognize two types of preliminary
agreements—“Type I” and “Type II.”115 The former is an enforceable binding contract. The latter is not. A written Type I preliminary agreement is a
“complete” agreement—reflecting the parties’ meeting of minds on all important negotiated issues.116 Since a Type I preliminary agreement is a totally
integrated agreement, it legally binds both parties to their ultimate contractual objective.117 Conversely, a written Type II preliminary agreement is generally not legally enforceable for several reasons: (1) it binds the parties only
“to a certain degree,” or to “certain major terms”; (2) it leaves “other terms
open for further negotiation”; (3) it “does not commit the parties to their
ultimate contractual objective”; and (4) the parties are only obligated to
negotiate open issues in good faith in order to achieve the stated “objective
within the agreed framework.”118
Once more, memoranda of understanding are preliminary agreements.
Therefore, applying the Type I test,119 some state and federal courts have
‘binding’ terms of the MOU constitute nothing more than an agreement to negotiate and
enter into a contract in the future. Therefore, the MOU is unenforceable.”); Keystone
Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 994 P.3d 945, 948 (Wash. 2004) (“The second type of
agreement is an agreement with open terms. Under an agreement with open terms, the
parties intend to be bound by the key points agreed upon with the remaining terms supplied
by a court or another authoritative source.”).
113
Cochran, 919 A.2d at 708.
114
Id.
115
See Fairbrook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 519 F.3d 421, 426–27 (8th Cir.
2008); Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“In some circumstances, however, preliminary agreements can create binding obligations.
[In general], binding preliminary agreements fall into one of two categories.”); SIGA
Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 349 (Del. 2013) (“Federal courts interpreting
New York law recognize two types of binding preliminary agreements, ‘Type I’ and
‘Type II.’”).
116
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
117
Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 548.
118
Id.
119
See Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at
549) (“There are four [elements which courts used to] determin[e] whether a preliminary
agreement is an enforceable [Type I agreement or binding contract. They are] (1) whether
there is an expressed reservation of the right not to be bound in the absence of a writing;
(2) whether there has been partial performance of the contract; (3) whether all of the
terms of the alleged contract have been agreed upon; and (4) whether the agreement at
issue is the type of contract that is usually committed to writing.”).
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declared that certain MOUs were valid, legally binding and enforceable
contractual agreements.120 In contrast, other courts have examined otherwise “valid” MOUs, applied the Type II standard,121 and concluded that
the written instruments were not enforceable contracts.122 But consider this
fact: standardized, preprinted application forms are not MOUs, conditional
binders, binding receipts, agreements in principle, or temporary binders.123
120

See, e.g., White v. AutoZone, Inc., 213 F. App’x 628, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2006) (“AutoZone argues that it could not have breached a contract ... because the [MOU] ... was
merely a letter confirming a verbal offer and not a contract .... White received the [MOU]
prepared and signed by Holland, an AutoZone manager, and began work ... under its terms.
Therefore, both parties were contractually bound by the terms set forth in the Holland
[MOU].”); Findling v. Lossing, No. 296841, 2011 WL 1565489, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.
Apr. 26, 2011) (“Lossing argues that, because the [MOU] was not a contract, she is not
liable for any breach. She contends that the [MOU] was essentially a ‘contract to contract’
[and] that the [MOU] did not indicate what the parties intended their obligations to be, it
contained no definitions, and nothing established what type of guaranty that she was to
issue .... In this case, both parties were competent to contract with one another .... Further,
they contracted to relinquish and redeem shares of that company respectively, as a result
of the parties divorcing one another .... The [MOU] appears to meet all of the requirements to
be deemed a valid contract.”); Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of
Columbia, 721 S.E.2d 455, 456, 459 (S.C. App. 2011) (“The City of Columbia entered
into a [MOU] with members of a development team .... When the City gave the project to
another team ... some members of the original development team [sued] the City for breach of
the MOU .... The City [filed] a motion for summary judgment contending [that] the MOU
[was] not a contract, and the circuit court granted the motion .... [T]he circuit court erred
[by] ruling as a matter of law that the MOU [was] not a contract .... [E]vidence in the
facts and circumstances surrounding the MOU ... supports a reasonable inference that the
MOU was a contract.”); see also The King v. Shinfield, [1811] 104 Eng. Rep. 709 (K.B.).
In Shinfield, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding. Id. Lanesbury asserted
that the memorandum stated the parties’ respective intent and was a binding apprenticeship
contract. Id. Defendant Palmer and the King’s Bench disagreed. Id.
121
See Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Lower courts must consider several factors to decide whether a preliminary agreement is
a binding Type II agreement: “whether the intent to be bound was revealed by (1) the
language of the agreement; (2) the context of the negotiations; (3) the existence of open
terms; (4) partial performance; and (5) the necessity of putting the agreement in final form, as
indicated by the customary form of such transactions.”).
122
See, e.g., id. at 72–73 (“The language of the [MOU]—two references to the possibility that negotiations might fail and the reference to a binding sales agreement to be
completed at some future date—shows that Arcadian did not intend to be bound .... The
language of the [MOU] reveals ... that ... API should not have believed that Arcadian intended
to be bound.”); Olszowy v. Norton Co., 553 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226 (App. Div. 1990) (“The function of the memorandum and related negotiating notes is merely to remind the negotiators
of what was orally agreed upon during the interim period prior to the preparation and
execution of the formal contract document. The memorandum is not a contract in and of
itself .... Accordingly, only plaintiff’s conjecture, speculation, and lack of memory
support his erroneous interpretation of the memorandum of agreement.”).
123
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 909 (Ct. App. 2004)
(“The Banner application form [stated that e]xcept as provided in the conditional receipt
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Therefore, since some MOUs, and other preliminary agreements may qualify
as binding and enforceable contracts, an important question begs for an answer: whether standardized application forms are enforceable Type I preliminary agreements. Based on a conservative reading of state and federal
courts’ analyses and decisions, the answer is no. There is a rich, common
law distinction between standardized application forms and, Type I preliminary agreements—which are often totally integrated and binding contracts.124
The relevance of this important proposition will be discussed in Part V.
C. The Parol Evidence Rule and the Admissibility of Standardized
Application Forms to Contradict or Vary Terms in Totally Integrated
Written Contracts
Again, preprinted application forms appear in many varieties—benefits,
employment, grant, housing, goods, insurance, loan, membership, publishing,
bearing the same number as this application, no insurance applied for will take effect until
the full first premium is paid and such policy is delivered to the owner.”) (emphasis added);
Ventolas v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., No. 93-3429, 1995 WL 808892, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Feb. 24, 1995) (“[The corporate applicant] met with [the insurance agent] ... and applied
for a disability insurance policy. The application form reference[d] a conditional receipt
and [did] not by its terms make any promise of coverage.”) (emphasis added); Wallace v.
Time Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 468, 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (“Wallace contacted ... an insurance broker ... [and] completed an application for a combined policy of life and disability insurance .... The application form provided that coverage would be effective as of
the date the policy was issued by the company and received by the insured unless provided
otherwise in a conditional receipt.”).
124
See Optiwind v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Goshen, No. LLICV084007819S,
2010 WL 4070580, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010) (“Since the preliminary agreement extended to the plaintiff the legal interest to build such a wind turbine, and the
subject matter of the commission’s decision centered on an application for a special permit to
construct a wind turbine, the plaintiff can demonstrate a specific, legal interest in the
subject matter of the commission’s decision, and can show that the commission’s decision has
specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.”) (emphasis
added); River Glen Assocs., Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 870, 870
(App. Div. 2002) (citing Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. Gab Bus. Svcs., 145 F.3d 543, 549 (2d Cir.
1998)) (“We agree with the motion court that there was no binding preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith plaintiff’s application for a commercial mortgage in view
of the disclaimers in the application and the sophistication and experience of plaintiff’s
principals.”) (emphasis added); see also Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Dep’t. of Educ.,
940 N.E.2d 1256, 1262–63 (Ohio 2010) (“Viewing the ODE’s review of a communityschool sponsorship application under R.C. 3314.015 as a two-stage process is further supported by the last sentence of R.C. 3314.02(C)(1), which permits any entity that falls within
one of the six enumerated categories to enter into preliminary agreements with any person or group of individuals .... The ability of an eligible entity to enter into preliminary
agreements prior to a final decision on the merits of its application to sponsor a
community school presumes that there has been a threshold determination by ODE that an
entity falls within one of the R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) categories.”) (emphasis added).
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and securities registration applications.125 And among courts’ considering
the issue, a majority view has emerged: standing alone, standardized application forms are not contracts.126 On the other hand, a definitive answer
to a related question remains exceptionally elusive: whether words and
phrases in standardized applications may alter or contradict words and
phrases in totally integrated contracts—those evolving from completed,
signed and approved applications?
Briefly, the parol evidence rule is a commonsensical doctrine that
memorializes and protects parties’ contractual intentions, rights, obligations and reasonable expectations.127 More specifically, the parol evidence
rule prevents a party from introducing extrinsic evidence—prior or contemporaneous, written or oral agreements—to contradict or vary terms in
an unambiguous written contract.128 Or, when a written instrument facially
expresses parties’ final contractual agreement, the parol evidence rule
prevents a party from adding more contractual undertakings, terms, conditions, exclusions and/or limitations.129 Moreover, attempting to introduce
oral or extrinsic evidence becomes even more difficult, if a written contract
contains a merger clause. Quite often, merger clauses will state that the writing is the complete integration of the parties’ intentions.130
125

See, e.g., Cent. Ohio Alt. Program v. Ballinger, No. 3:06CV01083, 2007 WL 846506,
at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2007) (“The defendant reasonably argues that the grant application on which COAP relies was not a contract .... By presenting and relying on only the
grant application, COAP has not shown that the parties entered into a contract.”); Vakas
v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 242 F.R.D. 589, 599 (D. Kan. 2006) (“[A]n
application ... for life insurance is not a contract .... [T]he contract is the clearest intention
of the parties, not the application.”); Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness and Poverty v. U.S.
Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 799 F. Supp. 148, 155 (D.D.C. 1992) (“The government was
mistaken when it translated an application for housing into a full-blown lease or a deed.”);
Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[A]n application for employment is not a contract.”).
126
See cases cited supra note 125.
127
See, e.g., Garret v. Ellison, 72 P.2d 449, 451–52 (Utah 1937) (discussing the
general principle underlying the rule).
128
See, e.g., Gilliland v. Elmwood Props., 391 S.E.2d 577, 581 (S.C. 1990); see also EPA
Real Estate P’ship v. Kang, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 211 (Ct. App. 1992) (“The parol evidence
rule ... prohibits the introduction of extrinsic evidence—oral or written—to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written instrument.”); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:1, at 862 (4th ed. 2012) (explaining that
the parol evidence rule “prohibits the admission of [extrinsic] evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral ..., or prior written agreements, [to explain the meaning of a contract when
the parties have reduced their agreement to an unambiguous integrated writing]”).
129
See U.S. Leasing Corp. v. Janicare, Inc., 364 S.E.2d 202, 205 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
130
See Blackwell v. Faucett, 108 S.E. 295, 296 (S.C. 1921) (reiterating that parol evidence may not be admitted to add or modify terms if a writing appears to express the parties’
whole agreement); Wilson v. Landstrom, 315 S.E.2d 130, 134 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
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Certainly, exceptions to the parol evidence rule exist. Consider Justice
Andrews’s analysis in Mitchill. He wrote:
[Before an oral agreement may vary a] written contract, at least three
conditions must exist: (1) The [oral] agreement must ... be a collateral
one; (2) it must not contradict express or implied provisions of the written contract; (3) it must be one that parties would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing, or, put in another way, an inspection of
the written contract, read in the light of surrounding circumstances,
must not indicate that the writing appears “to contain the engagements
of the parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of such
engagement.” Or, again, it must not be so clearly connected with the
principal transaction as to be part and parcel of it.131

Furthermore, a party may introduce extrinsic evidence to interpret an ambiguous term in a contract, even if a merger or an integration clause appears
in the contract.132 Also, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements—
those fashioned before a final, totally integrated contract—are admissible to
establish “illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, or other
invalidating cause.”133
But reconsider the question: whether the language in an approved and
preprinted application form may alter, contradict or modify language in an
applicant and offeror’s subsequent and wholly integrated contract? A canvas
of common law rulings and state statutes reveals that the answer depends
on whether a consumer applied for, say, insurance, or whether the individual
applied for employment or housing. To help illustrate the point, consider
Texas Insurance Code section 1151.052. It reads:
Entire Contract
(a)
An industrial life insurance policy must provide that the policy is
the entire contract between the parties, except that at the option of the
insurer, the insurer may make the policy and the policy application the
entire contract between the parties.
131

Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1928).
See Martin v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are
admissible ... to establish the meaning of ambiguous terms in the writing, whether or not
the writing is integrated.”); Duncan v. McCaffrey Grp., Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280, 306 (Ct.
App. 2011) (stressing that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to explain ambiguous language
in a contract).
133
See Ingraham v. Geico Ins. Co., No. 06-111, 2009 WL 793046, at *15 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 24, 2009) (finding that parol evidence may be introduced to vary a writing if a
contractual term evolved from fraudulent conduct, a mistake or an accident); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (1981).
132

428

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:405

(b)
To make the policy application a part of the contract, a copy of
the application must be endorsed on or attached to the policy at the time
the policy is issued.134

Unmistakably, under section 1151.052, the parol evidence rule would not
preclude an individual from citing words and phrases in the insurance application to contradict or alter terms in the insurance policy. Section 1151.052(b)
is clear: if an application is “attached to the policy” when the policy is issued,
the two written instruments form a totally integrated contract.135 Also, a careful review of other states’ insurance statutes reveals that some completed
and approved applications for insurance and the insurance policies comprise
the “entire insurance contract.”136 Consequently, in those jurisdictions, the
parol evidence rule does apply—if the standardized applications are endorsements to binding and enforceable insurance instruments.137
Now, assume that an individual completes and signs a preprinted employment application. Also assume that the employer and applicant ultimately form a contractual relationship under a preprinted, standardized
employment contract. May the terms in the approved and standardized employment application alter, contradict or modify language in the subsequent
and wholly integrated employment contract? The analyses and rulings in
McLain v. Great American Ins. Companies138 and Slivinsky v. WatkinsJohnson Company139 provide some limited insight.
134

TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1151.052 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
Id.; see also id. § 1101.003 (“[The life insurance] policy and the application for the
policy constitute the entire contract between the parties.”).
136
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1205A (1993) (“[T]he policy and the application ... if a copy of the application is ... attached to the policy when issued, shall constitute the entire contract between the parties.”) (emphasis added); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10113 (West 2014) (“Every policy of life, disability, or life and disability insurance
issued ... by any insurer ... shall contain and be deemed to constitute the entire contract
between the parties and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to any ... application or other writings [or] either of the parties ... unless the same are indorsed ... or attached
to the policy.”) (emphasis added); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 224(1)(c) (2011) (“[T]he policy,
together with the application ... a copy of which shall be endorsed upon or attached to the
policy ... shall constitute the entire contract between the parties.”) (emphasis added);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-420(2) (2013) (“[T]he policy together with the application, if a copy
[is] endorsed ... or attached to the policy shall constitute the entire contract between the
parties.”) (emphasis added); MINN. STAT. § 61A.05 (2014) (“Every policy of insurance issued
or delivered ... by any life insurance corporation ... shall contain the entire contract between
the parties. Every policy which contains a reference to the application, shall have a copy
of such application attached thereto or set out therein.”) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3344(A) (West 2014) (“[T]he policy, or the policy and the application for the policy,
if a copy of the application is endorsed ... or attached to the policy when issued, shall
constitute the entire contract between the parties.”) (emphasis added).
137
See statutes cited in supra note 136.
138
256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1989).
139
270 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1990).
135
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In McLain, Robert McLain secured one of Great American’s standardized
employment application forms and applied for work.140 At the bottom of the
form, the phrase “For Company Use Only” appeared.141 Great American
never signed or completed the bottom portion of the application.142 On the
back page of the application form, the following provision appeared:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and
regulations of the Great American Insurance Company, and I agree that
my employment and compensation can be terminated with or without
cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the
Great American Insurance Company or myself. I also understand and
agree that the terms and conditions of my employment may be changed,
with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time by the Great
American Insurance Company. I understand that no representative of
the Great American Insurance Company, has any authority to enter into
an agreement for any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.143

After completing and signing the application, McLain returned the
form to Great American.144 In the course of events, Great American hired
McLain.145 And even though McLain’s probationary review was favorable,
Great American fired McLain after eight months of employment.146 McLain
filed a lawsuit.147 Among other claims, McLain alleged that Great American
breached an implied-in-fact contract148 that permitted the employer to terminate McLain only for cause.149 In its answer, Great American asserted that it
terminated McLain for “insubordination.”150 But, McLain insisted he never
read an insubordination clause and no one from Great American discussed
140

McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. (emphasis added).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 867; see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988)
(“[F]actors apart from consideration and express terms may be used to ascertain the
existence and content of an employment agreement, including ‘the personnel policies or
practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications
by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the
industry in which the employee is engaged.’... [T]he totality of the circumstances determines the nature of the contract. Agreement may be shown by the acts and conduct of the
parties, interpreted in the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances.”).
149
McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
150
Id. at 865.
141
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it with him.151 “The jury found in favor of McLain and awarded $62,000
in compensatory damages.”152 Great American appealed.153
On appeal and citing the language in the application, Great American
argued that McLain could be terminated with or without cause.154 In addition, Great American asserted that the preprinted employment application
form was a totally integrated contract.155 Therefore, according to Great
American, the lower court violated the parol evidence rule when that tribunal allowed McLain to introduce evidence about termination procedures in
an allegedly implied-in-fact contract.156 To reach its decision, the California
Court of Appeals performed a two-part analysis.157 First, the court asked
whether the parties intended for the terms in the application form to be the
complete and final agreement.158 If so, the parol evidence rule evidence
would preclude the introduction of additional terms or conditions in a collateral, independent agreement.159 Second, the court asked whether the terms in
the employment application were susceptible to the interpretation and meaning that McLain proffered.160
To determine whether the application form was a totally integrated and
independent contract, the court of appeals weighed the following factors:
(1) whether the writing in the application was “complete,” (2) whether the
application form contained an integration clause, (3) whether the terms in
the alleged implied-in-fact agreement were material, (4) whether the latter
terms contradicted the terms in the preprinted application form, (5) whether
the parties would “naturally” form the allegedly implied-in-fact agreement
as a separate, independent agreement, (6) whether the circumstances surrounding the employment were probative, (7) whether the nature and objective of the employment were material, and (8) whether the introduction
of the extrinsic evidence mislead the jury.161 In the end, the McLain court
concluded that the standardized, preprinted application form was not a
totally integrated contract.162 In addition, the application did not contain an
151

Id.
Id. at 867.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 868 (“Because the application was a standardized form, did not cover several key
aspects of the employment relationship and ... expressly stated that the terms and conditions of
employment could be changed, we conclude that it was not an integrated document.”).
152
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integration clause. On the other hand, the implied-in-fact employment agreement was an independent contract; therefore, Great American was liable
for breaching it.163
Now, consider the facts and the dispute in Slivinsky v. Watkins. Sandra
Slivinsky applied for a job with Watkins-Johnson Company (Watkins), a
large aerospace manufacturer.164 Directly above the signature line on the
preprinted-standardized application form, the following language appeared:
“I understand that employment ... is conditional upon ... execution of an
Employee Agreement .... I further understand that if I become employed
by Watkins-Johnson Company, there will be no agreement expressed or
implied, between the company and me for any specific period of employment, nor for continuing or long term employment.”165 Watkins evaluated
Slivinsky’s credentials and work history.166 After Watkins’ agents interviewed Slivinsky several times, they employed Slivinsky.167
On the first day of her employment, Slivinsky signed the Employee
Agreement, which was described in Slivinsky’s completed and signed preprinted application form.168 The last paragraph in the Employee Agreement read: “Employee acknowledges that there is no agreement, express
or implied, between [the] employee and the Company for any specific
period of employment, nor for continuing or long-term employment. Employee and the Company each have a right to terminate employment, with
or without cause.”169
In January 1986, the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster occurred.170 In
the wake, many governmental contracts were cancelled—including the contracts that Watkins had formed with the federal government.171 Consequently,
six months later, Watkins fired Slivinsky and many more employees.172
Slivinsky sued Watkins under several theories of recovery—including an
163

Id. at 869 (“McLain introduced ... evidence to establish that there was an implied
contract that he could only be terminated for cause .... The testimony of two Great American
employees also suggests that McLain could not be terminated without cause .... Finally,
McLain testified that he left the independent adjusting firm based upon ... promises of
long-term advancement possibilities coupled with the assurance that McLain would be a
permanent employee once the 90-day probationary period ended. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to establish an implied contract that
McLain could only be terminated for cause.”).
164
Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 586 (Ct. App. 1990).
165
Id. (emphasis added).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 587.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
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action for breach of contract.173 In her complaint, Slivinsky insisted that
the reasons for her termination were pretextual: (1) she was fired to reduce
her superior’s cost overruns; (2) her superior did not like her; and (3) her
superior had difficulty communicating with her.174 Slivinsky also asserted
that Watkins made several oral promises during the pre-hire interviews—
promising to employ her long term, indefinitely or permanently, and promising that ordinary business cycles would not affect her employment.175
Responding to the lawsuit, Watkins filed a motion for summary judgment—stressing that Slivinsky failed to state any viable cause of action.176
Additionally, the employer asserted that under the written employment
agreement, Slivinsky was an employment-at-will employee.177 The trial court
granted Watkins’ motion for summary judgment.178 On appeal, Slivinsky
argued that the trial court’s adverse summary judgment was erroneous.179
But, to resolve the controversy, the California Court of Appeals fashioned
the appellate question in a somewhat novel way: whether Slivinsky could
introduce parol and/or extrinsic evidence—beyond Watkins’s written employment agreement—to determine the parties’ “complete” agreement.180
Citing the parol evidence rule, the court of appeals stressed that the
employment-termination procedures were enforceable only if the parties
intended for Slivinsky’s completed and signed application and Watkins’
Employment Agreement to comprise the final and totally integrated contract.181 If so, any evidence of a prior agreement or a contemporaneous oral
agreement could not be introduced to contradict Slivinsky and Watkins’s
completely integrated, written employment contract.182 Applying that standard, the appeals court concluded that the preprinted application form and
the subsequent employment agreement constituted the entire contract.183
To reach that conclusion, the appellate court found that Slivinsky’s standardized employment application “specifically conditioned employment upon
execution of an employee agreement.”184 Moreover, the preprinted application stated: “[If Watkins employs Slivinsky, there will be no express or
173
Id. at 586 (The mixed-claims and mixed-theories complaint included the following:
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud,
and invasion of privacy.).
174
Id. at 587.
175
Id. at 586.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 587.
178
Id. at 586.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 587.
181
Id. at 587–88.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 588.
184
Id.
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implied agreement] for any specific period of employment, nor for continuing
or long term employment.”185 Also, when Slivinsky executed the Employee
Agreement, she acknowledged that she and Watkins had “a right to terminate the employment, with or without cause.”186
Clearly, the McLain and Slivinsky courts reached different conclusions
after applying the parol evidence rule. Again, in McLain, the court declared
that application form and the employment contract did not constitute the
final embodiment of the parties’ intentions.187 So, may language in a standardized application form vary or modify language in a subsequent employment agreement? The answer is yes, if and only if both parties intended for
terms in both the standardized application and the employment agreement
to encompass the parties’ final and entirely integrated contract. At this point,
it is extremely important to reiterate a previously discussed principle of
contract law: stand-alone and preprinted application forms are not valid, binding and enforceable contracts.188
II. A SHORT REVIEW OF PERTINENT FEDERAL AND STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
A. Federal and State Antidiscrimination and Civil Rights Laws
During the late 1800s, the United States Congress enacted four statutes to help identify and eradicate ethnicity-based discrimination.189 Nearly
one hundred years later, Congress learned that persistent “irrational discrimination”190 remained in occupations,191 in residential and public
185

Id.
Id.
187
McLain v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (Ct. App. 1989).
188
See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes; see also Wagner v. Glendale Adventist
Med. Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding an application for employment
is not a contract; it is a mere solicitation of an offer of employment).
189
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 U.S.C.A. § 243 (West 2014); Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2014); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (West 2014);
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 (West 2014).
190
See, e.g., Ohio, ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“Although
the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to prohibit plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens, it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some
instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of a
permitted classification.”) (citations omitted); see also Katherine M. Franke, What’s
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 705–06 (2013) (“Discrimination ...
‘is irrational and unjust because it denies the individual what is due him or her under
society’s agreed upon standards of merit.’”).
191
See, e.g., E. Ericka Kelsaw, Help Wanted: 23.5 Million Unemployed Americans
Need Not Apply, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 19–20 (2013) (“[A]s Title VII was
186
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places,192 within educational and financial institutions,193 and against
disabled persons.194 Consequently, the federal legislative body enacted additional antidiscrimination statutes to eliminate or minimize irrational discriminatory practices based on age, ancestry, disability, ethnicity, familial
status, gender, marital status, national origin, and religion.195
originally enacted, all successful plaintiffs could recover back and front pay, declaratory
and injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees, but not compensatory or punitive damages. In
1991, finding that ‘additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter ... intentional
discrimination in the workplace,’ Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. With
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made punitive and compensatory
damages available to plaintiffs claiming intentional discrimination.”).
192
See, e.g., Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th Cir.
1992) (Congress discovered that housing discrimination against families was a pervasive
national problem.).
193
See Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory Access to
Loans, Credit, and Insurance: A Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who
Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950–1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
583, 585–86 (1996); Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI Title
IX and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219, 225–45 (1986).
194
E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). Congressional findings revealed: “[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem,” that “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and
to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous,” and that
discrimination “costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and non-productivity.” Id. §§ 12101(a)(2)–(8). The Act’s purpose is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
Id. §§ 12101(b)(1)–(2).
195
See National Housing Act of 1937, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5
(2012)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012); Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012); Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012); Job Training Partnership Act,
29 U.S.C. § 1577 (2012); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–
2009 (2012); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109
(2012); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611–2654 (2012); Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. § 476 (2012); Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal
Access to Public Accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Equal Access to Federal Funds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Access to Employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17
(2012); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601,
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Also, various states and American territories amended their constitutions
or enacted antidiscrimination statutes.196 And, like federal statutes, state laws
were designed to stop irrational discrimination based on age, ethnicity, disability and/or gender.197 Unlike federal statutes, however, many state’s antidiscrimination statutes allow alleged victims of irrational discrimination to
receive substantially more remedies and monetary relief.198 Furthermore,
3602(a), 3604, 3605, 3606 (2012); Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (2012);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 554 (2012).
196
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-8-4 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.210 (West 2013);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107 (West 2013);
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2013);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Const. Art. 1, § 20 (West 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4501
(West 2013); D.C. CODE § 1-2515 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.01 (West 2013); GA.
CODE ANN. § 8-3-203 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. Const. Art. 1, § 5 (West 2013); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-7301 (West 2013); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1510 / 50 (West 2013); IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-19 (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (West 2013); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1001 (West 1953); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.150 (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. Const. Art. 1, § 12 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4552 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW § 12-305 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1 (West 2013); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. Const. Art. 1, § 2 (West 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.59 (West 2013);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-33-723 (West 1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.055 (West 2013); MONT.
CODE ANN. Const. Art. 2, § 4 (West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-134 (West 1943);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:1 (2013); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296 (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-422.2 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 14-02.4-16 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (West 2013); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1680.402a (West 2013); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-5.4 (West 1956); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 31-21-60 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21606 (West 2013); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A5-106 (West 1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (West 2013); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3
(2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.4 (West 1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West
2013); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 5-11A-6 (West 1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West
2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (West1977); see also FindLaw, State Civil Rights Law,
http://statelaws.findlaw.com/civil-rights-laws/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http:
//perma.cc/36VV-2TMN.
197
See statutes cited supra note 196.
198
See Andrea Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent
Jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access To Federal Courts, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 784–85
(1983) (“[S]tate statutory schemes and common law causes of action may allow for compensatory and punitive relief, whereas under Title VII, a claimant is limited to equitable
relief, which usually takes the form of reinstatement or back pay or both. In addition, the
statute of limitations applicable to common law contract and tort claims generally is longer
than the limitations provision applicable to either Title VII or state employment discrimination statutes. Moreover, if the complainant invokes common law remedies, often
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fairly recently, several states enacted antidiscrimination laws to eradicate
or minimize invidious and irrational discrimination based on one’s sexual
orientation.199
B. Most Renowned and Litigated Federal Consumer Protection Laws
Congress and states have enacted literally hundreds of consumer protection statutes, too numerous to list and discuss here.200 The most renowned
or major statutes are designed to protect two large categories of consumers.
First, Congress enacted a series of statutes to protect consumers from “predatory” lending and credit practices. For example, in 1968, Congress passed
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).201 The purpose of the TILA is to protect
consumers from unfair and inaccurate credit practices.202 Under the TILA,
lenders or creditors must disclose a number of items: lenders’ total financial
undertaking, finance charges, annual percentage rates, and the total number of
payments to be made—including a payment schedule.203 And, responding to
reportedly exorbitant mortgage-settlement costs and other allegedly abusive
settlement practices, Congress enacted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) in 1974.204 Quite simply, under RESPA, lenders must
he can avoid the procedural hurdles that must be overcome when a suit is brought pursuant to either Title VII or a state statute.”).
199
See Arash Jahanian & Alan K. Tannenwald, Sexuality and Transgender Issues in
Employment Law, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 505, 515 n.81 (2007) (listing nearly twenty
states which have extended employment discrimination laws to sexual orientation discrimination); see also Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information, http://www.aclu.org
/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Mar. 26, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/PWK6-TVSJ (ACLU’s website presents a state-by-state summary
of statutes which outlaw irrational, sexual orientation, and gender identity discrimination.).
200
See Legal Resources—Statutes Relating to Consumer Protection Mission, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.shtm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/Y9BF-6LDP; Checklist of Significant California and Federal
Consumer Laws: Legal Guide M-1, CAL. DEP’T CONSUMER AFFAIRS, http://www.dca.ca
.gov/publications/legal_guides/m-1.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/4HDG-796W; State and Federal Consumer Laws, PEOPLESLAWYER.NET, http://
www.peopleslawyer.net/consumer-law.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/PH6-VQJC; Consumer Protection Law, http://www.federalreserveconsumerhelp
.gov/learnmore/consumer-protection-laws.cfm, FED. RESERVE (last visited Mar. 26, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/EXW6-MMN8.
201
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1693 (2012)).
202
Id.
203
15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (2012).
204
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2012)).
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give borrowers a good faith estimate of closing costs prior to closing.205 In
addition, lenders must provide a uniform settlement form at closing, which
itemizes all of the borrowers’ loan-settlement-service charges.206
Congress also enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in 1974.207
This act was designed to “improve the adequacy of information available
to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing
of consumer products.”208 Magnuson-Moss was a response to merchants’
widespread misuse of express warranties and disclaimers.209 Therefore, section 2310(d) creates a statutory right of action for consumers “who [are]
damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to
comply with any obligation under this chapter or under a written warranty,
implied warranty, or service contract.”210 Four years after MagnusonMoss’s enactment, Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) of 1978.211 FDCPA regulates creditors, and it protects consumers against unfair debt collection practices.212 More specifically, the
FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using abusive, unfair, and deceptive
collection practices.213 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that debt
collectors employ deceptive practices and cause substantial adverse consequence for consumers.214 Under the FDCPA, consumers may secure a
variety of civil remedies.215
Finally, in 1994, Congress amended the TILA by enacting the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).216 The purpose of HOEPA
is to protect consumers and to impose additional disclosure requirements
for high-cost or high-rate loans.217 The legislative history of HOEPA—in
both the Senate and House Reports—is clear: HOEPA amendments are
205

Id.
12 U.S.C. § 2603 (2012).
207
15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2012).
208
Id. § 2302(a).
209
Id. § 2301.
210
Id. § 2310(d).
211
Id. §§ 1692–1692p.
212
Id. § 1692f.
213
Id.
214
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2011: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
ANNUAL REPORT, APRIL 2011 2, available at http://perma.cc/ML42-7W42.
215
15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012).
216
Id. §§ 1601–1693.
217
Clark v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 00C7778, 2003 WL 21277126, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June 2, 2003) (“Generally, HOEPA lays out the guidelines, rules, and parameters governing
alternative mortgages. HOEPA and its regulations establish a cost threshold, which once
exceeded, triggers a set of restrictions on lending practices related to high risk loans.”)
(citation omitted); see 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2012).
206
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designed to address the problem of “reverse redlining”—“the practice of
targeting residents in certain geographic areas for credit on unfair terms.”218
Generally, TILA, RESPA, HOEPA, and FDCPA require lenders to disclose
material information in order to increase consumers’ likelihood of making
informed credit decisions.219
The second large category of federal statutes protects consumers from
dangerous products. For example, in 1972, Congress enacted the Consumer
Product Safety Act (CPSA).220 The CPSA was passed to protect the public
against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products and to
help consumers to evaluate the comparative safety of consumer products.221
To underscore the CPSA’s importance, Congress also enacted the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008.222 This latter legislation amended
major federal consumer product safety statutes by setting lead levels in products and paint, and by restricting the use of several chemical compounds
known as phthalates.223
C. State Consumer Protection Laws
All fifty states have enacted consumer-protection statutes, which give
state agencies or private actors the right to prosecute consumer fraud or
deceptive trade practices.224 Predictably, among the state statutes, the types of
protections, scope of civil liabilities, and types of remedies that consumers
might receive vary considerably.225 To illustrate, a majority of states allow
all aggrieved consumers to commence private actions.226 Iowa, Nebraska,
New York, and Nevada, however, prohibit certain private right of actions.227
218

Clark, 2003 WL 21277126, at *2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-652, at 158 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1977, 1981.
219
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1692b
(2012).
220
Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972).
221
15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1)–(4) (2012).
222
Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008).
223
Id. §§ 101–108.
224
See Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection
Liability: An Economic Approach, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010) (“Every state in the
nation has some kind of consumer protection statute.”).
225
Id. at 12–13.
226
Id. at 14.
227
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1601(2) (West 2014) (allowing private actions only if
plaintiffs prove that an offending behavior caused a public-interest impact); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 349 (McKinney 2014) (allowing private actions only if plaintiffs prove that an offending behavior caused a public-interest impact); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.0977 (2014) (only
allowing the elderly or disabled consumers to commence private actions); Molo Oil Co. v.
River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 222, 229 (Iowa 1998) (finding no private

2015]

IRRATIONALLY BIASED IN FAVOR OF THE FAA

439

In addition, many state consumer protection statutes contain a “laundry
list” of specific violations.228 Other statutes, however, only provide broad
definitions of a violation without enumerating an array of specific acts.229
Moreover, although most states allow agitated consumers to file class actions,
several southern states and one state in the northwest do not.230 Additionally,
within each region of the country, one finds a number of states preventing
dissatisfied consumers from certifying certain types of class actions,231 limiting a prevailing class of consumers’ damages awards,232 and limiting the
types of persons who may qualify as class members.233
It should be stressed, however, that an even more impressive development has occurred over the past fifty years. Most states have adopted a
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).234 These statutes either mirror the
exact version of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA),235
or the DTPA statutes are “substantially equivalent” or “fairly similar” to the
cause of action under Iowa consumer protection statute); Patterson v. Beall, 19 P.3d 839,
846 n.10 (Okla. 2000) (noting that Oklahoma did not allow private actions until 1988).
228
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (2014); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2014); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2014).
229
See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505 / 2 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2
(West 2014); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2014).
230
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(f) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (West 2014);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(4) (West 2014);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (2013).
231
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(d) (West 2014) (limiting class actions to certain
consumer claims).
232
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-608(1) (West 2014) (limiting class recovery to
actual damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(d) (West 2014) (limiting class recovery to
actual damages); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(3) (West 2014) (limiting class
recovery to actual damages); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(E) (West 2014) (limiting class
recovery to actual damages).
233
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(b) (West 2014) (limiting class actions to
residents or consumers injured within the state).
234
See Dag E. Ytreberg, Legislation Protecting Consumers Against Unfair or Deceptive
Trade Practices, 17 AM. JUR. 2D § 280 (2003). (“Generally speaking, the states have modeled
their legislation on the Federal Trade Commission Act, or have adopted the Uniform
Consumer Sales Practice Act or the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act or based their
statutes thereon.”); Donald M. Zupanec, Practices Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R.3d 449, at *2a (1979) (updated Mar. 2004).
235
The following twelve states have adopted the 1964 or 1966 version of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105 (West 2000); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2532–2536 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370 –375 (West 2000);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 481a-1–5 (West 2000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 510 / 1–7 (West
2001); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1211–1216 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325d.43–48
(West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-301–303.06 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 598.0905–0915 (West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4165.01–04 (West 2000); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 51–55 (West 1999); and OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608 (West 1999).
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UDTPA.236 In a nutshell, DTPA statutes “make it unlawful [for any person]
to use or otherwise engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of trade or commerce.”237
D. The Prevalence of Consumer Protection and Irrational Discrimination
Complaints—Statistical Evidence from Federal and State Agencies,
Courts and Private Research Organizations
Since the enactment of state and federal antidiscrimination statutes, alleged victims of irrational discrimination have filed thousands of administrative complaints and lawsuits.238 For example, employment-discrimination
suits have increased substantially each year since Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1967.239 In fiscal year 1997, the Equal Employment
236

The “substantially equivalent” or “fairly similar” DTPA-related statutes are: ALA.
CODE § 8-19-5 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.471 (West 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1211 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (West 2014); Id. § 4-101-201 (governing the sale of fracture-filled and clarity-enhanced diamonds); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17200 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2014); D.C. CODE
§ 28-3904 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603
(West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16 (West
2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4403 (West) (repealed 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 367.170 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 13-301 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.903 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5 (West 2014); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 407.020 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.0915 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-2 (West 2014); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349, 350 (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 66-74 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-15-02 (West 2013); 73 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-3 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-2 (West 2014);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-6 (2014); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-104 (West 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 2013); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-11-4 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453 (West 2014); VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-200 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 2014); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46A-6-104 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 (West 2013); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 40-12-105 (West 2014).
237
Cf. Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection In The States—A 50-State Report on
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. INC.,
archived at http://perma.cc/3EZP-BWEU.
238
See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1997
THROUGH FY 2012, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter EEOC Charge Stats], archived at http://perma.cc/P888-JWLR
(The report discloses that 80,680 “charges were filed in fiscal year 1997. In fiscal year 2012,
the number of charges had increased to 99,412. The charges were racial/color, gender,
disability and religion discrimination, retaliation, and violations of the equal pay act.).
239
See Michael J. Sniffen, Job Bias Suits Rise—Justice: Private Sector Litigation for
Discrimination More than Triples in Decade, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, 1/17/2000
LBPRESS at A16, 2000 WLNR 1358301 (“Aided by new federal laws, private lawsuits
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported that 80,680 persons filed antidiscrimination complaints.240 In fiscal year 2012, the number of filings increased appreciably—nearly one hundred thousand (99,412) persons filed
EEOC-related charges.241
More specifically, after reviewing fiscal year 2012 statistics more thoroughly, the EEOC found the following: (1) a large group of disgruntled persons (38.1%) filed 37,836 complaints, accusing defendants of practicing
“work-place retaliation”; (2) more than a third of the complainants (33.7%)
filed 33,512 “racial-discrimination charges”; (3) among all “retaliation
charges,” 31 percent (31.4%) or 31,208 were allegedly Title VII violations;
(4) about a third of the complainants (30.5%) filed 30,356 “gender-based
discrimination charges”; (5) a relatively smaller group of complainants
(26.5%) filed 26,379 “disability-discrimination charges”; and (6) 23 percent
(23.0%) of the aggrievants filed 22,857 “age discrimination charges.”242
Also, after the debt collection industry increased its compliance efforts,
the number of debt collection administrative complaints rose dramatically.
To illustrate, the FTC reported that dissatisfied consumers filed 119,609
complaints in 2009.243 One year later, the number of FDCPA complaints
increased to 140,036, and the annual number of lawsuits continued to
climb.244 Additionally, in very recent years, consumers of financial services
filed a record number of FCRA, TCPA, and truth in lending lawsuits. TCPA
litigation more than doubled, and FDCPA litigation set a record 11,811
filings in 2011.245 What is more, the number of FDCPA lawsuits continues
alleging discrimination in the work place more than tripled during in the 1990s, the
Justice Department said .... [J]ob bias lawsuits filed in U.S. District Courts soared from
6,936 in 1990 to 21,540 in 1998 .... Civil rights complaints of all varieties more than doubled
from 1990 to 1998, from 18,793 to 42,354 .... New civil rights laws paved the way for the
explosion in job bias cases, including the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .... The 1991 law amended five older federal employment
discrimination laws. It also allowed plaintiffs to win compensatory and punitive damages
in certain cases, permitted jury trials when plaintiffs sought monetary damages, and
overturned seven Supreme Court rulings.”).
240
EEOC Charge Stats, supra note 238.
241
Id.; see also Paul Feely, Lawyer: Ruling Opens Door to More Anti-Bias Suits, N.H.
UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Feb. 13, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 2918838.
242
EEOC Charge Stats, supra note 238; see also Feely, supra note 241.
243
EEOC Charge Stats, supra note 238.
244
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 214, at 5–6.
245
See WEBRECON L.L.C., FDCPA and Other Consumer Lawsuit Statistics—Full Year
2011 Recap, WEBRECON.COM, https://dev.webrecon.com/fdcpa-and-other-consumer-lawsuit
-statistics-full-year-2011-recap/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PE65
-25SJ (“[T]he Denver Colorado district court saw the most suits filed—totaling 658.
Philadelphia was 2nd with 634 suits. Los Angeles was 3rd with 623, followed by Chicago
with 592 and Newark with 486. Statewide, California led with 1654 lawsuits in 2011.
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to grow each year.246 In 2009, FDCPA litigation reached a new peak; the
new percentage was a 52 percent increase above the aggregate percentage
for prior years.247 On the other hand, consumers still file truth in lending
lawsuits. In recent years, however, the rates have fallen.248 Arguably, the
unforeseeable financial calamity in 2008 caused the higher-than-usual
spike: consumers filed the greatest number of truth-in-lending lawsuits—
against banks and mortgage companies—after the collapse of the mortgagehousing market.249 Those numerous lawsuits originated under Title 15,
section 1601 of the TILA.250
There is more. Without question, the National Fair Housing Alliance
(NFHA) is a politically “partisan” for-profit and non-profit organization.251
Yet, by most objective measures, the NFHA is a thoroughly competent,
resourceful and transparent organization.252 Each year, NFHA collects data
Florida was next with 1146 lawsuits, followed by New York with 1128, Pennsylvania
with 940 and New Jersey with 711.”).
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
See TRAC REPORTS, INC., Truth in Lending Federal Lawsuits Continue to Decline,
TRAC.SYR.EDU, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/323/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/7SDR-QVMF (“During May 2013 the government reported
only 16 new truth-in-lending civil filings. This followed only 26 such suits filed in April
and 14 suits begun during March, according to the case-by-case information analyzed by
the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). Truth in lending lawsuits have
fallen 89 percent, down from the peak of 152 reached four years ago in May 2009.”).
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
See Mission Statement, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, http://www.nationalfairhousing
.org/AboutNFHA/MissionandVision/tabid/2606/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/XC89-WKGK (“NFHA works to eliminate housing discrimination and to ensure equal housing opportunity for all people through leadership,
education, outreach, membership services, public policy initiatives, advocacy and enforcement.”); see also Rigging Antidiscrimination Law, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2013, at A16
(“It’s rare for a case that reaches the Supreme Court to be pulled from the docket ... twice
in two years on the same legal issue. Yet [this] happened .... Township of Mount Holly v.
Mount Holly Gardens Citizens asked whether the 1968 Fair Housing Act allows the
government to charge discrimination by using statistics rather than specific intent. The
feds had never employed this theory in housing until the Obama Administration began to
use it against lenders .... There’s no evidence that the Obama Administration played a
direct role in scuttling the case this time, but its housing allies did. Mount Holly, the Ford
Foundation, George Soros’s Open Society Foundations, the National Fair Housing Alliance
and Self Help Community Development contributed money to a developer who will build
new homes for the plaintiffs and other private buyers. That deal led to the settlement.”)
(emphasis added).
252
Cf. Federal Reserve Board of Governors Holds a Public Hearing on Potential
Revisions to the Board’s Regulation C—Final, in FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE, Sept. 24,
2010 (“[O]n behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, I’d like to
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from private and non-profit fair-housing organizations as well as from government entities.253 In particular, NFHA collects large volumes of data involving various types of housing-related transactions: rentals, sales, mortgage
lending, homeowners’ insurance, advertising, harassment, homeowners and
rental associations’ practices, zoning procedures, and persons’ gaining access
to shelters.254 The annual research is designed to measure the numbers of fairhousing complaints and the types of remedies that private and state actors
employ to arrest consumers concerns.255
In 2013, NFHA’s statistical report disclosed several pertinent findings.
First, during calendar year 2012, displeased consumers filed 28,519 administrative and judicial housing-discrimination complaints.256 In 201l, there
were 27,092 complaints.257 Private fair housing groups—rather than governmental agencies—investigated and reported the highest number of complaints. “In 2012, private fair housing organizations investigated 69.0% of
all housing-discrimination complaints in the United States.”258 In 201l, the
percentage was 67.6 percent.259 The report also stated:
A conservative estimate puts the number of violations of fair housing laws
at four million every year. Many people do not report housing discrimination because they don’t know where to go .... Also, landlords, managers,
real-estate agents, loan officers, and insurance agents who choose to
discriminate have become quite sophisticated in their practices. It is rare
for someone in the industry to engage in blatant discrimination; instead,

welcome everyone ... to discuss changes to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act .... [W]e have
heard from key players ... academics and researchers, consumer advocacy and community development organizations, data experts .... Although they play different roles, we
believe that all share a common goal—to ensure that the mortgage market is responsible,
transparent, efficient, and serves the needs of consumers and market participants alike ....
[We thank all of you] for being here on this panel .... [W]e have Jay Brinkmann, chief
economist and senior vice president of Research and Economics for the Mortgage Bankers
Association; Thomas Noto, associate general counsel at Bank of America; [and] Lisa Rice,
vice president, National Fair Housing Alliance.”) (comment of Elizabeth A. Duke, former
member of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors) (emphasis added).
253
NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, MODERNIZING THE FAIR HOUSING ACT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: 2013 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 16 (Apr. 11, 2013), archived at http://perma
.cc/S8NU-YF9J; see also NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, http://www.nationalfairhousing
.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L6VX-QN6Y.
254
NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, supra note 253, at 16.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 17.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id.
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people looking for homes, loans or homeowners’ insurance will get the
run around.260

Even more relevant, many fair-housing complainants are applicants—
“people looking for homes, loans or homeowners’ insurance.”261 To prove
the assertion, consider these findings: (1) in 2012, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) sued Countrywide Financial Corporation, alleging that Countrywide
discriminated against more than 200,000 ethnic-minority applicants who applied for residential loans;262 (2) DOJ filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo
Bank in 2012, accusing Wells Fargo of systemically discriminating against
ethnic-minority applicants who applied for mortgages between 2004 and
2009;263 (3) in 2012, DOJ sued Bank of America, asserting that the lender
violated the Fair Housing Act by discriminating against 25,000 disabled applicants who applied for loans;264 and, (4) in 2012, the NFHA reported that
220 persons—who applied for housing—were discriminated against on the
basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.265
Again, the evidence is incontrovertible: Congress and state legislatures
enacted various consumer protection and antidiscrimination laws to help
eliminate or decrease deceptive trade practices as well as irrational discriminatory practices and transactions. Furthermore, a careful examination of
the various statutes discussed in Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C of this Article reveals another indisputable fact: state and federal legislators gave protected
classes of dissatisfied consumers the right to use courts and formal administrative proceedings to secure legal and equitable remedies.266 Congress,
260

Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
262
Id. at 30.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 32.
265
Id. at 9.
266
See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 866 (2011) (holding a
fiancée who was allegedly fired in retaliation after his fiancé filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC has standing to sue under Title VII as an aggrieved person); Anjelino
v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88–93 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that male employees had
standing to assert sex discrimination claims for discrimination against female workers
because they suffered pecuniary injuries); Fiedler v. Marumsco Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1150
(4th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a white student who was expelled from school for allegedly
dating a black student had standing to sue under Section 1981); DeMatteis v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir. 1975) (declaring that a white man who was the
victim of discrimination because he sold his house to a black person had standing to sue
under Section 1981); Tessier v. Moffat, 93 F. Supp. 2d 729, 735–36 (E.D. La. 1998) (“To
have standing to sue under Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they are consumers or business competitors.”).
261
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however, enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, which compels contractual
parties to arbitrate their disputes in private and informal dispute-resolution
proceedings.267 Conversely, common law rules of contract formation and
interpretation are equally clear: standing alone, standardized-preprinted application forms are not binding and enforceable contractual agreements.268
Therefore, several highly FAA-related questions plead for commonsensical and intelligible answers: (1) whether Congress intended for discontented
persons—who applied for goods and services—to arbitrate consumer protection claims in private arbitration hearings or to litigate those claims in state
and federal courts; (2) whether Congress intended for disgruntled applicants
to resolve their discriminatory practices claims before private arbitrators or
before jurors in state and federal courts; (3) whether Congress intended for
the FAA to preempt federal and state courts’ enforcement of antidiscrimination and consumer protection laws; and (4) whether Congress envisioned
for competent state and federal judges or private nonlawyers/arbitrators to
determine and enforce persons’ rights under federal antidiscrimination and
consumer protection laws. To begin the search for answers, the next Section briefly reviews the FAA in pertinent part and discusses congressional
intent that undergirds the statute.
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1924
Again, section 2 of the FAA reads in relevant part: “A written provision
in any ... contract ... to settle by arbitration a controversy ... arising out of
such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”269 Thus, spanning a period of nearly forty years, the Supreme
Court has issued multiple decisions and stated emphatically: “judicial
hostility to arbitration” was the sole impetus behind Congress’s decision to
enact the FAA.270 To be sure, English courts had a long history of refusing
267

Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, 883–84 (1925).
Giesela Ruhl, The Battle of the Forms: Comparative and Economic Observations,
24 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 189, 190–91 (2003).
269
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
270
See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308–09 (2013); AT&T
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (stating Congress enacted
the FAA in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration); EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (“[Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925] to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp.,
268
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to enforce arbitration provisions in private contracts.271 The Court’s repeated
and single “judicial hostility” explanation,272 however, overlooks some critical and historical facts.
First, unlike English courts, American courts have an exceedingly long
history of enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts—especially provisions
in standardized insurance contracts.273 Second, the Supreme Court’s “judicial hostility” explanation does not comport with Congress’s intent in 1924.
The FAA’s legislative history is exceptionally clear: merchants and members of exclusive trade associations encouraged Congress to enact the FAA—
primarily to prevent merchants from warring among themselves and battling
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989); Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
225 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (“The United States
Arbitration Act ... revers[ed] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”).
271
H.R. Rep. No. 96-68, at 1–2 (1924) (“Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy
of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to
arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This
jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the
English common law .... American courts ... have felt that the precedent was too strongly
fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized
the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it. This
bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a
procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.”) (emphasis added).
272
See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510.
273
Using Westlaw electronic data service, the author accessed the Insurance-Law
(MIN-CS) database and submitted the following query:(CONTRACT! AGREEMENT /P
ARBITRATION ARBITRAT!) & DA(BEF JAN 1, 1923) (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). The
search generated 904 cases. The earliest arbitration-related case was decided in 1797. See
especially Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Payne, 57 Kan. 291, 46 P. 315, 317–18
(Kan. 1896) (concluding that “[a]n award is prima facie conclusive between the parties as
to all matters submitted to the arbitrators .... If every award must be made conformable to
what would have been the judgment of this court in the case, it would render arbitrations
useless and vexatious, and a source of great litigation; for it very rarely happens that both
parties are satisfied. The decision by arbitration is the decision of a tribunal of the parties’
own choice and election .... [C]ourts have always regarded [arbitration] with liberal
indulgence .... They have only looked to see if the proceedings were honestly and fairly
conducted, and, if that appeared to be the case, they have uniformly and universally
refused to interfere with the judgment of the arbitrators.”) (emphasis added); see also
Solem v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 109 P. 432, 433 (Mont. 1910) (declaring appraisers’ award was binding upon the insured and the insurance company when the
parties agreed to submit the disputed amount to arbitration under the terms of the fire
insurance contract); Caldwell v. Va. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 S.W. 698, 704 (Tenn. 1911)
(declaring that under the terms of the insurance contract, “the complainant was bound in
the event of loss to submit the question of sound value of his loss and damage to
arbitrators for an award”).
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each other in courts.274 More precisely, the FAA was enacted primarily “to
preserve business friendships” among members of mercantile associations,275 to reduce “bitterness” among members of trade organizations,276
to “preserve trade customs,”277 to resolve “merchants versus merchants”
disputes efficiently and amicably,278 and to eliminate mercantile members’
financial costs of litigating intra-association disputes in courts.279
274
See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 7–8 (1924)
[hereinafter Joint 1924 Hearings on Federal Arbitration Bills] (statement of Charles
Bernheimer, Chairman, Committee on Arbitration—Chamber of Commerce of the State
of New York) (“The lawyer’s work ... is an economic wastage in the everyday commercial
transactions. It does not benefit the lawyer and does not benefit the client. There are four
known methods ... to meet trade disputes, the ordinary everyday trade disputes .... 1) the
parties [can] settle ... 2) the parties [can] settle by negotiation ... 3) the parties [can] enter
into formal arbitration ... which has legal sanction, ... so that the parties cannot—as they
can in most ... states—back out at the last moment when they see [that] the case is going
against them; and 4) the last method is ... litigation, which is ... the worst method of all ....
Speaking for those who have had experience and who are engaged in business, ...
arbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money. There is no question about that .... It
preserves business friendships .... Friendliness is preserved in business. It raises business
standards. It maintains business honor, [and] prevents unnecessary litigation .... [My]
statement ... is backed up by 73 commercial organizations in this country who have, by
formal vote, approved ... the bill before you.”) (emphasis added); id. at 24 (statement of
Samuel M. Forbes, Secretary of Converters’ Association) (“Our association has had
[much] experience under the New York arbitration act and with arbitration generally ....
[W]e most strongly feel that the adoption of a Federal arbitration act such as is now proposed will be one of the most forward steps in commercial life. Our members have found
arbitration to be expeditious, economical, and equitable, conserving business friendships
and energy.”).
275
Id. at 7.
276
See id. at 28 (statement of Alexander Rose representing the Arbitration Society of
America) (“[I]n closing, I need hardly add to what has been said [regarding] the ethical
importance of arbitration in avoiding bitterness.”).
277
See id. at 29 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member, Committee on Commerce,
Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association and General Counsel for the
New York State Chamber of Commerce) (“The trade organizations ... have a tremendous
interest and influence in establishing trade customs .... [One rule is,] ... if you are a
member you arbitrate your differences .... The silk association has it; the fruit association
has it; and the lumber association has it. Now, ... [the proposed arbitration act will not]
increase the customs [but it will add] legal force [to the customs].”).
278
See id. at 12 (statement of R.S. French, Representing the National League of
Marine Merchants of the United States, the Western Fruit Jobbers’ Association of American,
and the International Apple Shippers’ Association of America) (“[T]he principles of this
arbitration bill are substantially in accord with those principles which [our members]
adopted and made a part of [their respective] constitutions and by-laws ... at [those organizations’] inception 25 or 30 years ago .... [Our] organizations [approve] ... this measure
which is before this committee .... I represent ... large exporters and importers of perishable
goods .... [And in our organizations], disputes may arise in domestic as well as in foreign
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Yet the Supreme Court continues to embrace incessantly and unapologetically the “judicial hostility” argument in order to justify and enforce three
of the Court’s engineered “judicial policies”: (1) a liberal federal policy must
favor arbitration agreements;280 (2) an unequivocal federal policy must
favor “arbitral dispute resolution”;281 and (3) any doubt regarding the scope
of arbitrable issues must be resolved in favor of arbitration.282
Absolutely, Congress enacted the FAA to remove any doubt about the
enforceability of arbitration provisions in all types of negotiated and standardized contracts—construction, insurance, financial, goods, services,
employment, trade association, real estate, and professional contracts.283
Additionally, one may conclude correctly that Congress structured the FAA
to be rationally rather than irrationally biased in favor of arbitration. Likewise, merchants, corporations, and large financial, educational, political, and
commerce. We handle at home and from abroad over 600,000 carloads of freight annually,
and naturally the opportunity for disputes arises frequently.”); see also id. at 35 (The
American Bar Association’s Brief of the Proposed Federal Arbitration Statute which was
made a part of the record) (“The United States Department of Commerce has recently
made a most significant declaration regarding the policy of the business world in relation
to arbitration. In its publication entitled—Trade Association Activities—[the Department]
devotes an entire chapter ... to ‘Trade disputes and ethics.’ This entire chapter is largely a plea
for arbitration and a suggestion of methods which trade bodies may follow .... Contributions
to this discussion were made by ... representative[s] of widely different lines of business.”)
(emphasis added).
279
Id. at 12.
280
See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983);
see also AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (reaffirming the
“liberal federal policy [which] favor[s] arbitration agreements”); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2001) (reaffirming the “liberal federal policy [which] favor[s]
arbitration agreements”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25
(1991) (reaffirming the “liberal federal policy [which] favor[s] arbitration agreements”).
281
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985) (stating that the FAA reflects an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral
dispute resolution”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (observing that “questions
of arbitrability [must] be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”).
282
See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (citing Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. and reaffirming that “[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) (reaffirming Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
and stressing that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues ... be resolved in
favor of arbitration”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25 (“The Arbitration
Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”).
283
H.R. Rep. No. 96-68 at 2 (1924) (“The bill declares simply that such agreements
for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their
enforcement.”).
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professional entities should be encouraged to arbitrate their contractual disagreements in “unlettered tribunals or rusticum forums.”284 And the reason
is not terribly complicated: the proceedings in “unlettered tribunals” are generally less expensive than federal and state court proceedings.285
But, a compelling question remains: whether federal and state courts
should be categorically, defiantly, and irrationally biased in favor of mandatory arbitration if disputes arise out of noncontractual relationships? In
light of the FAA’s legislative history and congressional intent, the commonsensical answer is no. Consider Justice Thurgood Marshall’s measured
and intelligible analysis in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.286 Writing
for the majority in 1985, Justice Marshal wrote:
The legislative history of the [FAA] establishes that the purpose behind its
passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements
to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal
of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of
claims .... [P]assage of the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered .... We ... are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict between
two goals of the Arbitration Act—enforcement of private agreements and
encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution—must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to realize the intent of the drafters.287

Even more importantly, the FAA’s savings clause reads: “[An arbitration provision in any contract] shall be valid ... and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity.”288 Still, a cursory examination
of reported cases reveals an unsettling truth: large numbers of federal judges
have become irrationally or strongly biased in favor of mandatory arbitration.289 Additionally, one can find judicial conflicts and considerably more
284
Cf. Suarez-Valdez v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Exp., Inc., 858 F.2d 648, 649–50 (11th
Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“[An agreement to arbitrate] indicates the parties’ preference for more informal, less expensive procedures .... [Litigating in court, therefore,]
would subject the parties to the very complexities, inconveniences and expenses of
litigation that they determined to avoid ….”); Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Payne, 46
P. 315, 318 (Kan. 1896) (emphasis added) (“[Arbitration] is a popular, cheap, convenient,
and domestic mode of trial, which the courts have always regarded with liberal indulgence.
They have never exacted from these unlettered tribunals—this rusticum forum—the
observance of technical rule and formality.”) (emphasis added).
285
Springfield Fire & Martine Ins. Co., 46 P. at 318.
286
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
287
Id. at 219–21 (emphasis added); see also Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576, 588 (2008) (reaffirming that Dean Witter “reject[ed] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims”).
288
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2014).
289
See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
any prejudice from piecemeal litigation is overcome by the “strong bias in favor of
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evidence of irrational judicial bias among cases in which state and federal
courts decided a narrower question: whether arbitration provisions in standardized, preprinted application forms are enforceable under the FAA?
IV. “IRRATIONALLY BIASED” RULINGS AND PERSISTENT JUDICIAL
CONFLICTS OVER THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN
EMPLOYEES’ AND CONSUMERS’ APPLICATION FORMS
Unquestionably, the FAA permits all business and commercial entities
to fashion valid contracts which contain mandatory-arbitration provisions.290
But, as discussed earlier, applications for employment as well as for goods
and services increasingly contain arbitration clauses.291 And to reiterate a
settled common law principle of contract law, writings in standardized, preprinted application forms are not enforceable contracts.292 Therefore, in light
of this latter principle, several weighty, FAA-specific questions become
readily apparent: (1) whether arbitration provisions in preprinted applications
are enforceable contracts under the FAA’s “written provisions in a contract”
clause; (2) whether, under the FAA, applicants’ common law and statutory
claims may “arise out of” application forms rather than binding contracts;
(3) whether arbitration clauses in standardized application forms are enforceable under the FAA without any bargained-for exchange consideration;
and, (4) whether the FAA preempts the application of the parol evidence rule
arbitration” under the Federal Arbitration Act); THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., L.L.C. v.
Spradlin, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (D.N.M. 2012) (stressing that “the FAA [has a] strong
bias in favor of arbitration”); Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp.
2d 334, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that ‘any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration—
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ This bias in favor of arbitration,
‘is even stronger in the context of international transactions.’”) (citations omitted); see also
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 316 (S.C. 2012) (reiterating that there
is a “strong policy favoring arbitration”); David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s
Pro-Defendant Biasing of The Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1151 (2013) (“By mandating that numerous plaintiffs litigate
their common question claims separately in individual arbitrations rather than jointly in
class action arbitrations, the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion entrenched a potent structural and systemic bias in favor of defendants.”).
290
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
291
Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 106 (2010).
292
See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes; see also Wagner v. Glendale Adventist
Med. Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (1989) (“[An application for employment is not a
contract], it is a ... mere solicitation of an offer of employment.”).
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and allows arbitration provisions in preprinted application forms to supersede
writings in subsequent and totally integrated employment, goods, and services contracts? These questions and related issues are discussed in this
Part of the Article.
A. Judicial Conflict—Whether Mandatory-Arbitration Clauses in
Standardized Application Forms Are Enforceable “Written Provisions
in a Contract” Under the Federal Arbitration Act
To reemphasize, under the FAA section 2, an arbitration agreement is
enforceable only if it is a written provision in a contract.293 Therefore, the
Supreme Court and state supreme courts have stressed repeatedly: courts
must always employ state law principles of contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement to determine whether parties formed an arbitration
agreement or an arbitration clause in a contract.294 In J.M. Davidson, Inc.
v. Webster,295 the Texas Supreme Court was quite emphatic about the importance of judges’ carefully applying state-law principles of contract
before forcing parties to enter private arbitral proceedings:
A [party] attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute ... falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement .... [A]lthough
we have repeatedly expressed a strong presumption favoring arbitration,
the presumption arises only after the party seeking to compel arbitration
proves that a valid arbitration agreement exists .... [A] federal policy
293

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (holding that
“courts generally ... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of
contracts” when deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) (reaffirming that
state-law principles of contract law must be used to create, interpret and enforce
arbitration agreements); Title Max of Birmingham, Inc. v. Edwards, 973 So. 2d 1050, 1054
(Ala. 2007) (“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and this court applies the ordinary statelaw principles governing contracts in construing an agreement to arbitrate.”); Lane v.
Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672, 677 (Colo. 2006) (“In determining whether the parties have agreed to
submit the issue in question to arbitration, we follow state law principles governing contract formation.”); Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 156 (Del.
2002) (holding that “[t]he policy that favors alternate dispute resolution mechanisms,
such as arbitration, does not trump basic principles of contract interpretation.”); Melena v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 107–08 (Ill. 2006) (holding that arbitration agreements
must be analyzed using ordinary principles of contract law); Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of
S.C., 644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (S.C. 2007) (“Because even the most broadly worded arbitration
agreements still have limits founded in general principles of contract law, [we] will refuse
to interpret any arbitration agreement as applying to outrageous torts that are unforeseeable
to a reasonable consumer in the context of normal business dealings.”).
295
J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003).
294
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favoring arbitration does not apply to the determination of whether there
is a valid agreement to arbitrate; instead, ordinary contract principles
[apply] .... Thus, [a party who attempts] to enforce an arbitration agreement must show the agreement meets all requisite contract elements.296

To establish a valid and enforceable contract, the vast majority of state
supreme courts require a party to prove the following elements: (1) two or
more contracting parties agreeing to be bound; (2) sufficient consideration;
(3) a sufficiently definite agreement; (4) the parties’ legal capacity to make a
contract; (5) the parties’ mutual assent; and (6) the contract will not violate
common law and statutory law.297 In addition, state supreme courts also
embrace several other principles:
When examining a contract, a court should first examine the four corners of the contract to determine how to interpret it. If the language in the
contract is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the contract must be effectuated. Vagueness and ambiguity are more strongly construed against
the party drafting the contract. [If] the intent of the parties is not clear,
[a] court should ... resort to extrinsic evidence.298

Now, assume that a third-year law student applies for a consumer loan
to purchase law casebooks and braces for her child. The parent-student completes and signs only a preprinted, standardized application form. Also assume: (1) the loan application contains an arbitration clause; (2) the lender
rejects the application; (3) the student-parent sues the lender for allegedly
discriminating irrationally on the basis of gender; and (4) the lender demands
mandatory arbitration. Clearly, based on the rules outlined above, the student’s stand-alone loan application is not an enforceable contract under common law principles of contract law.
Nevertheless, would the arbitration clause in the law student’s completed
and signed loan application still be enforceable under the FAA section 2? As
of this writing, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the narrow
question: whether an arbitration clause in a stand-alone, preprinted application form qualifies as a “written provision in a contract” under section 2 of
the FAA?299 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has decided two controversies involving the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a standardized application form that was “a part of” an enforceable contract.300
296

Id. at 227–28.
Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 266, 270 (Miss. 2003).
298
Id. (emphasis added).
299
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013).
300
See infra notes 301–32 and accompanying text.
297
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First, consider the relevant facts and holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corporation.301 Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) employed Robert Gilmer to serve as a financial services manager.302
Under the terms of Interstate’s employment contract, Gilmer had to become a
member of a third party, stock exchange organization.303 Gilmer completed
and signed the third party standardized application form, entitled Uniform
Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (UASIR).304
Under the terms of the UASIR, Gilmer agreed to arbitrate any dispute—between Gilmer and Interstate—that required arbitration under the third party
organization’s rules, constitutions or bylaws.305 Briefly put, Gilmer completed a membership application and formed a contractual relationship with
the securities exchange organization.306
Six years later, Interstate fired Gilmer.307 In response, the sixty-two-yearold employee filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.308 Later, Gilmer sued Interstate in federal
court.309 He alleged that Interstate’s firing violated the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).310 In response, Interstate filed a motion
to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim.311 Interstate relied upon the
arbitration agreement in Gilmer’s securities registration application.312 The
employee, however, cited language in FAA section 1, which reads in pertinent part: “nothing herein ... shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce.”313 Gilmer argued that he should not be compelled
to arbitrate his federal claim.314
In the course of events, the controversy reached the Supreme Court.
Several amici curiae supported Gilmer and argued that all disputes involving
301

500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id.
305
Id. (“NYSE Rule 347 provides for arbitration of ‘[a]ny controversy between a
registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered representative.’”).
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
311
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
312
Id.
313
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
314
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26–27.
302

454

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:405

“contracts of employment” should be excluded from mandatory arbitration
under FAA section 1.315 However, the Court stressed:
[I]t would be inappropriate to address the scope of [the exclusion under
FAA §1], because the [disputed] arbitration clause ... is not contained in a
contract of employment .... The record before us does not show, and the
parties do not contend, that Gilmer’s employment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration
clause ... is in Gilmer’s securities registration application—which is a
contract with the securities exchanges.316

Therefore, the Supreme Court embraced lower courts’ rulings and declared
that the exclusionary language in FAA section 1 did not bar arbitration
clauses which appear in securities exchange members’ registration applications.317 Once more, according to the Court, a third party’s registration
application and the securities organization’s membership agreement formed a
binding contract between Gilmer and Gilmer’s employer.318
Ten years after deciding Gilmer, the Supreme Court decided Circuit City
Stores v. Adams.319 The relevant facts in the latter case are fairly similar to
those in Gilmer. Saint Clair Adams visited a Circuit City Store in Santa Rosa,
California.320 He completed and signed an employment application form,
which read:
I agree [to] settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City,
exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator.
By way of example only, such claims include claims under federal, state,
and local statutory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
including the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and [the] law of tort.321

Ultimately, Circuit City employed Adams as a sales counselor.322 Two
years later, a dispute arose between Circuit City and Adams.323 In response,
315

Id. at 25 n.2.
Id. (emphasis added) (“Gilmer ... did not raise the issue in the courts below, it was not
addressed there, and it was not among the questions presented in the petition for certiorari.”).
317
Id. (“[W]e therefore hold that § 1’s exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer’s
arbitration agreement.”).
318
Id.
319
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
320
Id. at 109.
321
Id. at 109–10.
322
Id. at 110.
323
Id.
316
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Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in
state court alleging that the employer violated California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act,324 and committed various torts under California
law. Circuit City filed an action in federal court asking the district court
judge to compel arbitration of Adams’s claims under FAA section 1.325 Circuit City prevailed.326 The controversy reached the Supreme Court, however, where the parties asked the Court to resolve an inter-circuits conflict
over whether an arbitration clause in a standardized employment form is
an excluded “contract of employment” under FAA section 1.327 To resolve
the conflict, the Court declared that the “contract of employment” language exempted transportation workers from mandatory arbitration under
section 1 of the FAA.328
In addition, the Court stressed: “The instant case [does not involve] the
basic coverage authorization under § 2 of the Act, but the exemption from
coverage under § 1.”329 Even more importantly, Circuit City insisted that
the signed and completed application form was not an excluded contract
under section 1 of the FAA.330 The Supreme Court, however, declined to
grant certiorari regarding the question of whether Adams’s signed employment application was a stand alone “contract of employment.”331 Still, in
the end, the Court accepted implicitly—without deciding—that Adams’s
completed application form and his employment formed a totally integrated
contract.332 Plainly, the Gilmer and Circuit City courts did not address the
324

Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 12900–12907 (Deering 2013)).
Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 110.
326
Id.
327
Id. at 110–11.
This comprehensive exemption had been advocated by amici curiae in
Gilmer, where we addressed the question whether a registered securities representative’s employment discrimination claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq., could be submitted to arbitration pursuant to an agreement in his securities registration application.
Id. at 112.
328
Id. at 112 (“Most Courts of Appeals conclude the exclusion provision is limited to
transportation workers, defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.’ As we stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit takes a different view and interprets the § 1 exception to exclude all
contracts of employment from the reach of the FAA.”) (citation omitted).
329
Id.
330
Id. at 113.
331
Id.
332
Id. The Courts’ explanation is found in the employment application form, which
stated in pertinent part, “I will settle any ... disputes ... relating to my application ... employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City ... by ... arbitration.” Id. at 109–10.
325
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question of whether an arbitration clause in a completed, signed, and standalone standardized application form is a “written provision in a contract”
under FAA section 2. Consequently, among lower courts, this highly important question has generated conflicting rulings. To illustrate the essence
of the split, consider the facts and rulings in two cases which were decided
in the same year and after Gilmer and Circuit City.
In Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of
Washoe,333 James and Linda Burch (Burches) purchased a new house from
Double Diamond (Diamond).334 Approximately four months after closing,
Diamond gave Linda Burch a “thirty-one-page warranty booklet.”335 At that
time, Diamond also offered the homeowners a “2-10 Year Home Buyers
Warranty” (HBW) and asked the consumers to complete and sign a one-page
“Application for Home Enrollment” form.336 In response, Linda signed the
standardized application form; but, she did not read the thirty-one-page
booklet.337 Purportedly, the HBW was an express warranty—promising that
the house would be (1) free from materials and workmanship defects for one
year; (2) free from electrical, plumbing, and mechanical systems defects
for two years; and (3) free from structural defects for ten years.338 More
relevant, the one-page “Application for Home Enrollment” form stated:
By signing, [the] Homebuyer acknowledges that s/he has viewed and
received a video of “Warranty Teamwork: You, Your Builder & HBW,”
read the warranty, ... received a copy of this form with the Home Buyers
Warranty Booklet, and CONSENTS TO THE TERMS OF THESE DOCUMENTS INCLUDING THE BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION
contained therein.339

The arbitration clause in the HBW read in pertinent part:
Any controversy ... arising out of or relating to Builder’s workmanship/
systems limited warranty coverages ... shall be settled by final and
binding arbitration in accordance with the Construction Arbitration
Services (CAS) or other [National Home Insurance Company] NHIC/
HBW approved rules ... in effect at the time of the arbitration .... Any
controversy concerning a claim arising out of or relating to the Builder’s
ten year structural coverage (insured by NHIC) shall be settled by final
333

49 P.3d 647 (Nev. 2002).
Id. at 648.
335
Id.
336
Id.
337
Id.
338
Id.
339
Id.
334
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and binding arbitration .... Arbitration of all structural warranty disputes
will be conducted by arbitrators supplied by an NHIC approved arbitration service.340

Nearly two years after purchasing the house, the Burches discovered
“‘serious problems underneath [their] house’—saturated floor joists, wet
insulation, muddy ground, and a wet, moldy foundation.”341 The consumers
reported the defects to Diamond and requested certain repairs.342 Put simply,
the Burches did not like the offer and consequently filed a lawsuit in state
court, raising several common law theories of recovery: breach of express
and implied warranties, negligence, and fraud and misrepresentation.343
Diamond filed a motion to stay the trial and a motion to compel arbitration.344 The builder argued that the terms of the application and the booklet
required the parties to arbitrate all disputes relating to the construction of
the Burch’s home.345
The district court granted Diamond’s motion to compel arbitration.346
The lower court concluded that the one-page warranty application—which
referenced the HBW—was a valid contract.347 The Burches appealed, filing a
writ of mandamus and arguing that the district court’s motion to compel
arbitration should be vacated.348 On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged that “the FAA establishes a strong public policy favoring arbitration for the purpose of avoiding the unnecessary expense and delay of
litigation where parties have agreed to arbitrate.”349 But the state supreme
court stressed: FAA section 2 “does not mandate the enforcement of an unconscionable contract or arbitration clause.”350 Examining the record, the
340

Id.
Id. at 649.
342
Id. (“[The Burches] requested that Double Diamond remedy the situation by
removing the insulation, professionally treating the area with mildew and fungicide
controls, installing upgraded insulation with proper venting, constructing a proper water
barrier underneath the house, and reimbursing them for all current and future fees for
professional inspections. While contesting liability, Double Diamond offered to completely dry the crawl space underneath the house, install two additional foundation vents
and a six-mill vapor barrier, treat all areas of active fungus with an approved fungicide,
and reinstall insulation except at the rim joist.”).
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
Id.
347
Id.
348
Id.
349
Id. at 650.
350
Id. at 650 (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(holding that generally applicable contract defenses—such as unconscionability—may be
used to invalidate an arbitration clause)).
341
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Nevada Supreme Court outlined several reasons for reversing the district
court’s ruling.351 One explanation, however, shines brightly: “The Burches
did not have an opportunity to read the one-page application form, or the
thirty-one-page HBW booklet ... before signing ‘the application.’ The arbitration clause was located on page six of the HBW booklet.”352 Therefore,
the arbitration clause in the standardized application form was procedurally
unconscionable, thereby effectively precluding the formation of a valid
arbitration contract.353
Now consider the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in EEOC v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps,354 which was decided almost seven weeks after Burch.
Donald Scott Lagatree (Lagatree) applied for a position as a full-time legal
secretary with the law firm of Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP
(Luce).355 Luce was impressed with Lagatree’s credentials and experience.356 Therefore, on his first day of work, Lagatree received the law firm’s
standard, conditional-offer-of-employment letter.357 The letter outlined
Lagatree’s salary and benefits.358 In addition, the letter stated that Lagatree
or the firm “could terminate [his] employment at any time, with or without
cause.”359 An arbitration provision also appeared in the letter, requiring
Lagatree to submit all “claims arising from or related to his employment”
to binding arbitration.360 More specifically, the arbitration clause read in
relevant part:
In the event of any dispute ... arising from or related to your employment or
the termination of your employment, we jointly agree to submit all such

351

Id. (“The Burches did not receive a copy of the HBW’s terms until after Double
Diamond had paid the premium to enroll the Burch home in the warranty program—
almost four months after they closed [the] escrow on their home. Double Diamond told
the Burches that the HBW’s issuance was ‘automatic’ and offered extra protection for
their home, when in fact the warranty limited their protection under Nevada law .... The
Burches were not sophisticated consumers, they did not understand the HBW’s terms,
and the HBW’s disclaimers were not conspicuous.”).
352
Id.
353
Id. (“Under these circumstances, the Burches did not have a meaningful opportunity to decide if they wanted to agree to the HBW’s terms, including its arbitration
provision. As a result, the HBW was [also] procedurally unconscionable.”).
354
303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002).
355
Id. at 997.
356
Id.
357
Id.
358
Id.
359
Id.
360
Id.
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disputes or claims to confidential binding arbitration, under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Any arbitration must be initiated within 180 days after
the dispute or claim first arose, and will be heard before a retired State or
Federal judge in the county containing the firm office in which you were
last employed. The law of the State in which you last worked will apply.361

For two days, Lagatree worked “without a contract.”362 Moreover, as
an applicant, Lagatree realized: “[Signing the arbitration provision in the
letter] was the only way that he could ... become an employee of the
firm.”363 Still, for various reasons, Lagatree refused to sign the conditionaloffer-of-employment letter that housed the arbitration provision.364 Shortly
thereafter, Luce withdrew the job offer.365 And the record is clear: Luce
refused to employ Lagatree “only because he would not sign the arbitration provision.”366
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Luce on
behalf of Lagatree.367 The EEOC alleged that Luce retaliated against
Lagatree—which is a violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,368 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),369 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),370 and the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 (EPA).371 The EEOC asked the federal district court to award
various damages372 and grant injunctive relief—preventing Luce from forcing
employment applicants to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment.373 The district court refused to award compensatory damages
and rejected EEOC’s request for injunctive relief.374 The district court, however, ordered Luce to stop forcing applicants to arbitrate Title VII claims.375
361

Id.
Id. at 998 (emphasis added).
363
Id.
364
Id. at 997–98 (“[H]e ‘couldn’t sign ... the arbitration agreement’ because ‘it was
unfair.’ ... [And he could] not sign an arbitration agreement under an at-will employment
situation because he believed he needed to keep in place his ‘civil liberties, including the
right to a jury trial and redress of grievances through the government process.’”).
365
Id. at 998 (emphasis added).
366
Id.
367
Id.
368
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012).
369
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2012).
370
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012).
371
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012).
372
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d at 998 (“Lagatree sought lost wages,
damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages.”).
373
Id. at 997.
374
Id.
375
Id.
362
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The lower court also declared that applicants for employment do not have
to arbitrate claims under the ADA, ADEA, and EPA.376 Luce appealed.377
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and issued multiple rulings.378 First, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated
explicitly: employers may require applicants “to sign agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of their employment.”379 Of course, that
required Lagatree and Luce to form a binding and enforceable contract. But,
the record is clear: Lagatree worked just two days “without a contract.”380
Even more importantly, the language of FAA section 2 is unambiguous: a
party may compel arbitration under the FAA only if the party presents proof
of an arbitration clause in a valid, written, and legally enforceable contract.381
So, what compelled the Ninth Circuit to reject the district court’s conclusion that employment applicants do not have to arbitrate Title VII claims?
Simply put, the court of appeals ignored settled principles of contract law,
circumvented the “written contract” requirement under section 2 of the
FAA, focused on the language in FAA section 1, and applied the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Circuit City.382 Once more, in Circuit City, the Court did
not address the question of whether—absent a valid contract—applicants
for goods, services or employment must arbitrate federal and state law claims
under FAA section 2. Instead, citing FAA section 1, the Supreme Court
simply declared that the FAA covers every “contract of employment” except transportation workers’ employment contracts.383 Without a doubt,
the rulings in Burch and Luce conflict.384 Therefore, when the opportunity
376

Id.
Id. at 998.
378
Id. at 997 (“We vacate the district court’s permanent injunction against Luce
Forward .... We additionally reject the EEOC’s retaliation theory. Lagatree did not
engage in a protected activity when he refused to sign the Luce Forward arbitration
agreement, and consequently, Luce Forward did not retaliate by refusing to hire him.”).
379
Id.
380
Id. at 998 (emphasis added).
381
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
382
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d at 1003.
383
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
384
Compare Haynes v. Fincher, 525 S.E.2d 405, 406–07 (Ga. App. 1999) (“[T]he
Hayneses applied for the builder’s warranty .... [The] signed application provides that the
warranty consists of that application and the warranty program booklet .... [T]he booklet
establishes that any disputes the buyers have with the builder may be submitted to
binding arbitration governed by the procedures of the Federal Arbitration Act .... The
Hayneses argue that the binding arbitration provision ... is not an enforceable agreement
because neither they nor Fincher initiated it as required by [the code]. The argument is
without merit because [the code] requires parties to initial arbitration clauses only in home
sale or loan contracts. The builder’s warranty ... is not a home sale or loan contract ....
Consequently, the absence of the parties’ initials beside the warranty’s arbitration provision is
377
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arises, the Court should address and answer intelligibly the question of
whether an arbitration clause in a standardized, preprinted application
form or in a conditional-offer-of-employment letter is an enforceable written contract under FAA section 2. As of this writing those instruments are
not enforceable contracts under the settled principles, which are outlined
intelligibly and clearly in two classic contract law cases—Mitchill v. Lath
and Lucy v. Zehmer.385
B. Judicial Conflict—Whether Disgruntled Applicants’ Antidiscrimination,
Civil Rights and Harassment Claims Arose Out of Valid Employment
Contracts or From Allegedly Unenforceable Standardized Employment
Application Forms
To repeat, the FAA section 2 also reads in relevant part: “[A] controversy ... arising out of such [written] contract [may be settled by arbitration].”386 Of course, the FAA does not define “arising out of such
contract.”387 A conservative reading of the phrase, however, means courts
may not compel arbitration unless parties’ disagreements evolve from within
the four corners of a written contract. On the other hand, several courts have
adopted a more liberal definition—concluding that disputes arising from
non-negotiated instruments and relationships are also covered.388 But note
that in Hobley v. Yellow Transp., Inc.,389 the federal district court judge
discussed a middle position. Citing Texas law, the federal judge penned
the following interpretation of the phrase “arising out of a contract”:
[Courts employ] a two-part test: (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate must
exist between the parties; and (2) the dispute in question must fall within
the scope of that arbitration agreement. Under Texas law, ... [a] claim is
arbitrable if it is so interwoven with the underlying contract that it
could not stand alone; however, it is not arbitrable if the claim is so
not fatal.”) (emphasis added), with Mendez v. Puerto Rican Intern. Cos., Inc., 2010 WL
2654439, at *3 (D. Virgin Islands July 1, 2010) (Plaintiffs signed certain dispute resolution agreements (DRAs) when they applied for work. “This dispute presents a question of
arbitrability .... Defendants contend that [a valid] agreement exists .... Plaintiffs contend
that they never intended to agree to such a one-sided bargain. Under normal principles of
contract interpretation, there is no good reason to conclude that by signing the DRAs,
Plaintiffs intended to commit themselves to such an unbounded, far-reaching duty ....
Without clear and unmistakable evidence that Plaintiffs did intend to bestow such a benefit on Defendants, this court will not assume that the parties so intended.”).
385
See discussion supra Introduction.
386
9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
387
Id.
388
See infra notes 391–437 and accompanying text.
389
No. 3:09-CV-1160-K, 2010 WL 286690 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2010).
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independent of the contract that it can be maintained without reference
to the contract .... The court must look to the facts forming the basis of
each claim to determine whether it could be maintained without reference to the contract, ... not simply whether it references the contract.390

Still, the “arising out of a contract” language continues to produce conflicting rulings among state and federal courts over the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in standardized application forms. Again, an important
principle of contract law must be stressed: stand-alone, standardized, preprinted application forms are not valid contracts. Yet, when deciding whether
to compel arbitration of various claims, several courts have ignored that
principle. Quite simply, several tribunals have created exceptions to the
FAA’s arising-out-of-a-contract requirement and granted motions to compel arbitration when movants simply established: (1) the controversy only
arose out of the application process; (2) the dispute was only related to an
application form; and (3) a disagreement was related in any manner to the
intake process and application.391
Consequently, in the wake of those exceptions, a questionable and
controversial multi-part doctrine has evolved among some inferior federal
courts. Under the FAA section 2, arbitration is mandatory if (1) disgruntled individuals complete and sign preprinted stand-alone applications,
390

Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Adams v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., No. CIV-12-1310-HE, 2013 WL
1450507, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 9, 2013) (The non-negotiated instrument read: “[Parties
agree to arbitrate all] controversies arising out of or relating to the applicant’s application or
candidacy for employment, promotion, demotion, or termination of employment with the
[c]ompany.”) (emphasis added); Mendez v. Puerto Rican Int’l Cos., Nos. 05-cv-00174
-LDD, 05-cv-00199-LDD, 2010 WL 2654439, at *2, n.8 (D.V.I. July 1, 2010) (The arbitration clause read in pertinent part: “Regardless of whether Wyatt offers me employment,
both Wyatt and I agree to resolve ... all ... controversies arising out of or relating to ... my
application or candidacy for employment.”) (emphasis added); Hobley, 2010 WL
286690, at *1 (“I agree to resolve all ... controversies arising out of, or related to, my
application for employment, my employment, or the cessation of my employment.”);
Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha, Inc., No. 06-1735, 2007 WL 707364, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2,
2007) (“The aspirant ... and [the Fraternity] ... agree that any and all disputes ... arising
out of or relating in any manner whatsoever to the Intake process and application shall
be subject to and resolved by compulsory and binding arbitration.”) (emphasis added);
Allen v. Labor Ready Sw., B237673, 2013 WL 1910293, at *2 (Cal. App. May 9, 2013)
(The employment application read: “I agree that any disputes arising out of my application for employment or employment ... will be resolved by final and binding arbitration.”)
(emphasis added); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Brenner, Nos. 13-12-00564-CV, 13-12-00620CV, 2013 WL 3326640, at *4 (Tex. App. June 27, 2013) (The instrument read: “[A]ny
claim, controversy and/or dispute ... arising out of and/or in any way related to [the]
application for employment, employment and/or termination of employment’ would be
‘resolved by arbitration.’”) (emphasis added).
391
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absent any evidence of valid and enforceable employment contracts; (2) the
standardized application forms contain arbitration clauses; and (3) the
complainants’ employment discrimination claims are interwoven with the
arbitration provisions in completed and signed application forms.392 To be
sure, the exceptions to the FAA’s arising-out-of-a-contract rule effectively
marginalize or undermine a previously discussed FAA’s requirement: federal
courts must apply ordinary state-law principles of contract to determine
whether a valid arbitration contract exists or whether an arbitration clause
is valid and enforceable.393
To help prove the latter assertions, consider the Indiana district court’s
analysis and decision in Baumann v. The Finish Line, Inc.394 Tonya Baumann
applied for a position at Finish Line’s call center in Indianapolis, Indiana.395
Finish Line required her to complete and sign a standardized employmentapplication form before hiring her.396 The application contained an “Applicant Statement,” which read in relevant part:
I agree [to settle all] ... controversies arising out of or relating to my
application or candidacy for employment and/or cessation of employment with The Finish Line ... exclusively by final and binding arbitration .... [C]laims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory
or common law, such as ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, including the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ....
Complete details of my agreement to submit these claims to arbitration
are contained in [the] ... Employee Dispute Resolution Plan, which has
been made available for my review prior to the execution of this application. I have read and understand the above paragraph and have voluntarily agreed to it.397

The Employee Dispute Resolution Plan (Plan) read: “Application for
employment, initial employment, or continued employment ... constitutes
consent and agreement by both the Employee and the Company to be
bound by this Plan.”398 The record, however, revealed that Finish Line and
Baumann never executed a written employment contract.399 Instead,
Baumann began working as an at-will employee—again, without contract
392

See infra note 551 and accompanying text.
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (reaffirming the principle that
courts apply general state-law principles of contract to determine whether an arbitration
agreement falls within the scope of the FAA).
394
No. 108-cv-1385-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 2750094 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009).
395
Id. at *1.
396
Id.
397
Id. (emphasis added).
398
Id.
399
Id. at *1–2.
393
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of employment.400 As things progressed, Baumann became dissatisfied
with her work environment and filed a sex discrimination charge against
Finish Line.401 In response, the company fired her.402 Later, Baumann commenced an employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII).403 Finish Line filed a motion
to compel arbitration, asserting that “a valid and binding arbitration agreement” barred the Title VII lawsuit.404
The federal district court embraced Finish Line’s argument and granted
summary relief.405 What influenced the judge’s decision? The court began its
analysis by citing the settled rule of contract law: arbitration agreements are
treated as ordinary contracts.406 But, after applying that principle, the federal
district court rejected Baumann’s arguments.407 In her answer, Baumann
argued that the Applicant Statement and the Plan did not comprise a valid
and enforceable arbitration contract.408 She stressed: (1) the Plan did not contain an effective date; and (2) she received a copy of the Plan before Finish
Line formally adopted the instrument.409 Put simply, the judge concluded:
the application and Plan comprised a totally integrated, written employment contract.410 The judge also declared that Baumann acknowledged
receiving the Plan when she signed the Applicant Statement.411
The federal district court judge’s analysis and ruling in Baumann are
less than stellar for several reasons. First, a conservative reading of the facts
in Baumann strongly suggests that Finish Line’s Plan was nothing more
than words and phrases in an employee handbook. Indiana law is exceedingly clear; employee handbooks are not unilateral contracts of employment.412 In Orr v. Westminster Village North, Inc.,413 the Indiana Supreme
400

Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
402
Id.
403
Id.
404
Id. (Finish Line filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration.
The court converted the request “into a Motion for Summary Judgment on the sole issue
of whether the Court must dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration.”).
405
Id. at *6.
406
Id. at *3.
407
Id. at *6.
408
Id. at *3.
409
Id.
410
Id.
411
Id. (“Baumann has not apprised the Court of a single provision in either the
Applicant Statement or the Plan that was conditioned upon the Plan having an effective
date .... The Court concludes that the blank line is legally insignificant.”).
412
City of Indianapolis v. Byrns, 745 N.E.2d 312, 317 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
413
689 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. 1997).
401
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Court outlines the test to determine whether an employee handbook might
be an enforceable employment contract.414 The Baumann court, however,
never applied or mentioned the Orr test.415
Second, the FAA’s arising-out-of-a-written-contract test was not satisfied because Baumann’s stand-alone, completed application form was not
a written contract under Indiana law.416 Consequently, the application and
the Plan could not comprise a totally integrated employment contract.
Third, the indisputable facts in the record undermined the court’s implicit
summary judgment ruling: she was an employment-at-will worker, performing without the protection of a written employment contract. Still, the
federal judge concluded implicitly that Baumann’s statutory sexual harassment claim evolved from a written employment contract.417 Furthermore,
assuming that a valid employment contract existed between the applicant
and the employer, the court did not explain how the sexual harassment claim
arose from the written contract.418
The material facts in Heseman v. Hensler419 and Baumann are quite
similar. The holdings, however, conflict. In Heseman, the defendant, Joseph
Hensler, was the owner, president, and chief executive officer of Clarklift,
Inc.420 Carolyn Heseman, the applicant and plaintiff, applied for a job at
Clarklift.421 She completed and signed an application form, which contained an arbitration clause.422 The latter read in pertinent part:
In the event you contend that Clarklift-Team Power ... [violated] ... any
of your rights, you and Clarklift-Team power agree to submit any such
matter to binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal
Arbitration Act. If the company does not receive a written request for
414

Id. at 720–22 (The Indiana Supreme Court requires a party to prove several
elements: (1) proof of an employee handbook that contains an unambiguous promise or
an offer of employment; (2) proof of an employee handbook that adequately informs
employees about the scope and parameters of the offer; (3) proof that an employee read
the handbook and the offer, and (4) proof that the employee accepted the offer by beginning to work.).
415
Id. at 712–22.
416
See, e.g., W.S.K. v. M.H.S.B., 922 N.E.2d 671, 695 (Ind. App. 2010) (reiterating that
“mutuality of obligation” must be present to create a contract and concluding applications
for medical-staff positions are not contracts).
417
Baumann v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 108-cv-1385-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 2750094, at
*1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009) (“The court has considered the parties’ arguments and,
without addressing the merits of the complaint.”).
418
Id. at *1–6.
419
No. C044769, 2005 WL 941362 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Apr. 22, 2005).
420
Id. at *1.
421
Id. at *1–2.
422
Id.
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arbitration from you within 6 months of the date of this application,
you agree you will have waived any right to raise any claim.423

Clarklift hired Heseman to manage the accounts payable department,
and she “received several promotions and pay raises.”424 But, all was not
well. Allegedly, one of Clarklift’s mechanics began harassing Heseman.425
After Heseman complained about the harassment, Hensler terminated
Heseman, claiming that her job performance was substandard.426 Later,
Heseman filed a complaint under California’s antidiscrimination code, asserting that Hensler and Clarklift condoned and practiced sexual harassment,
sexual discrimination, and retaliation.427 Defendants filed a motion to
compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the Application for
Employment.428 The superior court denied the motion and Clarklift and
Hensler appealed.429
The California court of appeals began its analysis by asking whether
the application form was a valid contract.430 Embracing the superior court’s
ruling, the appellate court concluded that the application and the arbitration
clause were procedurally unconscionable.431 But even more importantly, the
court of appeals found that the arbitration provision covered only “claims
423

Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
425
Id. (Allegedly, the mechanics harassed Heseman by “repeatedly commenting on
her physical appearance and attractiveness, offering to take her out to lunch even though ...
[she] told him that she was married and not available, proposing that he was more virile
than her husband, telephoning her with sexual overtures, telling a female coworker that
he wanted to have sex with [Heseman], and asking the coworker about ... [Heseman’s]
personal life.”).
426
Id.
427
Id; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2014) (“It is an unlawful
employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except
where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the
State of California ... [f]or an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic
information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual
orientation, or military and veteran status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the
person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment, or
to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to
employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.”).
428
Heseman, 2005 WL 941362, at *1.
429
Id.
430
Id. at *3.
431
Id. at *2 (“The arbitration provision is both procedurally unconscionable, as it is
presented to each applicant on a take it or leave it basis, and substantively unconscionable, as it forces the employee to agree to arbitrate all claims while the employer does not
have to arbitrate any of its claims.”).
424
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arising out of the application process itself.”432 Heseman’s sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and retaliatory discharge claims “arose more
than six months after” she completed and signed the standardized application
form.433 Therefore, the non-negotiated, standardized arbitration provision
did not cover the claims outlined in Heseman’s complaint.434
The court’s analyses and conclusion in Heseman are more intelligibly
convincing than those in Baumann. And the reason is not terribly complicated. The California court carefully reviewed settled principles of contract
law and applied those principles to address two important FAA-related
questions: (1) whether Clarklift and Heseman formed a valid contract that
contained an arbitration clause; and (2) whether Heseman’s claims evolved
from the terms of the written contract.435 In the end, the answer to both
questions was no.436 Still, in the near future, the Supreme Court will have
to address the following question directly: whether FAA section 2 requires
workers to arbitrate their antidiscrimination, civil rights, and harassment
claims if those claims evolved from standardized employment application
forms or arose out of an employment application process?437
C. Judicial Conflict—Whether Applicants’ Consumer Protection Claims and
Lawsuits Arose Out of Valid and Enforceable Financial Services Contracts
or Out of Allegedly Unenforceable Standardized Application Forms
In the wake of Superstorm Sandy’s widespread destruction in 2012,
the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs encouraged storm victims
432

Id. at *5.
Id. at *2.
434
Id. at *5.
435
Id. at *3.
436
Id. at *2 (“[Heseman] opposed the motion on the grounds that the agreement, by
its terms, did not apply to [her] claims, which arose more than six months after her employment commenced; the agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it
required her to waive her right to judicial redress of further claims as a condition of
employment; the agreement was substantively unconscionable because it applied only to
her claims against Clarklift, and not to any claims Clarklift might have against her; and
the agreement did not encompass her noncontractual, statutory claims against the
individual defendants.”).
437
Compare McLean v. Byrider Sales of Ind. S, L.L.C., No. 2:13-cv-524, 2013 WL
4777199, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2013) (concluding that plaintiffs’ claims under the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4311, and
Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 arose out of plaintiffs’ applications or candidacies for employment), with Niolet v. Rice, 20 So. 3d 31, 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that plaintiff’s
assault and battery claims were not directly or indirectly related to plaintiff’s employment
(citing Smith v. Captain D’s, L.L.C., 963 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (Miss. 2007) (holding that a
sexual-assault assault claim had no connection with the employee’s employment))).
433

468

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:405

to apply for home rebuilding grants.438 On Sandy’s first anniversary, however, thousands of homeowners and consumers in New Jersey filed a racial
discrimination lawsuit against Governor Christopher Christie and his administration.439 In particular, the fairly large group of disgruntled consumers
alleged: “Latino and African-American applicants were disproportionately
rejected for rebuilding funds.”440 Governor Christie and the state disputed
the allegations.441
As the author was penning this Article, a legal question evolved: whether
Governor Christie would ask a court to force the complaining consumers
into binding arbitration under the FAA section 2. Arguably, the answer to
438

Melissa Hayes, Group Claims Sandy Aid Has Been Discriminatory, NORTHJERSEY
.COM (Nov. 27, 2013, 6:46 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/Group_claims_Sandy
_aid_has_been_discriminatory.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V5X8-35J3 (“The department oversees two main housing programs: the Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Elevations
and Mitigation grants, often called RREM, which provide up to $150,000 for repairs and
home elevations; and separate $10,000 resettlement grants for storm victims who agree to
stay in their county for three years.”).
439
Id.; see also Star-Ledger Editorial Board, Christie Administration Is Blowing Smoke
On Sandy (Dec. 4, 2013, 9:46 AM) http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2013/12/the
_christie_administration_is.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P4AP-EFHV (“As thousands
of Hurricane Sandy victims desperately wait for word on whether or not they’ll get relief
money to rebuild, the Christie administration continues to brush off the most basic questions about its grant programs .... [M]ore than a year after the devastating storm, it’s [sic]
distributed only 10 percent of its funds for rebuilding homes .... Some were told they’re
ineligible and have no idea why .... The state says Sandy victims who were rejected were
informed in writing of the reason for their ineligibility, and can always appeal. But applicants
say ... they were never informed that they can appeal a wide variety of state decisions ....
‘Just so it’s general notice to all of you, don’t ask me any questions about Fair Share
Housing,’ said Christie, declaring its team of lawyers not worth ‘my time or my breath.’
Never mind that this so-called ‘hack’ group has been advocating for fair housing in New
Jersey for almost 40 years, and just won three major court victories over the administration,
this year alone.”).
440
Hayes, supra note 438 (“[According to the Fair Share Housing Center, state] documents reveal a disorganized system of processing applications that in effect discriminated
against Latino and African-American applicants, and that changed its policies without ...
informing the public .... Adam Gordon, Fair Share’s staff attorney, said ... it was clear
that Latino and African-American applicants were disproportionately rejected for rebuilding funds .... The rates of success in terms of people getting funding vary dramatically
by race, ethnicity and geography.”).
441
Id. (“[T]he commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs ...
disputed the allegations, [asserting that] ‘[r]ace and ethnicity absolutely did not factor in
to the application processing’ [and that] the state used a random application process to
ensure that low- and moderate-income and elderly and disabled residents were given
equal access to funds to rebuild their homes or move elsewhere in the same county.”); see
also Hurricane Sandy and New Jersey’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2013, at A22.
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the latter question depends in part on answers to the following questions:
(1) whether the Superstorm Sandy home rebuilding application contains
an arbitration clause; and (2) whether Governor Christie believes that he
can continue an otherwise successful political career without maintaining
the support of Latino and African American voters in New Jersey and
elsewhere. As of this writing, the answer to the political question is no.
Conventional wisdom strongly indicates that a Republican-designated
Christie will need support from significant numbers of minority voters to
win the White House in 2016.442 Therefore, assuming that an arbitration
clause appears in the home rebuilding application form, the Governor has
decided to defend its administration in a court of law instead of seeking the
assistance of private arbitrators.443
Unlike Governor Christie, however, numerous other defendants have
filed motions to compel arbitration, after displeased consumers and financial services applicants filed lawsuits.444 Again, FAA section 2 requires
arbitral claims to arise out of written contracts.445 Yet, a review of consumer
protection cases reveals that federal and state courts are split on whether
financial services claimants must enter binding arbitration if consumer
protection disputes arose out of completed and signed application
forms.446 Below, the controversies and decisions in two representative cases
are discussed to help illustrate the essence of this particular judicial conflict.
442

Cf. Kate Zernike & Jonathan Martin, Chris Christie Coasts to 2nd Term as Governor
of New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2013, at A1. (“Governor Christie won decisively,
making impressive inroads among younger voters, blacks, Hispanics and women—all
groups that Republicans nationally have struggled to attract. Gov. Chris Christie of New
Jersey won re-election by a crushing margin ... a victory that vaulted him to the front
ranks of Republican presidential contenders and made him his party’s foremost proponent of
pragmatism over ideology .... Mr. Christie’s gains among black and Hispanic voters at the
polls are the result of an aggressive, years-long effort: He has held more than 100 town
hall-style meetings, including several in predominantly black areas that he lost in 2009.”).
443
Cf. Come Clean On Sandy Grants, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Sept. 15, 2013, available
at 2013 WLNR 23037333 (“Families denied superstorm Sandy rebuilding help are now
suing the state just to get answers as to why they were denied funds .... [What was the]
response ... to the lawsuit by the state Department of Community Affairs? ‘No comment’
.... Information about funding eligibility requirements, the criteria used in deciding which
applications to approve, and data about the number of applications received, rejected and
approved should be online now.”)
444
See, e.g., Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F. 3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.
2008); Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1027 (11th Cir. 2003);
Hopkins v. World Acceptance Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1399 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
445
9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2013).
446
Compare Edwards v. Costner, 979 So. 2d 757, 759, 765–66 (Ala. 2007) (concluding that a nonsignatory third-party cannot be forced to arbitrate his claims, even if the
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First, consider the most salient facts in Pake v. Fry.447 Before his death,
Norman E. Luster (Luster) was legally incompetent and had approximately
$115,000 in assets.448 A court appointed Luster’s cousins—Joseph Pake
(Pake) and Regina Rose (Rose)—as coguardians of Luster and his estate.449
SouthTrust Securities, Inc. and AXA Financial Inc. are subsidiaries of The
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (Equitable).450
Stephen Fry (Fry) was SouthTrust’s agent.451 Pake and Rose decided to
invest Luster’s cash and contacted the agent.452 Fry completed the customer
cash account application form, which contained an arbitration clause.453
Pake signed the application form.454 However, “Rose did not sign the
Account Application.”455
Embracing Fry’s recommendation, Pake purchased shares in several mutual funds.456 But, after considering Fry’s subsequent recommendations,
Pake sold the mutual fund shares and purchased an annuity from AXA
Financial.457 According to Pake, Fry promised that “the owners of the annuity ... would receive not less than the principal amount and a 5% return
annually.”458 In truth, “the value of the annuity ... dropped to approximately
arbitration agreement covers “all disputes ... resulting from or arising out of ... [a] transaction ... sought to be entered into ... [or] taking place either before or after the parties
entered into this agreement”), and S. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 385 S.W.3d 770,
774 (Ark. 2011) (declaring that the insurer could not enforce the arbitration provision in
the application for insurance under the FAA § 2), with Nichelson v. Soeder, No. 4:06CV1403,
2006 WL 3079109, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2006) (compelling the arbitration of “any
claim ... arising out of ... any application ... to obtain [a] loan”), and Salvadori v. Option
One Mortg. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2006) (concluding that any federal
or state contract, tort, statutory, regulatory, common law or equitable claim must be
arbitrated even if the arbitration clause included “[a]ny claim ... arising out of ... any
application ... to obtain [a] [l]oan”).
447
No. COA05-325, 2005 WL 3046532 (N.C. App. Nov. 15, 2005).
448
Id. at *1.
449
Id.
450
Id.
451
Id. at *4.
452
Id. at *1.
453
Id. 3 (“With respect to their negligent misrepresentation claims, plaintiffs assert
defendants ‘prepared the application and all accompanying documents for the annuity purchased from [AXA Financial], and said application and all data and information furnished
to [AXA Financial] by [Fry and SouthTrust] contained substantial errors regarding the
identity of the annuitant as [Pake] and [Luster] as owner.’”).
454
Id.
455
Id.
456
Id.
457
Id.
458
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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$60,400.00.”459 But Fry reported that the total value of “the life insurance
and annuity interest would total approximately $121,965.70.”460
After Luster’s death, Equitable refused to pay the insurance proceeds,
alleging that (1) Pake rather than Luster was “named annuitant”; (2) Luster
was the owner of the annuity; (3) the annuity did not provide death benefits for Pake; and (4) a penalty had been assessed for “withdrawing more
than 10% of the annuity’s total.”461 As administrators of Luster’s estate,
the cousins sued AXA Financial, Fry and SouthTrust (SouthTrust).462 The
complaint listed several common law and statutory claims: negligent misrepresentation, fraud and securities violations.463 In response, SouthTrust
filed a motion to compel arbitration.464
The trial judge concluded that Pake and Rose’s claims—on behalf of
Luster’s estate—“[arose] out of the relationship between Luster and SouthTrust” and “[fell] within the scope of the arbitration clause in the Account
Application.”465 Still, the trial court denied SouthTrust’s motion to compel
arbitration for two reasons: (1) Rose did not ratify Luster’s contract with the
defendants; and (2) Rose did not sign the application form that contained
the arbitration clause.466 In the end, the trial court declared that Pake’s sole
signature on the account application form could not bind Luster’s estate;
therefore, arbitration was not required.467
SouthTrust appealed and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s ruling in part.468 The appellate court simply concluded:
“By its terms, the scope of the arbitration provision covers the transactions
involving Luster and Luster’s estate.”469 The court of appeals, however,
459

Id.
Id.
461
Id.
462
Id.
463
Id.
464
Id.
465
Id. at *2.
466
Id. at *1, *4.The Account Application contained a hand-added “X” beside the first
of two “Applicant’s Signature” lines, the first of which was signed by Pake. The Account
Application also contained a hand-added “X” beside the second “Applicant’s Signature”
line, to the immediate right of the signature line signed by Pake. However, the second
Applicant’s Signature line was left blank. Rose did not sign the Account Application.
Id. at *1.
467
Id. at *2.
468
Id. at *1.
469
Id. at *2. “In the instant case, there is no issue regarding whether the dispute between plaintiffs and defendants falls within the substantive scope of the arbitration clause
in the Account Application.” Id. at *3.
460

472

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:405

did not explain how they reached that conclusion, because the court never
cited an arbitration clause in any contract.470 Instead, the appellate court
simply reported that a phantom arbitration clause appeared in one of
SouthTrust’s preprinted application forms.471 But again, it is important to
stress that FAA section 2 is unequivocal; a tribunal may not compel parties to arbitrate a dispute unless a disagreement arose out of a written contract that contains an arbitration provision.472 The appellate court’s ruling
is problematic for another reason: Under North Carolina’s settled principles of contract law, a completed, signed and stand-alone application for
various services is not a valid contract.473
Finally, the facts in Pake are incontrovertible: Pake purchased several
mutual fund contracts.474 Many months later, he cancelled those investment
instruments and purchased an annuity contract on behalf of Luster.475 Therefore, one is compelled to ask whether the arbitration clause in the completed
and signed application became an integral part of the respective mutual
fund and annuity contracts. If the answer is yes, the appellate court failed
to discuss and explain why the parol evidence rule would not apply. And if
the application never became an integral part of the controversial annuity
contract, the application—and its arbitration clause—stood alone as an unenforceable instrument under North Carolina’s law.
In Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,476 the federal district court
also addressed whether parties must arbitrate a consumer protection dispute
that allegedly arose out of a completed and signed application form.477 But,
the federal court’s analysis and disposition are remarkably different from
those in Pake.

470

Id. at *1–5.
Id. at *2.
472
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
473
See Kerik v. Davidson County, 551 S.E.2d 186, 193, 232–33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(concluding the board of commissioners approval of a rezoning application was not an
illegal contract, even though the rezoning applicant made promises to the board of commissioners and the board did not obligate itself to the applicant); City of Winston-Salem
v. Robertson, 344 S.E.2d 838, 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (“The granting of an application
for a driveway permit is not a contract.”); Gaynoe v. First Union Direct Bank, N.A., No. 97
CVS 16536, 2001 WL 34000142, at *7 (N.C. Super. Jan. 18, 2001) (concluding that a contract was not formed by a credit-card application alone).
474
Pake, 2005 WL 3046532, at *1.
475
Id.
476
Civ. A. No. 10-918, 2011 WL 93062 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2011).
477
Id. at *1.
471
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Sisc Johnson was a co-owner of Choice Carpet and Floors (CCF).478
BB&T Bankcard Corporation (Bankcard) issued credit cards.479 In 2007,
Johnson secured a commercial credit card application from Bankcard.480 A
“Commercial Card Plan Agreement” (Agreement) and a personal guaranty
agreement were attached to the application form.481 Johnson and the other
coowner of CCF executed the “signature and authorization” provision on the
application, which read in pertinent part: “[CCF] by the signature of its
authorized officer(s) below, requests that a BB & T Commercial Card(s) to be
issued to the authorized Cardholders as set forth on the BB & T Bankcard
Corporation Commercial Card Application.”482
In addition, referencing an arbitration provision, the attached Agreement stated: “By applying for a card, Cardholder agrees that if a dispute
of any kind arises out of or relates to this Agreement or Cardholder’s
application for a Card, either Cardholder or [BB & T Bankcard] can
choose to have that dispute resolved by binding arbitration as set forth
in the Arbitration Provision.483

The latter provision also stated:
‘Claim’ ... means any claim, dispute or controversy between Cardholder
and Bank arising from or including the validity and scope of this
Arbitration Provision or the Agreement .... The term [also] includes ...
any claim, dispute, or controversy between Cardholder and Bank that
arises from or relates to ... your application for the Account ... Upon the
election of either Cardholder or Bank, any claim between Cardholder
and Bank shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to this Arbitration Provision.484

In late January 2008, Johnson traveled to Branch Banking and Trust
Company (Branch) for two purposes: (1) to remove herself as a guarantor
for the credit card debt; and (2) to return the credit card.485 At that time,
Branch’s agents assured Johnson that her status as a guarantor had been
terminated.486 Yet that assurance did not stop Branch from sending multiple debt collection letters to Johnson.487 In each letter, Branch alleged that
478

Id.
Id.
480
Id.
481
Id.
482
Id.
483
Id.
484
Id. at *2.
485
Id.
486
Id.
487
Id.
479
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Johnson was responsible for the outstanding credit card debt.488 Later,
Johnson learned that Bankcard had reported the delinquencies to several
credit report agencies.489
Ultimately, the erroneous information on the credit reports adversely
affected Johnson’s credit.490 Johnson filed a lawsuit against Branch and
BB&T Financial (BBT).491 Generally, Johnson alleged that BBT and Bankcard furnished inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies and failed
to investigate disputed items.492 More specifically, the complaint included
statutory and common law claims: alleged violations under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA),493 defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence.494 Citing an allegedly ironclad and enforceable agreement between
CCF and Bankcard, the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration.495
The federal district judge denied the motion.496
How did the Johnson court reach its conclusions? First, given the diversity of the various litigants, the federal district judge researched both
Georgia’s and Pennsylvania’s common law rules.497 In both jurisdictions,
courts must apply ordinary state law principles of contract formation and
interpretation to determine whether parties have agreed to arbitrate.498 In
addition, a court may not grant a motion to compel arbitration, unless:
(1) a valid arbitration contract exists; and (2) a particular dispute falls
within the scope of the agreement.499 But even more importantly, to be enforceable, a valid contract requires competent contracting parties, sufficient consideration, each party’s willingness to be bound, and a clear subject
matter or undertaking.500
488

Id.
Id.
490
Id.
491
Id. at *1.
492
Id.
493
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
494
Johnson, 2011 WL 93062, at *1.
495
Id.
496
Id.
497
Id. at *3 (“With regard to claims against BB & T Financial, Johnson argues without dispute that Georgia law governs whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable.”).
498
See Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d
513, 524 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944
(1995)); Simmons Co. v. Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp., 532 S.E.2d 436, 440 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000) (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944).
499
See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009).
500
See Cone Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau, Civ. A. No. 7:09-CV-118(HL),
2010 WL 4639295, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2010); SKF USA, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Smalls),
714 A.2d 496, 500 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (“To form a valid contract, all of the essential
489
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Johnson admitted that she completed and executed a commercial credit
card application.501 She also admitted that an arbitration provision was attached to the application.502 But, fighting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, she insisted that the application was not a valid contract under
the FAA.503 Ultimately, the district court found: (1) Johnson “did not assent
to be personally bound” under the terms of the Arbitration Provision;504
(2) BB&T and Johnson never formed an arbitration agreement; (3) assuming that a valid arbitration agreement was formed, it was between Choice
Carpet and Floors and Bankcard/BB&T;505 and (4) the agreement included
an ambiguous term, “Cardholder,” which was construed in favor of Johnson.
Therefore, in light of its findings, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration and allowed Johnson to proceed with her lawsuit.506
But, the federal district court judge’s intelligent analysis did not end there.
The defendants argued that the broad scope of the arbitration clause covered all of Johnson’s claims—those falling within the eight corners the Application and Agreement as well as those resulting from the relationship
between the Application and Agreement.507 In contrast, Johnson stressed
that her lawsuit was beyond the scope of the Arbitration Provision for two
reasons: (1) Choice Carpet and Floors—a party to the Arbitration Clause—
was not a complainant in the lawsuit; and (2) several irregularities surrounding Johnson’s personal credit history formed the foundation for her
FCRA claim.508
To determine whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration
agreement, the prevailing rule is uncomplicated: a court must examine
factual allegations in an underlying complaint instead of focusing solely on
the underlying theories of recovery.509 And if the factual allegations of the
dispute are reasonably connected to the arbitration provision in a contract, a
court may grant a motion to compel arbitration.510 Applying these principles,
elements, including consideration, must exist.”) (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. First Pa. Bank,
466 A.2d 753 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983)).
501
Johnson, 2011 WL 93062, at *1.
502
Id.
503
Id. at *3.
504
Id.
505
Id.
506
Id. at *5.
507
Id. at *4.
508
Id.
509
See, e.g., Medtronic AVE., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 247 F.3d 44, 55
(3d Cir. 2001).
510
See, e.g., Dusold v. Porta-John Corp., 807 P.2d 526, 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(“[O]nly those disputes that the parties could reasonably intend to be submitted to
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the federal district judge found that the Agreement and the attached Arbitration Provision covered only line of credit disputes between Choice
Carpet and Floors and Bankcard/BB&T.511 On the other hand, Johnson’s
amended complaint included “allegedly erroneous information ... on
Johnson’s personal credit report.”512 Consequently, the judge declared that
Johnson’s statutory and common law claims were beyond the scope of the
Arbitration Provision.513 But even more importantly, the judge ruled, assuming that the commercial credit card application was a valid arbitration
contract between Johnson and the defendants, Johnson’s statutory and common law claims did not fall within the scope of that contract.514
D. Judicial Conflict—Whether Arbitration Clauses in Standardized
Application Forms Are Enforceable Under the FAA Without Any
Probative Evidence of Bargained-For Exchange Consideration
Again, under the common law, two elements must be satisfied before
courts will enforce a contract: (1) the contract must be valid;515 and (2) each
party must present sufficient consideration to support the valid contractual
agreement.516 Once more, it is important to reiterate that a vast majority of
arbitration should be encompassed within their contractual agreement .... [T]he betterreasoned cases start with the premise[:] ... [I]n order for the dispute to be characterized as
arising out of or related to the subject matter of the contract, and thus subject to
arbitration, it must, at the very least, raise some issue the resolution of which requires a
reference to or construction of some portion of the contract itself. The relationship between the dispute and the contract is not satisfied simply because the dispute would not
have arisen absent the existence of a contract between the parties. If such a connection to
the contract is not present, tort claims between the parties could not reasonably be
intended to have been subject to arbitration within the meaning of an arbitration clause
requiring this method of resolution only for claims ‘arising out of or related to’ the
contract.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
511
Johnson, 2011 WL 93062, at *4.
512
Id.
513
Id. at *5.
514
Id. at *4.
515
See, e.g., Orthodontic Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Hanachi, 564 S.E.2d 573, 575 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (“Generally, a party seeking to enforce a contract has the burden of proving
the essential elements of a valid contract.”); Anderson v. Gibbs Lumber Co., 10 P.2d 416,
417 (Okla. 1932) (“[T]o enforce [a] contract, the agreement between the promisor and
promisee ... must be a valid contract.”).
516
See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368, 1376 (11th Cir.
2005) (“[I]n determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts
apply the contract law of the particular state that governs the formation of contracts ....
Georgia law provides that mutual promises and obligations are sufficient consideration to
support a contract.”); Magnusson Agency v. Pub. Entity Nat’l Co.-Midwest, 560 N.W.2d
20, 26–27 (Iowa 1997) (stressing that consideration is a necessary element).
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state supreme courts have adopted the rule that stand-alone, completed, and
signed applications—for goods, services, employment, and membership—
are not valid contracts.517 Yet, among state and federal courts a serious
divide exists over whether standardized, preprinted application forms are
valid contracts if the applications contain arbitration clauses.518 But assume
that the terms and arbitration provisions in executed application forms comprise valid contracts. Still, an important question remains: whether a “promise
for a promise” may serve as sufficient and bargained-for exchange consideration to enforce the arbitration provisions in the application forms?
Section 71 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads awkwardly in
relevant part: “To constitute consideration, a ... return promise must be bargained for .... [A] return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for
that promise.”519 Certainly, an overwhelming majority of state supreme
courts have adopted the “promise for a promise” rule.520 Nevertheless, state
and federal courts are thoroughly divided over the question of whether an
employer’s promise to consider an individual’s application and the applicant’s promise to arbitrate disputes may serve as sufficient consideration
to enforce an arbitration clause in a standardized application form. Below,
cases are discussed which highlight the depth of the conflict among and
between federal and state courts.
First, consider the brief facts, analysis, and holding in Henry v. Pizza Hut
of America, Inc.521 David Henry applied for employment at a Pizza Hut.522
He completed and signed a two-page application form.523 It contained an
arbitration clause, which read in pertinent part:
517

See supra Part I.A and accompanying text and notes.
See supra Part IV and accompanying text and notes.
519
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
520
See, e.g., Knack v. Indus. Comm’n, 503 P.2d 373, 376 (Ariz. 1972) (“A promise for a
promise is adequate legal consideration to support a contract.”); Stub v. Belmont, 124
P.2d 826, 829 (Cal. 1942) (concluding that the promise for a promise was good consideration); Grossman v. Schenker, 100 N.E. 39, 41 (N.Y. 1912) (“[A] promise for a promise ...
constitutes a good consideration.”); Stewart v. Herron, 82 N.E. 956, 959 (Ohio 1907)
(“Among the considerations recognized in law as sufficient to support a contract is ... mutual
promises, or ... a promise for a promise.”); Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 606 (Tex.
App. 1999) (“A promise for a promise is sufficient consideration in Texas.”); Omni Group,
Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 645 P.2d 727, 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (“A promise for a
promise is sufficient consideration to support a contract.”); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d
666, 672 (Wis. 1985) (“It is black letter law that a promise for a promise, or the exchange
of promises, will constitute consideration to support any contract of this bilateral nature.”).
521
No. 6:07-cv-01128-Orl-DAB, 2007 WL 2827722 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2007).
522
Id. at *1.
523
Id.
518

478

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:405

Because of the delay and expense of the court systems, Pizza Hut and I
agree to use confidential binding arbitration, instead of going to court,
for any claims that arise between me and Pizza Hut .... Without limitation,
such claims would include any concerning compensation, employment
(including, but not limited to, any claims concerning sexual harassment
or discrimination), or termination of employment .... In any arbitration,
the then prevailing employment dispute resolution rules of the American
Arbitration Association will apply, except that Pizza Hut will pay the
arbitrator’s fees, and Pizza Hut will pay that portion of the arbitration
filing fee in excess of the similar court filing fee had I gone to court.524

After Henry began working, he and Pizza Hut executed another written
instrument entitled, “Acknowledgment of Receipt and Understanding.”525
Among other obligations, the Acknowledgment required Henry to admit that
he had received a copy of Pizza Hut’s orientation handbook and sexual
harassment policy.526 Additionally, a slightly different arbitration provision
appeared in the Acknowledgment.527 Put simply, the words and phrases in
the two arbitration provisions did not mirror each other.528
After working for a period of time, Pizza Hut fired Henry.529 Alleging
that the firing was racially motivated and citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981,530 Henry
filed a civil rights lawsuit in a state court.531 Pizza Hut removed the case to
federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the underlying lawsuit.532 In its motion, Pizza Hut argued that Henry’s § 1981 claim
fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the application.533 Henry
524

Id.
Id.
526
Id.
527
Id. at *2.
528
Id. (“The second arbitration clause contains two textual differences from the first
clause. The second sentence omits the words ‘Without limitation’ and begins with ‘Such.’
In addition, the second arbitration clause omits language requiring Pizza Hut to pay arbitration fees and any increase in filing fees associated with arbitration. Instead, the last
sentence of the clause reads: ‘In any arbitration, the then prevailing employment dispute
resolution rules of the American Arbitration Association (and, to the extent not inconsistent,
the then prevailing rules of the Federal Arbitration Act) will apply.’”).
529
Id. at *1.
530
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads as follows: “All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
531
Henry, 2007 WL 2827722, at *1.
532
Id.
533
Id.
525
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disagreed, arguing that the less offensive or burdensome arbitration provision in the Acknowledgment should apply.534 In the end, the court read the
two clauses together and found a single, valid arbitration agreement.535
As an alternative affirmative defense in the motion to compel arbitration
proceedings, Henry argued that sufficient and mutual consideration did not
support the parties’ purportedly valid arbitration agreement.536 Specifically,
Henry argued that the mutuality-of-obligation doctrine required Pizza Hut
“to expressly promise to provide a written response to employee complaints
and ... to provide all employees with copies of the arbitration rules before
signing the arbitration agreement.”537 Conversely, Pizza Hut argued that a
promise for a promise may serve as sufficient consideration.538 To support its
assertion, Pizza Hut stressed: (1) Henry gave a written promise to arbitrate
when he “signed the employment application”;539 and, (2) the company’s
promise to consider Henry for employment was sufficient consideration to
support the arbitration agreement.540 Ultimately, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed with Pizza Hut and forced
Henry into binding arbitration.541
Several other federal courts have cited somewhat comparable language
in other application forms, applied the promise-for-a-promise rule, and
reached similar conclusions like the one in Henry. For example, in Carman v.
Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC,542 the United States District Court for the
534

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3 (“These two clauses do not differ in a way that will significantly affect this
court’s analysis .... The second arbitration clause does not contain language that demonstrates
an intent to supersede the first clause. Thus, the two clauses should be read together, to the
extent they are consistent ... for purposes of assessing Pizza Hut’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.”) (citing Sammons v. Sonic-North Cadillac, Inc., No. 6:07-cv277, 2007 WL 2298032, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007) (considering two substantially
similar arbitration clauses together in assessing a motion to compel arbitration)).
536
Id. at *6.
537
Id. (emphasis added).
538
Id. at *5.
539
Id. (emphasis added).
540
Id.
541
Id. (“Pizza Hut considered him for employment. When Henry signed the second
arbitration clause, Pizza Hut hired him as an employee. Both of these acts constitute consideration under modern contracts law.”); see, e.g, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 71 (1981); Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Schwailer, 901 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
542
No. 4:08CV1547 CDP, 2009 WL 248680, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2009) (“Christopher
Carmen is an investment banker who was formerly employed by A.G. Edwards & Sons ....
Wachovia Capital Markets ... succeeded to all assets and liabilities of A.G. Edwards. Following the takeover by Wachovia, Carmen’s employment was terminated .... Carmen
claims that Wachovia breached the contract he had with A.G. Edwards, and that Wachovia
now owes him certain sums for work performed while he was still employed. Wachovia
has moved to stay this case and compel arbitration, or in the alternative to dismiss for
535
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Eastern District of Missouri concluded: “The plain language of Carmen’s
employment application demonstrates that there was a bargained-for agreement .... A.G. Edwards undertook to consider Carmen’s application for employment in exchange for Carmen’s agreement to arbitrate any dispute
arising out of that employment.”543 And, in Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s
Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,544 the signed employment application comprised
an arbitration clause.545 The latter read in relevant part: “[The employer
agrees] to consider Plaintiffs for employment if plaintiffs, upon employment, [agree] to abide by [the company’s] rules which include[s] the arbitration of all claims.”546 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois declared that the written promise for a promise was sufficient bargained-for consideration.547
failure to state a claim. Wachovia argues that Carmen agreed in his employment application
to arbitrate any dispute arising from his employment or termination. Additionally, Carmen
agreed to submit any claims to arbitration when he registered to sell securities by completing
his Securities Industry Form U-4 .... Carmen argues that the agreement to arbitrate found
in his employment application is unenforceable.”).
543
Id. at *2.
544
957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
545
Id. at 152. (“Frank’s Nursery & Crafts ... sells lawn and garden products, plants,
flowers, home decorative items, and crafts. Plaintiffs Rebecca Bennett and Kimberly
Sheller ... are former employees .... At the time Plaintiffs applied for employment and were
terminated they were minors. Each signed an employment application that provided: ‘any
claim that I may wish to file against the Company ... must be submitted for binding and
final arbitration before the American Arbitration Association; arbitration will be the exclusive
remedy for any and all claims unless prohibited by applicable law .... I have reviewed,
understand and agree to the above.’ Following their discharge, Plaintiffs filed a charge of
sexual discrimination ... [and sued] in this Court alleging sexual harassment in violation of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Plaintiffs allege that during their employment, they were
subjected to a constant hostile work environment due to the sexual harassment by defendant’s
assistant manager .... Defendant denies the allegations of sexual harassment.”).
546
Id. at 154.
547
Id. In Chatman v. Pizza Hut, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reached the same conclusion.
Alfredo Chatman filed a class action complaint in state court ... asserting
claims against ... Pizza Hut ... and franchise owners ... under the Illinois
Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”), 820 ILCS § 115/1, et seq.
and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS § 105/1, et
seq. Chatman electronically signed and submitted to Pizza Hut an online
job application. The application contains [an] ... ‘Agreement to Arbitrate’ .... Pizza Hut argues that the Arbitration Provision is supported by
three forms of consideration: (1) Pizza Hut’s promise to consider the
plaintiff for employment; (2) Pizza Hut’s obligation to submit to binding arbitration; and (3) Pizza Hut’s continued employment of the plaintiff. We agree. Under Illinois law, each of these acts is sufficient to support
the agreement .... [W]here an employer promises to consider an applicant for employment in exchange for the applicant’s return promise to
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But, three years after the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri issued its promise-for-a-promise ruling in Carman, the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District decided Marzette v. AnheuserBusch, Inc.548 and reached a contrary promise-for-a-promise ruling. In
Marzette, Alisha Marzette and Kathy Dunmire applied for employment at
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (Anheuser).549 Both Marzette and Dunmire completed
and signed an employment application form, which contained an arbitration clause.550 In applicable part, the latter provision read:
I agree that if I become employed by [Anheuser], and unless a written contract provides to the contrary, any claim I may have against [Anheuser]
will be subject to final and binding arbitration in accordance with [Anheuser’s] dispute resolution program, and that arbitration will be the exclusive method I will have for final and binding resolution of any such
claim .... I acknowledge that no promise regarding employment has
been made to me.551

Anheuser hired Marzette and Dunmire to be security guards.552 And during their employment, both employees received hourly wages and became
union members.553 In the course of events, the two employees filed an employment discrimination suit against Anheuser.554 They alleged that the
company violated provisions under the Missouri Human Rights Act.555 To
counter, Anheuser filed a motion to compel arbitration.556 The employer
asserted: (1) the terms and arbitration clause in Marzette’s and Dunmire’s
signed employment applications were binding contractual agreements; and,
(2) both employees had a contractual duty “to arbitrate any claims arising
out of their employment” with Anheuser.557 The Missouri trial court denied
abide by company rules upon employment—including the arbitration of
all claims—there is sufficient consideration to establish a valid, enforceable contract.
Chatman v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 12 C 10209, 2013 WL 2285804, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. May 23,
2013) (citations omitted); see also Ravenscraft v. BNP Media, Inc., No. 09 C 6617, 2010
WL 1541455, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010) (finding consideration where “defendant agreed
to consider the plaintiffs for employment if the plaintiffs, upon employment, agreed to
abide by the company rules”).
548
371 S.W.3d 49 (Mo. App. 2012).
549
Id. at 50 nn.1–2.
550
Id. at 51.
551
Id. (emphasis added).
552
Id.
553
Id.
554
Id. at 50.
555
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010–213.137 (West 2012).
556
Marzette, 371 S.W.3d at 51.
557
Id.
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Anheuser’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the employees and
Anheuser never formed a valid arbitration agreement.558 Moreover, even
assuming that the parties formed a valid contract, the trial court declared
that sufficient consideration did not support the purported valid arbitration
agreement.559 Anheuser appealed.560
Citing federal and state courts’ promise-for-a-promise holdings in Sheller,
Carmen, Henry and Martindale v. Sandvik,561 Anheuser encouraged the
Missouri Court of Appeals to embrace those decisions and reverse the trial
court’s ruling.562 Although recognizing that this issue has generated a split
among courts, the court of appeals refused.563 Instead, the Missouri Court
of Appeals cited the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana’s decision in Geiger v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.564
In Geiger, the court declared that an employer’s promise to consider an
employment application was insufficient consideration for an applicant’s
promise to arbitrate.565 Finding the Geiger court’s analysis and conclusion
persuasive, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that Anheuser’s willingness to
consider Marzette’s and Dunmire’s employment applications was insufficient
consideration to support promises to arbitrate in purportedly valid arbitration contracts.566 It is important to stress that the Supreme Court of West
Virginia as well as the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
have also embraced the Geiger court’s holding.567
558

Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 51.
560
Id.
561
800 A.2d 872, 879 (N.J. 2002).
562
Marzette, 371 S.W.3d at 52.
563
Id. at 52 n.5 (“[C]ourts in other jurisdictions are split [over this issue; however,
defendants] urge us to follow the holding in Sheller [in which] ... the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois found sufficient consideration for an arbitration
agreement contained in an employment application.”).
564
134 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989, 1001–02 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
565
Id. at 1001–02.
566
Marzette, 371 S.W.3d at 52 n.6 (“[A]n employer’s willingness to consider an applicant for employment is insufficient consideration to support a prospective employee’s
waiver of the right to a jury trial for employment disputes wholly unrelated to the application
or hiring process.”).
567
See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“We ... conclude that Ryan’s has failed to demonstrate that, under Tennessee law, an
employer’s promise to consider an employment application is adequate consideration for a
promise to arbitrate employment disputes that are wholly unrelated to the application or
hiring process.”); Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir.
2001) (finding no evidence under Indiana law that a mere promise to consider an application for employment may serve as consideration for an applicant’s contractual promise to
arbitrate); State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 613 S.E.2d 914, 924 (W. Va. 2005) (“[A]n
employer’s promise merely to review an employment application in exchange for a job
559
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V. EMPIRICAL AND STATISTICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
ENFORCING MANDATORY-ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN EMPLOYMENT,
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND OTHER TYPES OF STANDARDIZED
APPLICATIONS—FINDINGS FROM A CASE STUDY
Again, FAA section 2 requires state and federal courts to compel arbitration if parties’ controversies “arose out of” written contracts or transactions.568 On the other hand, to determine whether a dispute falls within the
scope of an arbitration agreement, courts must apply states’ traditional rules
of contract construction and interpretation.569 Additionally, among the states,
a universal rule has emerged: courts must ignore particular causes of action or
the “legal labels attached to allegations” and consider only the underlying
factual allegations and defenses to determine whether the disputed claims
fall within the scope of arbitration clauses.570
But reconsider some earlier observations, which appear in this Article:
each day, extremely large universes of individuals apply for all types of
goods, services, positions and affiliations.571 Invariably, the preprinted,
standard application forms contain mandatory-arbitration clauses.572 And,
more frequently than not, compelling circumstances force applicants to sign
those forms and forfeit their constitutional or statutory right to litigate a
claim before a jury.573
Now, consider a general as well as an interrelated legal and empirical
question: whether state and federal court judges weigh—wittingly or unwittingly—more than the factual allegations in disgruntled applicants/plaintiffs’ underlying complaints before deciding to grant or deny defendants’
motions to compel arbitration? Or stated more succinctly, the questions are:
(1) do state and federal courts consider complainants’ underlying theories
of recovery when deciding whether to compel arbitration?; (2) are state and
applicant’s promise to submit employment-related disputes—not associated with the
application process—to arbitration does not represent consideration sufficient to create an
enforceable contract to arbitrate such employment disputes.”).
568
9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012)
569
Entrekin v. Internal Med. Assocs. of Dothan, P.A., 689 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir.
2012).
570
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 622 n.9
(1985); see also Medtronic AVE., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 247 F.3d 44, 55 (3d
Cir. 2001) (declaring that courts must examine factual allegations in complaints instead of
focusing on legal theories to determine whether claims fall within the scope of arbitration
agreements); Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. 1995) (declaring
that courts must focus on factual allegations in complaints, rather than on underlying causes of
action to determine whether claims fall within the scope of arbitration agreements).
571
See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
572
See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
573
See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
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federal courts more or less likely to grant or deny a motion to compel arbitration if the applicants-complainants are, say, consumers, hourly employees,
or professionals?; (3) are state and federal courts more or less likely to grant
or deny a motion to compel arbitration if defendants are, say, financial institutions and corporations?; (4) are state courts or federal courts significantly
more likely to deny a motion to compel arbitration?; and (5) are state and federal judges equally likely to allow allegedly “irrational biases” or extrajudicial
variables to sway the disposition of motion to compel arbitration disputes?
Over two decades, the author cautiously and methodically analyzed a
sizable number of reported cases and performed a content analysis on each
case.574 That methodology allowed the author to assemble a large database
of empirical evidence to determine whether allegedly “irrational judicial
bias” appears in state and federal courts’ opinions, and, if so, whether such
bias stains judges’ procedural and substantive rulings.575 In a series of published law journal articles, the author documented and reported that judges
often allow immaterial or extralegal variables to significantly influence all
sorts of litigants’ likelihoods of prevailing procedurally and on the merits
in both state and federal courts.576
As reported earlier, judicial conflicts proliferate over whether mandatoryarbitration provisions in standardized applications are enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act.577 Therefore, in light of these continuing splits,
the author decided to conduct an empirical study to determine whether irrelevant or prejudicial factors are systematically affecting—consciously or
unconsciously—federal and state court judges’ dispositions of motion to
compel arbitration disputes. Certainly, many jurists and commentators assert that well-educated and well-intentioned judges only apply settled common law rules, statutes and/or public policy to achieve fair outcomes.578 As
574

See generally Robert Edward Mitchell, The Use of Content Analysis for Explanatory Studies, 31 PUB. OPINION Q. 230, 237 (1967); Daniel Taylor Young, How Do You
Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using Algorithmic Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce
Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2010–13 (2013) (“In
order to test the ‘constitutional moments’ thesis, some metric is required for quantifying
public attention to various topics. With technology making it easier to manipulate larger
and larger sets of data, several tools have become available in recent years that purport to
offer this kind of analysis .... Social scientists engaged in content analysis have long
recognized that such studies often have embedded causal assumptions.”).
575
See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77, 88, 90–91 nn.58, 103, 111–12 (2008) (presenting a
fairly comprehensive history and description of Professor Rice’s published content-analysis
studies and theoretical analyses of various common law and statutory questions).
576
Id.
577
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215 (1985).
578
See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again, 30
REV. LITIG. 671, 673 (2011) (reporting that historically judges were presumed to be impartial
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discussed below, however, federal courts are more willing to weigh legally
immaterial variables and issue arguably “irrationally biased” motion to compel arbitration rulings.579 Furthermore, that same propensity increases the
likelihood of motion to compel arbitration splits within and between state
and federal judiciaries.580
A. Data Sources and Sampling Procedures
The general proposition in this study is simple: there is no statistically significant difference between federal and state courts’ disposition of applicantsrespondents and defendants-movants’ motion to compel arbitration disputes.
Thus, to construct a reasonably sound motion to compel arbitration database,
the author used several research methodologies. First, Westlaw’s and Lexis’s
data retrieval systems were used to locate every reported motion to compel
arbitration decision that terminated in a trial, an appellate, or a supreme court.
Also, if the electronically reported cases discussed or cited other unreported
motion to compel arbitration cases, the author read the regional reporters
and analyzed those cases.
Using an encompassing query, this method identified more than 10,000
state and federal court cases.581 Therefore, the author took a proportional
stratified random sample582 of the disputes, which were decided procedurally,
or on the merits between 1925 and 2014.583 The proportional sample comprises 563 cases, which center on the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
written contracts.584 Employing a different query, the author uncovered 115
and “courts refused to entertain even the possibility of judicial bias); Michele Benedetto
Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 140 (2013) (reporting that some judges refuse to believe their biases and wealthy backgrounds color
judicial deliberations).
579
See supra Part IV.A.
580
See supra Part IV.B.
581
The following query was constructed: sy(arbitration/p contract). Executing that
expression in Westlaw’s ALLSTATES and ALLFEDS databases generated 6,319 and 3,698
cases, respectively.
582
See, e.g., Ratanasen v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 11 F.3d 1467, 1470–72 (9th Cir.
1993) (explaining the differences between and the efficacy of employing “simple random
sampling” and “stratified random sampling”); Bruce M. Price, From Downhill to Slalom:
An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (And Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 138 (2007) (“Using a proportional, stratified,
random sample of bankruptcy cases from [two twelve-month periods, the author created
a] ... database of cases for every state in the Tenth Circuit.”).
583
The investigator searched Westlaw’s MIN-CS, ALLSTATES, ALLFEDS, CTA and
DCT databases between May 2013 and June 2014. In addition, the author searched various
regional reporters as well as LEXIS’s Genfed COURTS File during the same period.
584
See infra Table 1 and the accompanying discussion.
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cases involving the enforceability of arbitration provisions in standardized,
preprinted applications.585 To be sure, the relatively small number of the
latter cases belies their significance. Among the application-dispute cases,
many were class actions in which large classes of applicants argued that arbitration provisions in standardized application forms are not enforceable
under the FAA.586
Furthermore, since the enactment of the FAA, private arbitrators have
decided thousands of cases each year.587 These latter cases involve all types
of disputes and complainants—both aggrieving applicants and non-applicants. Moreover, studies suggest that private arbitrators are “biased,” too.588
585

The following query was fashioned: “applicant’s” “applied for” “application for” /p
“federal arbitration act”). An execution of that query in Westlaw’s ALLCASES database
generated 115 state and federal court cases. See also infra Table 1 and the accompanying
discussion.
586
See, e.g., Labor Ready Nw., Inc. v. Crawford, Civ. No. 07-1060-HA, 2008 WL
1840749, at *1–3 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2008) (an arbitration dispute involving a large multistate
employer who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a large class of applicants who
signed employment applications that contained arbitration clauses and sued under Oregon’s
Oregon wage-and-hour laws); Battels v. Sears Nat’l. Bank, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1210 (M.D.
Ala. 2005) (a controversy involving Sears who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a
large class of credit cardholders who signed applications that contained arbitration
clauses and sued under the Fair Credit Billing Act and the Truth in Lending Act); Allen
v. Labor Ready Sw., No. B237673, 2013 WL 1910293, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2013)
(a case involving an employer who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a class of
approximately 600,000 temporary employees in the United States, Canada, and Puerto
Rico who signed applications that contained arbitration clauses); Muhammad v. Cnty.
Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 90 (N.J. 2006) (a case involving a payday
lender who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a large class of borrowers who
signed applications that contained arbitration clauses and sued under the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act and New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).
587
See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN REPORT, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications
/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7545, archived at http://perma.cc/7CQC-EE8C (reporting that
private arbitrators decided 33,948 consumer arbitration cases between January 1, 2003
and March 31, 2007).
588
See, e.g., Simone Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card Arbitration,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 16, 2007, at A2 (“The National Arbitration Forum (NAF),
one of the nation’s largest private arbitration firms, is commonly used by creditors and
secondary debt buyers .... [The Monitor] found that the 10 most frequently used arbitrators—who decided almost 60 percent of the cases heard—decided in favor of the
consumer only 1.6 percent of the time, while arbitrators who decided three or fewer cases
decided for the consumer 38 percent of the time. NAF would not comment on the findings
because it had not participated in the analysis, but maintains that its arbitrators are
neutral .... [T]he knowledge that rulings bring repeat business may create financial
pressures for arbitrators. ‘Arbitration work is often very lucrative, and arbitrators know
that if they rule against a corporate defendant too frequently or too generously (from the
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They exhibit an “irrational” tendency to decide arbitral disputes more often in
favor of defendants than in favor of (1) consumers, or (2) applicants—specifically individuals who apply for financial services, employment, housing, and benefits.589 In light of these findings, some jurists have suggested
that federal and state courts’ procedural and substantive dispositions of arbitral controversies might be similar to arbitrators’ dispositions.590 Therefore, to
secure enough cases to test this latter proposition, the author accessed exceedingly large databases of arbitrators’ decisions—which were reported between
1925 and 2014.591 Next, the author took several proportional stratified
random samples of arbitrators’ decisions.592 Slightly more than three hundred (303) private-arbitrator cases are included in this study.593 In the end,
the author’s entire database comprises 981 cases.594
B. Characteristics of Motion to Compel Arbitration Litigants in State and
Federal Courts, 1925–2014
In a typical motion to compel arbitration trial, the movant/plaintiff is the
person who raised a defense in an underlying lawsuit; and, the respondent/
defendant is the applicant/plaintiff in the underlying action. Table 1 illustrates some selected demographic attributes of the persons who resolved
disputes before private arbitrators.
standpoint of that corporation), they will lose the work,’ wrote F. Paul Bland, staff attorney at
Public Justice, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit legal services group that opposes
mandatory binding arbitration agreements in consumer contracts, in comments for the
Congressional hearing. NAF’s Anderson denies any charges of pro-business bias. He
says the arbitrators who work for NAF are former judges and attorneys with at least 15 years’
experience. Strict guidelines prevent any financial conflicts of interest.”) (emphasis added).
589
Id.
590
See, e.g., id. (“A Monitor analysis of the last year of available data from [the National
Arbitration Forum] found that arbitrators awarded in favor of creditors and debt buyers
in more than 96 percent of the cases. Such results may be similar to outcomes in court.”)
(emphasis added).
591
To secure a proportional and stratified sample of arbitrators’ decisions, several
research queries were executed—respectively—in the following Westlaw and Lexis
databases: (1) AAA Employment Arbitration Awards—SEARCH: “discrim”; (2) AAA
Employment Arbitration Awards—SEARCH: “find! for claimant!” “in favor of claimant”;
(3) Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA/NASD) Arbitration Awards—
SEARCH: “breach w/8 stocks” (4) Washington Arbitration Decisions—SEARCH: “injury”
(N=2705) and “defense award” (N=2267). Only 60 cases were sampled; (5) WASHINGTON
ARBITRATION AWARDS—SEARCH: “injury,” plus (“plaintiff award” and Insurance) and
(not “admitted liability”); and (6) WASHINGTON ARBITRATION DECISIONS—SEARCH:
“injury” (N=2705) and “plaintiff award” (N=2445). Only 150 cases were sampled.
592
Id.
593
See infra Table 1 and the accompanying discussion.
594
See infra Table 1 and the accompanying discussion.
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Also, the table presents background information for litigants who petitioned courts to decide whether arbitration clauses in standardized applications and in certain written contracts were enforceable under the FAA. The
first variable in Table 1 is “Jurisdictions.” Significantly, disputes involving
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in applications were more likely to
be resolved in state courts. Conversely, federal courts were more likely to
decide the enforceability of arbitration provisions in contracts. The reported
percentages are 58.3% and 52.2%, respectively.
The second variable—”Geographic Regions”—describes the origin of arbitral disputes. The reported percentages reveal two significant and interesting
findings. First, disputes involving the enforceability of arbitration clauses in
applications are significantly more likely to originate in the West and South—
24.5% and 22.8%, respectively. Also, disagreements surrounding the enforceability of arbitration provisions in contracts are more likely to evolve
in the South and West—27.3%, 22.4%, respectively. On the other hand,
litigants in the Southwest are significantly more likely (20.2%) to litigate
disputes involving the enforceability of arbitration clauses in applications.
And, in the Midwest, parties are considerably more likely (22.4%) to litigate
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in contracts.
In Table 1, the variable—“Types of Plaintiffs in the Underlying Lawsuits”—is self-explanatory. First, when movants filed lawsuits to enforce
arbitration clauses in standardized applications (N = 115), the respondents
or plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits were significantly more likely to be
(1) dissatisfied applicants who applied for consumers’ good and services; or
(2) dissatisfied applicants who applied for employment. The reported percentages are 39.1% and 34.0%, respectively. Similarly, when movants filed
actions to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts (N = 563), nearly 60 percent
(59.0%) of the respondents were dissatisfied persons who applied for consumers’ good and services before commencing underlying lawsuits. And
approximately 20 percent (19.0%) of the respondents filed employment
applications before suing the movants in underlying lawsuits. On the other
hand, when movants sued to enforce arbitration clauses in applications as
well as in contracts, nearly equal numbers of plaintiffs in the underlying
lawsuits were aggrievants who applied for professional memberships and
“other” services. The combined percentages for the two groups are 26.9% and
22.0%, respectively.
In Table 1, the variable—“Types of Defendants in the Underlying Lawsuits”—is also self-explanatory: the movants were the defendants in the
underlying lawsuits. Now, compare the movants who filed actions to enforce
arbitration provisions in applications with those who filed motion to enforce
arbitral clauses in contracts. A significantly larger percentage of corporations
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filed motions to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts than in applications.
The percentages are 64.0% and 52.2%, respectively. Conversely, a substantially larger percentage of financial institutions filed motions to enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications than in contracts. The respective
percentages are 36.6% and 21.7%.
The final variable in Table 1 is entitled, “Plaintiff’s Theories of Recovery
in the Underlying Lawsuits.” Before movants commenced actions to enforce
arbitration clauses in application forms, the plaintiffs-respondents in the
underlying lawsuits were significantly more likely to sue the movantsdefendants (1) for violating state and federal antidiscrimination laws (30.4%);
or (2) for violating various breach-of-contract and tort-based rules (28.7%).
Now, consider the movants-defendants who filed actions to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts. In the underlying lawsuits, the plaintiffs-respondents
were significantly more likely to sue this latter group of movants (1) for violating consumer protection statutes (30.4%); or (2) for violating various
breach of contract and tort-based rules (42.6%).
C. Motions to Enforce Arbitration Provisions in Applications and the
Bivariate Relationships Between Litigants’ Characteristics and the
Disposition of Motions to Compel Arbitration in State and Federal Courts
Again, the demographic variables in the previous Section present a description of movants and respondents who litigated motion to compel arbitration disputes in state and federal courts between 1925 and 2014. Therefore,
in light of the reported findings, reconsider section 2 of the FAA. It reads in
relevant part: “[A] written provision ... to settle by arbitration a controversy ...
arising out of [a] contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”595 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,596 the
Supreme Court declared that under the FAA’s savings clause, “generally
applicable contract defenses”—such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability—
may invalidate arbitration clauses in contracts.597
Read more broadly, the FAA’s “savings clause” permits courts to weigh
and apply judiciously settled principles of contract law as well as equitable
doctrines when deciding whether to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts.598
595

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added).
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1741 (2011).
597
Id. at 1746.
598
Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 2012) (“[U]nder the
savings clause of Section 2, general state contract principles still apply to assess whether
596
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Also, reconsider an important principle of contract law: independently,
standardized applications are not binding and enforceable contracts.599 But,
assume that applications are indeed legally binding contracts. The FAA’s
savings clause would allow courts to apply common law principles of contract law. Under the savings clause, however, judges do not have authority
to use extrajudicial factors—for instance, types of defendants, or litigants’
respective legal status—to decide whether to enforce arbitration clauses in
application forms.
Yet, as illustrated in Table 2, state and federal judges ignore or marginalize the explicit admonitions appearing in the FAA’s language—“arising out of a contract” and “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity.” Instead, trial and appellate judges consciously or unconsciously
allow impermissible extralegal factors to determine whether to enforce arbitration clauses in application forms—again, instruments that are not valid
and enforceable contracts.

[See Table 2 on the next page.]

those agreements to arbitrate are valid and enforceable, just as they would to any other
contract dispute arising under state law.”).
599
See Gilmer. v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (finding that
a securities registration application was not a “contract of employment.”); C.I.T. Corp. v.
United States, 150 F.2d 85, 95 (9th Cir. 1945) (“The application is not a contract .... It is
an application for a loan.”); Harris Wayside Furniture Co., Inc. v. Idearc Media Corp.,
Civ. No. 06-CV-392-JM, 2007 WL 1847313, at *3 (D.N.H. June 25, 2007) (“[U]nder both
New Hampshire and Texas law, [an] application is not a contract, so its provisions are not
binding on the parties .... [Therefore], the [publishing] application was an offer to contract,
not a contract.”).
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To help prove the latter assertion, consider Table 2. It presents the
findings among applicants who filed underlying lawsuits and sued various
defendants for allegedly violating the applicants’ rights under state and federal laws. First, consider the findings, which are located under the heading,
“Applications, Arbitration Clauses & Disposition of Movants’ Motions to
Compel Arbitration in Trial Courts.” Focus on the variable entitled, Types
of Courts. Unexpectedly, the finding reveals that federal district courts are
significantly more likely (58.3%) to enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications; and state trial courts are significantly less likely (67.2%) to
grant motions to compel arbitration. Again, this is a surprising and somewhat
puzzling finding. And the reason is not complex. State trial court judges—
like federal district court judges—embrace unquestionably a frequently cited
Supreme Court’s policy: “As a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”600
Yet, a major split exists—between state trial court judges and federal district
court judges—over the enforceability of arbitrations provisions in preprinted
application forms.
Furthermore, an examination of the statistics in Table 2 reveals a similar
split between state and federal appellate courts. Consider the statistics appearing under the heading, “Applications, Arbitration Clauses & Disposition of
Movants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration in Appellate Courts.” Federal appellate courts are substantially more likely (70.8%) to grant movants’ motions
to compel arbitration. Conversely, state appellate courts are significantly
less likely (67.2%) to grant motions to compel arbitration, or significantly
less likely to enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications. Again,
an earlier observation needs repeating: The FAA’s savings clause does not
600

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1982)
(emphasis added). Compare Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Ala. v. Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497,
501–02 (Ala. 1999) (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25, and stressing that “trial
courts are required to stay or dismiss proceedings and to compel arbitration when the
parties have entered into a valid contract containing an arbitration agreement”), and State
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 98CVS 14377-I, 2006 WL 3490937, at *7 (N.C. Super.
Dec. 4, 2006) (embracing the federal arbitration policy), with Blankenship v. T.D.
Ameritrade, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1:13-8048, 2014 WL 637144, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 18,
2014) (reiterating that arbitration agreements must be construed with due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of arbitration.),
and Schwartz v. CACH, L.L.C., 2014 WL 298107, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2014) (citing
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25, and embracing the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” while stressing that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”).
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encourage judges to consider litigants’ legal statuses or any extrajudicial
factor when deciding whether to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts or
in preprinted application forms.
The second variable in Table 2 is entitled, “Alleged Victims and Plaintiffs in the Underlying State and Federal Lawsuits.” In state and federal trial
courts, one finds general—although not statistically significant—trends:
Lower court judges are generally more likely to enforce arbitration clauses
in applications when the underlying applicants-victims are hourly employees
and professionals/partners. The corresponding percentages are 51.3% and
56.0%, respectively. In contrast, state and federal trial courts generally deny
motions to compel arbitration when the underlying applicants are consumers
and other alleged victims. The respective percentages are 66.7% and 83.3%.
On the other hand, the statistics in Table 2 reveal that the legal statuses
of the plaintiffs and victims in the underlying lawsuits had a statistically significant effect on the disposition of motions in both state and federal appellate courts. For example, in these latter tribunals, justices are substantially
and statistically more likely to enforce arbitration clauses in applications
when underlying applicants-victims are hourly employees and professionals/
partners. The corresponding percentages are 51.3% and 84.0%, respectively.
In contrast, both state and federal appellate courts are substantially and statistically less likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when the underlying applicants are consumers and other alleged victims. The respective
percentages are 51.1% and 83.7%.
The statistics in Table 2 also answer the question of whether courts allow
the legal statuses of movants—the defendants in the underlying lawsuits—
to influence the disposition of motions to compel arbitration. State and federal
trial courts are statistically and significantly more likely to enforce arbitration
clauses in applications (57.1%) when financial institutions are the movants.
But trial court judges are statistically and significantly less likely to enforce
arbitration provisions in standardized applications when movants are corporations (61.7%) and insurers/others (77.0%). Although not statistically significant, fairly similar trends are found among cases decided in state and federal
appellate courts. Judges sitting on courts of appeals are also less likely to
enforce arbitration clauses in preprinted application forms when movants are
corporations (53.3%). Contrarily, appellate court justices are more likely to
enforce arbitration provisions in applications when movants or underlying
defendants are financial institutions (64.3%) and insurers/others (69.2%).
Arguably, the remaining statistics in Table 2 reveal the most important
and informative findings for practitioners who litigate motion to compel
arbitration disputes in state and federal courts. Consider the last variable in
the table entitled, “Plaintiffs’ Claims and the Alleged Violations in the Underlying State and Federal Lawsuits.” Trial court judges are significantly and
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statistically more likely to enforce arbitration clauses in application forms
when respondents or plaintiffs—in the underlying lawsuits—sue movants/defendants for purportedly violating antidiscrimination and securities/financial
laws. The corresponding percentages are 54.3% and 63.5%, respectively.
On the other hand, trial court judges are substantially and statistically less
likely to enforce arbitration clauses in applications when plaintiffs—in the underlying lawsuits—sue movants/defendants for allegedly breaching contracts
or committing torts (common law claims), and for violating consumer protection laws. Respectively, the latter percentages are 75.8% and 58.0%. And,
although not statistically significant, similar and notable trends appear among
the cases which were decided in state and federal appellate courts.
Arguably, FAA policies are rationally biased in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts. But the results reported in this study are equally
clear. Courts act irrationally by allowing extrajudicial variables to influence
the disposition of motions to compel arbitration. Briefly put, such variables
should have no “predictive” power. Therefore, in light of the statistically
significant findings in Table 2, two additional questions ask for answers:
(1) whether extralegal factors are more or less likely to influence courts’ decisions to enforce or not enforce arbitration clauses in negotiated or standardized contracts?; and (2) whether courts are likely to enforce arbitration
clauses in applications more often than arbitration provisions in contracts?

[See Table 3 on the next page.]
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The statistics appearing in Table 3 address both questions. First, in the
center of Table 3, three columns of statistics appear under the heading,
“Mandatory-Arbitration Provisions in Applications and the Disposition of
Movants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration.” And, on the right side of the
table, three additional columns of statistics are illustrated under the heading, “Mandatory-Arbitration Provisions in Contracts and the Disposition
of Movants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration.”
Consider the first variable in the table—Trial Courts’ Dispositions. The
findings are clear, regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in applications. Again, state trial courts are statistically and significantly more
likely to deny motions (67.2%) and refuse to enforce arbitration provisions
in applications. Conversely, federal district courts are statistically and meaningfully more likely to enforce (58.3%) arbitration provisions in applications. Regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in negotiated or
standardized contracts, the results are similar: State trial courts are substantially less likely to enforce (60.0%) arbitration clauses in contracts. And federal district courts are significantly more likely to grant motions (51.4%) and
enforce arbitration provisions in contracts.
Now, examine the statistics in Table 3 which are associated with the second variable—Courts of Appeals’ Dispositions. One of the findings among
courts of appeals is a mirror image of a finding appearing among trial courts:
like state trial courts, state appellate courts are significantly more likely to
deny motions (55.2%) and refuse to enforce arbitration provisions in applications. On the other hand, federal courts of appeals are statistically and
substantially more likely to grant motions (70.8%) and enforce arbitration
provisions in applications. Even more revealing, both state and federal
courts of appeals are equally likely to grant motions and enforce arbitration provisions in standardized and negotiated contracts. The reported percentages are 62.5% and 59.5%, respectively.
In Table 3, the third and fourth variables are labeled, Federal & State
Trial Courts Respondents, and Federal & State Appeals Courts Respondents,
respectively. Review the corresponding rows of statistics in the center of the
table. They confirm two earlier findings: state trial courts and federal district
courts are less likely to enforce arbitration clauses in applications (68.5%)
when respondents or underlying plaintiffs are consumers. State trial courts
and federal district courts, however, are more likely to enforce arbitration provisions in applications (54.0%) when respondents are employees or individuals who applied for employment. Among state and federal appellate courts’
dispositions, the same patterns appear: Courts of appeals are less likely to
enforce arbitration clauses in applications (51.8%) when respondents are
consumers. On the other hand, courts of appeals are more likely to enforce arbitration provisions in applications (62.3%) when respondents are employees.
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Are the same statistical outcomes observed among state and federal
courts when the question concerns the enforceability of arbitration clauses
in negotiated and standardized contracts? The answer is no. Reviewing the
statistics on the right side of Table 3, we discover that state trial courts and
federal district courts are equally unlikely to enforce arbitration provisions
in standardized and negotiated contracts when the respondents are consumers or hourly employees. The reported percentages are 54.8% and 51.2%,
respectively. In contrast, state and federal courts of appeals are equally more
likely to grant motions and enforce arbitration clauses in contracts when the
respondents are consumers or hourly employees. Respectively, the percentages are 60.0% and 63.8%.
The final two variables in Table 3 and the corresponding statistics illustrate the effects of consumers’ and employees’ theories of recovery on the
disposition of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts.
Regardless of their respective jurisdictions, all trial and appellate courts
are significantly more likely to enforce arbitration clauses in both applications and contracts when consumers and employees file antidiscrimination
lawsuits against the movants. The respective percentages are 53.5%, 54.6%,
62.8%, and 63.0%. In addition, when respondents sue movants for violating
financial and securities laws, the greater majority of state and federal, trial
and appellate courts are statistically more likely to enforce arbitration clauses
in both applications and contracts. The reported percentages are 63.6%,
68.2% and 62.7%, respectively. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of
state and federal, trial and appellate courts are significantly less likely to
enforce arbitration clauses in applications and contracts when respondents
sue movants for violating consumer protection and deceptive trade practices laws. The corresponding percentages are 74.0%, 52.1% and 56.0%.
Did Congress intend to foster these types of statistically significant and,
arguably, irrational judicial outcomes when that body enacted the FAA section 2? Conservative readings of numerous primary sources—the FAA, its
legislative history, and the Supreme Court’s FAA-related decisions—
provide a resounding answer: no.
D. A Two-Stage, Multivariate Probit Analysis of the Interrelationships
Between Movants and Respondents’ Attributes and the Dispositions of
Motions to Compel Arbitration in State and Federal Courts of Appeals
Above, numerous statistically significant findings were discussed. Unquestionably, one’s focusing exclusively on the stand-alone or sole effect of
any particular variable prohibits a jurist or statistician from arguing convincingly: (1) state and federal courts are irrefutably “irrationally biased;” and
(2) the irrational bias determines whether movants or respondents are more or
less likely to win the majority of motion to compel arbitration disputes. In
an earlier published article, the author cautioned jurists against embracing
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such hasty and unwarranted conclusions.601 Why? Serious and careful research always requires one’s conducting multiple tests to determine whether
sufficient, statistical and probative evidence exist before concluding that
judges’ dispositions are “irrationally biased.”602
Furthermore, an impartial researcher must address straightforwardly an
important question regarding the quality of the researcher’s sample data:
Whether published cases in regional law reporters describe fairly and comprehensively the universe of judicial decisions in state and federal courts?603
Therefore, to increase the likelihood of one’s implementing a comprehensive
study, an investigator must (1) use statistical tests that generate “inferential”
or “causal” coefficients, which are more “powerful” than simple percentages;
(2) measure both independent and simultaneous effects of legal and extralegal variables on the disposition of, say, motions to compel arbitration;
and (3) test for “selectivity bias” in the sample data.604
One important reason explains why a researcher must test for “selectivity bias” in choice data. Unlike state trial courts or federal district courts’
decisions, courts of appeals’ decisions are significantly more likely to be
respected and authoritative—since appellate decisions are markedly more
likely to be “final decisions.” In addition, state trial courts and federal district
courts often issue unfavorable rulings in, say, motion to compel arbitration
trials. In response, some movants and respondents accept the adverse rulings
601
Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State
Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly
“Impartial” and “Competent” Federal Courts—A Historical Perspective and an
Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal and State Courts, 1925–2011,
3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 466 (2012).
602
See generally Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over
Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral
Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory
Judgments—1900–1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1194–1214, 1208–09 (1998) [hereinafter Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord] (presenting a case study of state
and federal courts’ disposition of lawsuits involving corporate entities, insurers, and insurance consumers, and discussing statistical problems which are associated with a researcher’s
using only reported cases and simple percentages to make “causal” inferences).
603
Id. at 1208–09.
604
Elsewhere, the author has discussed “selectivity bias,” the inferential problems
associated with it, and the tests for detecting such bias in sample data. See Willy E. Rice,
Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions over Whether Insurers Must Defend Insureds
that Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical and Empirical Review of Federal
and State Court Declaratory Judgments 1900–2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1088–89
nn.431–32 (2000); Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord, supra note 602, at
1209 n.386 (testing for “selectivity bias” in “other- and self-selection data”); Willy E.
Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical
Analysis of State Supreme Courts’ Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenantof-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900–1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325,
371–76 nn.157–59 (1992) (explaining and testing for “selectivity bias” in “choice data”).
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and decide not to seek appellate review.605 But, other litigants do not accept
the rulings. In the end, some members of this latter group decide to seek
more favorable rulings in state or federal courts of appeals.606
Put simply, the purpose of a “selectivity bias” test is to determine whether
statistically significant differences exist between the population of litigants
who choose to appeal (“appellants”) adverse rulings and the population that
decided not to appeal (“non-appellants”). And, if the researcher finds significant differences between appellants and non-appellants, the aggregate
of the dissimilar personal and background characteristics—rather than
“irrational judicial bias” or other impermissible attributes—provides a better
explanation of appellants’ likelihood of winning or losing motion to compel arbitration lawsuits in state and federal courts of appeals.
As illustrated in Tables 1, 2 and 3, the current sample contains information about appellants’ and non-appellants’ characteristics. Therefore, a
“selectivity bias” test must be performed before trying to determine whether
state and federal appellate judges’ allegedly “irrational bias” explains the
rather questionable, puzzling and unexpected outcomes in motion to compel arbitration lawsuits.607 And, if selection bias is not, the next challenge
is to secure the individual and statistical effects (“explanations”) of certain
variables on courts’ dispositions of motions to compel arbitration—while
controlling for and determining the multiple and simultaneous effects of
other “presumed” predictors.
Now, consider Table 4. It presents a multivariate, two-stage probit
analysis608 of the disposition of motions to compel arbitration in state and
federal appellate courts.609 The table illustrates several distributions, probit
values, and statistics.
605

See infra Table 4 and compare the total sample size (N=981) with the number of litigants (N=669) who decided to appeal adverse decisions to state and federal courts of appeals.
606
See infra Table 4.
607
See Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions, supra note 604, at 1088–89
nn.431–32 (discussing measuring bias in sample data).
608
In multiple published law review articles, the author has discussed and employed
this statistical procedure to measure simultaneously independent and multiple effects of
“independent variables” on the disposition of court decisions. See Rice, Allegedly “Biased,”
“Intimidating,” and “Incompetent”, supra note 601, at 544–551 nn.790–838; Willy E.
Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical and
Historical Analysis of Courts’ Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-Ferguson Act—1941–1993, 43 CATH.
U. L. REV. 399, 445–49 nn.213–19 (1994); Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative
Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis,
5 REV. LITIG. 219, 287 nn.406–09 (1986) (using StataCorp’s Stata Statistical Software to analyze the data generally and to compute the multivariate-probit coefficients in particular);
Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection, supra note 604, at
369–77 nn.157–60 (explaining multivariate probit analysis).
609
A copy of the author’s database is on file with the author.
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To begin, it is important to underscore that the findings in Table 4 are
based on a multivariate probit analysis of 981 cases. Of this latter number,
approximately 70 percent (678) of the litigants appealed motions to compel
arbitration decisions to federal and state appellate courts. The remaining 30
percent (312) decided not to appeal. Consequently they were “unobserved” in
either state or federal courts of appeals. Again, the absence of the unobserved
litigants could be a source of “selectivity bias,” which would effectively
preclude three interrelated and unequivocal conclusions: (1) appellate courts
are “irrationally biased” in favor of arbitration or the Federal Arbitration
Act; (2) appellate courts’ irrational bias explains in part the disposition of
motions to compel arbitration; and (3) courts of appeals weigh heavily
extrajudicial factors when deciding whether to grant or deny motions to
enforce arbitration provisions in standardized applications, which are not
contracts under the FAA.
Now, consider more carefully the variables and coefficients in Table 4.
Fourteen (14) “dummy” variables610 or predictors appear in the table under
four headings: “Underlying Legal Instruments” comprising three variables;
“Litigants by Jurisdictions” containing predictors; “Types of Defendants
in the Underlying Lawsuits” comprising two dummy variables; and “Plaintiffs in the Underlying Antidiscrimination Lawsuits” containing three dummy
predictors. In addition, Table 4 illustrates two distributions of probit coefficients along with their respective distributions of robust standard errors,
z-statistics, and levels of statistical significance.611
On the left, the first distribution of probit coefficients appears under
the label “Decisions to Appeal Motion to Compel Arbitration Rulings to State
and Federal Appellate Courts (N = 669).” Those probit coefficients answer
whether the multiple, individual and simultaneous effects of fourteen dummy
variables significantly influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal adverse
motion to compel arbitration rulings. The findings show that some probit
coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, we may conclude that some
610
Put simply, the subcategories or subgroups are individual binary (0, 1) or “dummy
variables.” See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116–18 (5th ed. 2003)
(explaining the purpose and use of dummy variables in regression analysis).
611
See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN LAW 93, 233–34 n.4 (2010) (stating that “[w]hen a result has less than a 5
percent chance of having been observed but is observed anyway, it is said to be statistically
significant”, and explaining that a 1 percent chance “represents a ‘higher’ level of significance
because it indicates a less probable outcome and hence a more rigorous statistical test”);
David L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An
Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 460 n.184 (2013) (“Statistical
significance is the probability that an observed relationship is not due to chance .... A pvalue of less than 0.05 is usually considered statistically significant .... A 5% probability
is equal to a p-value of 0.05 or less. Results with a p-value of less than 0.01 are considered highly statistically significant.”).
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of the fourteen factors influenced movants and respondents’ decisions to
appeal unfavorable trial and district courts’ rulings to state and federal
appeals courts.
More specifically, litigants’ decisions to appeal or not appeal can be
explained by (1) knowing the movants who wanted to enforce arbitration
provisions only in state-approved application forms; (2) knowing that
movants in the Second and Ninth Circuits tried to enforce arbitration
clauses; (3) knowing the movants who wanted to enforce arbitration clauses
only in state appellate courts; (4) knowing the movants want to enforce arbitration clauses only in federal courts of appeals; (5) knowing that movants
were either defendants-employers or defendants–financial institutions in the
underlying lawsuits; and (6) knowing the ethnicity or gender of respondents/plaintiffs who filed the underlining antidiscrimination lawsuits against
the movants.
To repeat, some predictors influenced appellants and non-appellants’
decision to appeal adverse rulings to courts of appeals. And, some of the
same predictors influenced courts of appeals’ dispositions of motions to
compel arbitration. Thus, it is prudent to determine whether “selectivity bias”
appears in the data. Or stated somewhat differently, it is necessary to assess
whether there are any meaningful similarities between two equations or the
two distributions of probit coefficients. At the bottom of Table 4, the findings of a Wald test for independent equations appear. The Chi-square value
is not statistically significant—suggesting that no disquieting “selectivity
bias” appears in the sample data.
Therefore, absent any meaningful “self-selection bias,” the next task is
to determine the simultaneously individual and multiple effects of the fourteen dummy variables on the dispositions of motions to compel arbitration.
More specifically, the mission is to assess whether the predictors are significantly more or less likely to influence appellate courts’ dispositions of
motions to enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications as well
as in negotiated or standardized contracts.
Even a hasty review of the four columns of statistics in Table 4 reveals
that several of the fourteen predictors have statistically significant effects
on motions to compel arbitration outcomes in state and federal courts. To
illustrate, consider the subheading that appears on the right side of Table
4—“Disposition of Motion to Compel Arbitration Lawsuits in State and
Federal Courts of Appeals.” Four distributions of coefficients and statistics
appear under that subheading in bold print. A closer look reveals that nine
of the fourteen predictors have statistically significant probit coefficients.612
612

At all times, the interpretation of the “positive” and “negative” probit coefficients
under this heading must be viewed from the perspectives of (1) the plaintiffs who filed the
underlying lawsuits in state trial courts and in federal district courts, or (2) the respondents
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First, the “Applications Only” variable has a negative (-.1711) probit
coefficient. This means that generally, plaintiffs—who commenced underlying lawsuits—were statistically less likely to prevail when movants/defendants asked appellate courts to enforce arbitration provisions only in
standardized applications. Again, the “State Applications Only” predictor
represents various applications that were fashioned and sanctioned under
state laws.613 And, the positive (.2730) probit coefficient associated with this
latter variable reveals that the respondents or the plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits are statistically more likely to win when appellate courts decide
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in state-sanctioned application forms.
Do state and federal courts’ jurisdictions or jurisdictional powers affect
those tribunals’ dispositions of motions to compel arbitration? Do types of
legal disputes influence the outcomes? The answer to each question is yes. In
Table 4, locate these two predictors: “State-Based Disputes Only,” and
“Federal Appellate Courts Only.” Their corresponding probit coefficients
are negative and statistically significant. Put simply, the -.4917 coefficient
in the motion to compel arbitration proceedings. Of course, defendants in the underlying
lawsuits also filed motions to compel arbitration in those same lower state and federal
courts. So, focusing on the motion to compel arbitration litigation in the trial and district
courts, this question arose: What was the outcome of each motion-to-compel-arbitration
dispute? A dependent “dummy” variable—“OUTCOME-Trial-Court”—was created. It
comprised two values (0, 1). If an underlying plaintiff prevailed in a state trial court or in
a federal district court, the value 1 was assigned; and if the underlying plaintiff did not
prevail, the value 0 was assigned. For cases decided in state and appellate courts, a second
dependent “dummy” variable—“OUTCOME-Appellate-Court”—was fashioned. And the
same coding scheme was applied. Thus, in Table 4, a negative probit coefficient means
that the corresponding predictor decreased plaintiffs’ likelihood of winning a motion-tocompel-arbitration dispute. On the other hand, a positive probit coefficient means that the
corresponding predictor increased plaintiffs’ likelihood of winning a motion-to-compelarbitration dispute.
613
See, e.g., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez, 107 P.3d 279, 286 (Alaska 2005)
(“At the request of GEICO we have taken judicial notice that the Division of Insurance
has approved application forms submitted by insurers and by agencies serving insurers
that ... list the various levels of coverage required but do not state the premium that will be
charged for each level of coverage.”) (emphasis added); Rosshirt v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 336
S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (“The Allstate agent did not attach to his affidavit a
copy of the state-approved application form which was in use.”) (emphasis added); Hall v.
Shah, 953 N.Y.S.2d 758, 761 (App. Div. 2012) (“The date of application is the date that ... a
signed state-prescribed application form, or a state-approved equivalent form ... is received
by the facilitated enroller or the local district”) (emphasis added); Corcoran v. Atascocita
Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-12-00982-CV, 2013 WL 5888127, at *5 (Tex.
App. Oct. 31, 2013) (“There is no specific provision in the 1997 Guidelines authorizing
homeowners to appeal [the Architectural Control Committee] disapproval to [Atascocita
Community Improvement Association]. Furthermore, approved application forms attached to
the 1997 Guidelines do not mention an ability to appeal to ACIA.”) (emphasis added).
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indicates that plaintiffs are substantially less likely to win motion to compel
arbitration disputes when plaintiffs’ underlying lawsuits comprise only statelaw claims.614 The -.5502 probit coefficient also has a similar meaning: in
federal courts of appeals generally, respondents who filed the underlying
lawsuits are substantially less likely to win in motion to compel arbitration
proceedings.
On the other hand, an underlying plaintiff’s likelihood of winning a
motion to compel arbitration lawsuit increases or decreases substantially,
depending on the location of the federal court of appeals. For example, the
predictor variable “Second Circuit Only” has an accompanying negative
probit coefficient (-.1307). And the predictor “Ninth Circuit Only” has an
accompanying positive probit coefficient (.1095). Interpreting the two coefficients, we discover that respondents-plaintiffs are substantially less likely
to win motion to compel arbitration disputes in the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. But, in the Ninth Circuit, plaintiffs who commenced the
underlying lawsuits are substantially and statistically more likely to prevail
in motion to compel arbitration proceedings.
Similarly, plaintiffs-respondents are more likely to prevail in motion to
compel arbitration proceedings when the defendants-movants in the underlying lawsuits are employers. The corresponding positive probit coefficient
(.3166) is statistically significant. Conversely, plaintiffs-respondents are
less likely to prevail when financial institutions file motions to enforce
arbitration provisions in applications and contracts. The corresponding and
statistically significant probit coefficient is negative (-.0994).
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Without knowing more, this finding is arguably suspect or puzzling. And the
reason is not very complex. In Table 3, the percentages show that state courts are significantly more likely to deny motions to enforce arbitration provisions in both standardized
applications and valid contracts. Thus, one could argue that state courts rather than
federal courts are more “pro-plaintiff.” But, many state-law claims—which are filed in
state courts—are removed to federal courts. See, e.g., Montero v. Carnival Corp., 523
Fed. Appx. 623, 635 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Montero [sued] Carnival in Florida state court,
asserting claims of Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure
under maritime law. Carnival removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to compel
arbitration based on the arbitration provision [in] the employment contract between
Montero and Carnival.”); Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 767 (8th Cir.
2011) (“Mack Green and other current or former shuttle bus drivers [sued] SuperShuttle in
Minnesota state court alleging violations of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act ....
After SuperShuttle removed the action to federal court, the district court granted SuperShuttle’s motion to compel arbitration.”); Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d
1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Cox filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Hawai’i Civil
Rights Commission, and ... the Commission granted him the right to sue. Cox then filed a
complaint in state court, which Ocean View removed to federal district court.”). Ultimately, in
federal courts, the state law disputes or any accompanying motions to compel arbitration
are greatly more likely to be adjudicated in favor of defendants. See Montero, 523 Fed.
Appx. at 627; Green, 653 F.3d at 767; Cox, 533 F.3d at 1126; see also supra Table 3.
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Earlier, an examination of the percentages in Tables 2 and 3 revealed
that plaintiffs’ underlying theories of recovery or claims influence federal
and state courts’ likelihood of granting or denying motions to enforce arbitration clauses in application forms and in valid contracts. Again, in many underlying lawsuits, plaintiffs often sued defendants for allegedly violating
consumer-protection, financial, securities, and/or deceptive trade practices
laws. Furthermore, we discovered that state and federal courts occasionally
grant defendants’ motions by enforcing arbitration clauses in standardized
applications, and denying plaintiffs’ requests for a trial by jury.615 On other
occasions, however, state courts refuse to enforce arbitration clauses in applications or in contracts, when consumer-protection, financial fraud, and/or deceptive trade practices claims appear in plaintiffs’ underlying complaints
or pleadings.
In addition, as reported earlier, applications forms are ubiquitous. And
each year, several million persons use such forms to apply for various goods,
services, benefits and memberships.616 Furthermore, billions of contracts
are formed annually.617 Consequently, such large numbers of applications
and contracts guarantee that some persons will experience bad events. Therefore, the question arises: are courts more or less likely to enforce arbitration clauses in applications or in contracts when disgruntled plaintiffs
accuse defendants of violating state and federal antidiscrimination and
civil rights laws? Again, in both Tables 2 and 3, one finding is unequivocally clear and consistent: courts are always substantially more likely to compel arbitration when plaintiffs commence antidiscrimination lawsuits against
defendants-movants.618
Of course, the next, narrower, and even more important question becomes
whether courts of appeals permit plaintiffs’ ethnicity or gender to substantially increase or decrease the likelihood of enforcing arbitration provisions
in standardized applications and in contracts when plaintiffs file underlying
antidiscrimination lawsuits? The unexpected answer appears in Table 4.
Consider the three “dummy” predictors that appear under the general category, “Plaintiffs in the Underlying Antidiscrimination Lawsuits.” The first
coefficient (-.0202) is negative; which means that courts of appeals are likely
615

See supra Table 3.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A and II.D and
accompanying text.
617
See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnston, Internet Business Transactions Near 450 Billion a
Day—The Truth about Digital Universe, WEBLOGIC.SYS-CON.COM, http://weblogic.sys
-con.com/node/1404879 (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/62ZN
-2RUP (“Commerce on the Internet continues to skyrocket .... IDC estimates that by
2020, business transactions on the internet—[business to business] and [business to
consumer]—will reach 450 billion a day.”).
618
See supra Tables 2 and 3.
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to compel arbitration when Anglo-American plaintiffs commence antidiscrimination lawsuits against defendants. Additionally, the second negative
probit coefficient (-.0277) indicates that federal and state appellate courts
are more likely to compel arbitration when ethnic minorities file civil
rights and antidiscrimination against defendants.
But note that although the latter probit coefficients underscore a previously uncovered and discussed trend in Tables 2 and 3, the coefficients are
not statistically significant. On the other hand, the effects of the last predictor in Table 4—“Males Only”—is statistically significant. The corresponding and negative probit coefficient (-.5028) reveals that state and federal
courts of appeals are statistically and substantially more likely to enforce
arbitration provisions in standardized applications and in contracts when
males commence antidiscrimination lawsuits against defendants.
Once more, it is important to ask: Did Congress enact FAA section 2,
intending for numerous extrajudicial variables as well as plaintiffs’ theories
of recovery to influence state courts’ decisions to enforce or not to enforce
arbitration clauses in standardized applications? Did congressional members expect a conservative or a liberal reading of FAA section 2 to influence
federal courts’ decisions to enforce or not to enforce arbitration clauses in
standardized or negotiated contracts? Based on a careful review of the FAA’s
legislative history, the answer to each question is no.
CONCLUSION
Elsewhere, a general consensus has emerged about the U.S. Supreme
Court and many lower federal courts that they readily ignore or marginalize
states’ common law and statutes—those which get in the way of conclusions and rulings that the Court and inferior judges want to deliver.619 The
statistically significant findings—which appear in this Article—lend credence to that consensus. Indisputably, the overwhelming majority of state
619
Stephen Givens, Looking Through the Wrong End of the Telescope: The Japanese
Judicial Response to Steel Partners, Murakami, and Horie, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1571, 1594
(2011); see also Shawn Eisele, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.: Paving the
Way for Cap and Trade?, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 382 (2008) (“The Supreme Court ...
found ... ‘[c]ontext counts’ when it comes to statutory interpretation .... [Therefore], the
Court did not authorize EPA to take action essentially marginalizing the PSD statute by
removing modifications from the purview of PSD.”); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law
and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 570–71 (2007)
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Milwaukee II—which removed the federal common
law of nuisance as a tool to address interstate water-pollution issues—may have influenced
the marginalization of state common law.”); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse:
The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1722–30, 1742 (1989) (arguing
that the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape using “constitutional rhetoric” and
demonstrating that the Court marginalized a federal statute by focusing on tort rhetoric).
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supreme courts have embraced two important common law rules: (1) a standalone and standardized application form is not a contract; and (2) the terms
and clauses in an application form may not alter, or contradict terms and
clauses in a totally integrated and written contract.620
In fact, after carefully studying the state supreme courts’ rulings in the
renowned contract law cases Mitchill v. Lath and Lucy v. Zehmer, even the
greater majority of motivated first-year law students understand and appreciate the importance of those legal principles.621 Yet, as reported and documented in this Article, we have learned that (1) federal appellate courts
readily enforce mandatory-arbitration clauses in standardized applications
as if the latter were binding and enforceable contracts; and (2) most federal
courts and some state courts of appeals allow arbitration clauses in various
types of stand-alone and standardized applications to modify or expand the
language in subsequent, totally integrated written contracts. But even more
unsettling, both state and federal appellate court judges consider and allow
intentionally or unintentionally extralegal factors to influence their motion
to compel arbitration decisions.
The assertion is true: in the early twentieth century, some courts refused
to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitration clauses in contracts.622 And,
in response, Congress enacted the FAA to arrest purportedly federal and
state courts’ universal bias against arbitration.623 Therefore, the FAA’s
“strong bias in favor of arbitration” is not and should not be a surprise or an
issue.624 On the other hand, the FAA was not enacted to foster an irrational
bias in favor of mandatory arbitration and barring jurors from hearing
plaintiffs’ statutory and common law claims. Yet, based on the statistically
significant findings which are reported in this Article, a striking conclusion
emerges: Most federal courts of appeals and some state appellate courts are
irrationally biased against weighing and applying intelligently common
law and statutory rules when deciding whether to enforce arbitration provisions in completed and signed application forms. Furthermore, in motion to
compel arbitration proceedings, appellate courts are significantly more likely
to be irrationally biased in another significant way—they completely ignore
the FAA’s “arising out of a written contract” test and enforce cavalierly
arbitration clauses in applications. Once more, the latter standardized forms
are not binding and enforceable contracts.
620

Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 649 (N.Y. 1928); Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516,
522 (Va. 1954).
621
Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646; Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 522.
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See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
623
Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Review of Selected
2009-2010 Insurance Decisions, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 971, 985–87 (2011).
624
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1995).
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What would be a timely and effective remedy to address the motion to
compel arbitration problems raised in this Article? Without a doubt, historical and congressional evidence is clear that Congress did not enact the
FAA to govern the enforceability of arbitration clauses in standardized application forms.625 Therefore, Congress should enact a statute that prevents
courts from enforcing arbitration provisions in paper and electronic applications for goods, services, and employment.626
In recent years, attempts have been made to enact several versions of a
proposed “Arbitration Fairness Act.”627 For example, the proffered “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013” read in pertinent part: “[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.”628 Certainly, that proposed language is broad enough to arrest a substantial and persistent judicial problem: Irrationally biased and excessively
pro-arbitration appellate courts’ propensity to ignore the FAA-related
congressional intent by (1) enforcing arbitration clauses in standardized
application; (2) marginalizing federal and state consumer protection, antidiscrimination, and civil rights statutes, and (3) undermining states’ traditional principles of contract formation, interpretation and enforcement.

625

See supra notes 388–92 and accompanying text.
After accessing Westlaw’s ALLCASES database and employing the query—
[(online /3 applied application) /p arbitrat!], the findings reveal: Many federal and state
courts have addressed whether arbitration provisions in online applications are enforceable
under the FAA. But even more disquieting, even within the same court or jurisdiction, split
decisions can be found over the enforceability of online arbitration clauses in electronic
applications. Compare Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (declaring that the arbitration clause in the online application was unenforceable
under the FAA), with Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp.2d 904, 917–18
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (enforcing the online arbitration provision in an application and requiring
class members to enter binding arbitration).
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See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(2) (2009); and, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878 1st
Session (2013).
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S. 878, 118th Cong. § 402(a) (1st Sess. 2013).
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